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Editor’s Introduction
The editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention are pleased to offer this general issue
for volume 3, number 3. The next year will bring us to volume 4, our fourth year of
publication. GSP has, we believe, offered some unique and interesting articles on the
traditional topics of genocide studies, and we think we have published some new and
innovative material. This issue continues that trend.
The first article, ‘‘Rape as Cultural Control: Consequences of Sexual Violence
against Women during Genocide’’ by Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham, is one of the first
scholarly articles on rape during genocide to appear in a genocide journal. That this is
a salient and important contemporary concern is evident in continuing revelations of
the use of rape as a weapon of intimidation both in the Darfur region of Sudan and in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Responding to this type of situation, ReidCunningham argues that ‘‘rape is used as a tactic of war and genocide because of its
physical and psychosocial consequence on individuals, families, and communities.’’ She
examines the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Darfur, and the DRC and notes
that the impact of rape spreads to the entire community. In particular, ‘‘forced
impregnation . . . represents a symbolic conquest of the woman by the rapist and, by
extension, of the raped woman’s community, family, and culture.’’
This article is interesting and important because it points out how rape is a
‘‘regulation of power through sexual means,’’ as well as ‘‘an instrument to inflict
damage through sexual means.’’ In this sense, it is an integral part of genocide. ReidCunningham fits her analysis into a theoretical framework and explicates the
complicated relationship between rape and genocide. Her exceptional analysis moves
genocide studies much farther along the path toward understanding how crimes
against women are a major part of crimes against humanity. It is also our hope that
this article will help to focus attention on this important and perennially relevant
topic.
The second article in this issue highlights another important and often ignored
aspect of genocide. Through his analysis of ‘‘Churchill in Munich,’’ Robert Melson asks
whether a ‘‘catastrophe averted is likely to be viewed as a catastrophe.’’ As Melson
argues, ‘‘politicians hesitate to act to prevent catastrophe in general, and genocide in
particular, because if they act decisively and yet fail to prevent a humanitarian
catastrophe they can be blamed for failure, while if they succeed at prevention they are
unlikely to be rewarded for their success.’’ To illustrate this idea, Melson poses this
question: If Winston Churchill instead of Neville Chamberlain had gone to meet Adolf
Hitler in Munich, and if he had succeeded in averting World War II, would he have
been accused of bringing the world to the brink of war? Melson calls this the ‘‘the
paradox of genocide prevention.’’ As he notes,
the trouble is that no generation seems to know how to learn from the past and avoid
the catastrophes of the future. In the context of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unintended
consequences that is the future, political leaders do not wish to incur the costs of
prevention. These costs may be too high, endangering their political survival, while the
political benefits may be too low or even nonexistent.

While Melson’s essay raises important and interesting questions about genocide
prevention, it does not directly address the problem of proving a negative. That is, how
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can one ever know what was prevented, and how does one know what might have
occurred? Such speculation is, of course, at the heart of the modern debate over
genocide prevention.
The third article in this issue, ‘‘Theorizing Destruction: Reflections on the State of
comparative Genocide Theory’’ by Maureen Hiebert, is a needed review of some
of the recent literature in what Hiebert refers to as the ‘‘young discipline that seeks to
understand an ‘old scourge.’’’ Hiebert’s focus is on the ‘‘comparative analysis of
multiple cases of genocide’’ and, in particular, on ‘‘comparative genocide theory.’’
Hiebert believes, in fact, that the focus on definitions of genocide leaves
‘‘comparative genocide studies under-theorized relative to other disciplines in the
social science and humanities.’’ She progresses through the different approaches,
summarizing and analyzing each. Her thorough examination is too detailed for this
brief introduction; her conclusion is that while ‘‘comparative genocide theory has
flourished over the last twenty years,’’ we now need to ‘‘concentrate on how we
theorize, specifically how we create comparative theories and how we test those
theories using the comparative method.’’ Overall, she points out, genocide scholars
must find a way to ‘‘bridge the gap between abstract theorizing . . . and concrete policy
making.’’
The piece that follows constitutes a major shift in attention. In ‘‘‘Why are we
learning this?’ Does Studying the Holocaust Encourage Better Citizenship Values?’’
Henry Maitles examines the ‘‘relationship between learning about the Holocaust and
the development of positive values.’’ Maitles’ research was designed to find out
whether learning about the Holocaust affected students’ attitudes on contemporary
issues such as racism and discrimination. After testing a cohort of about 100 students
(aged 11 and 12) who studied the Holocaust and comparing them with peers who did
not, he found that the group who studied the Holocaust ‘‘maintained more positive
values than they had before their lessons on the Holocaust and were more positive
than their peers.’’
Again shifting topics, the fifth article, by Wibke Timmerman, examines the impact
of hate speech as it relates to genocide. In ‘‘Counteracting Hate Speech as a Way of
Preventing Genocidal Violence,’’ Timmermann argues that hate speech precedes and is
part of ethnic violence and genocide. Her basic argument that ‘‘vicious, systematic, and
state-organized hate propaganda should be criminalized under international law’’ is
based on several justifications for ‘‘proscribing hate speech,’’ including the protection of
human dignity and of the equality rights of victims of such speech; the need to ‘‘protect
public peace’’; and the danger that hate speech may create a ‘‘climate of hate and
violence directed against a specific group.’’
Although Timmermann maintains that this approach respects ‘‘the important
right to freedom of speech,’’ and attempts to elaborate that argument, her discussion
does not sufficiently counter the fact that legal systems that protect free speech within
their constitutions, in particular the United States, would have a difficult time
justifying the approach she advocates. Her argument that hate speech prepares
populations for crimes planned by the country’s leadership is not universal, since hate
speech of many different forms may be found in most societies, the majority of which
have not committed genocide. Therefore, while this article opens an important
discussion, it does not definitively answer the important questions posed by the author
or by those interested in the prevention of genocide and the preservation of free speech.
That discussion continues, and we hope it will produce more articles to be submitted
to GSP.
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The final article in this volume is our second Research Note. We publish Research
Notes when the submission is not sufficiently developed to be included as a full-length
article but contains important material on a topic currently being researched by the
author. Research Notes highlight ongoing research and address topics about which
little is known.
In the present case, ‘‘The Greek Relief Committee: America’s Response to the
Greek Genocide’’ by Nikolaos Hlamides examines the role of an aid organization based
in New York City that worked from 1917 through 1921 to administer aid to the
Ottoman Greek population ‘‘in response to the genocide of the Greeks in the Ottoman
Empire.’’ Hlamides highlights a relatively ignored and largely unknown chapter in the
genocides of the twentieth century.
As we submit this last issue of volume 3 and plan for volume 4, we trust that
you have found an array of interesting and innovative material in Genocide Studies
and Prevention. As far as we are aware, we were the first journal to publish an article
on rape in genocide; the first to call for a change in international law to add an entire
new category of crimes, as called for by David Scheffer (‘‘atrocity crimes’’); the first to
publish a symposium on international law and genocide that revolved around this
proposal; and the first to publish a special issue on the aftermath of genocide—in
addition to the many other accomplishments that characterize GSP’s three short years
of publication. We trust that you will renew your membership in the International
Association of Genocide Studies to continue to receive Genocide Studies and
Prevention as perhaps the best means to stay up to date on the latest research in
the field and to help support the continued publication of the journal. We, the editors,
want to thank you for your continued support as readers, contributors, and reviewers.
With that in mind, we are proud to offer GSP 3:3 to our readers.
Herb Hirsch
GSP Co-editor
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Rape as a Weapon of Genocide
Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham
PhD candidate, School of Social Welfare, University of
California—Berkeley
Sexual violence against women during war and genocide is a pressing problem.
Rape is used as a tactic of war and genocide because of its physical and
psychosocial consequences for individuals, families, and communities. The
physical and emotional sequelae of individual assaults are magnified when rape
is committed on a mass scale, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1996), Rwanda
(1994), and Darfur, Sudan (2003–present). The victimization of raped women
affects the community through the collective responses of survivors and their
families, friends, and neighbors. Forced intercourse and impregnation represent a
symbolic conquest of the woman by the rapist. This conquest becomes generalized to
the whole population as survivors, witnesses, families, and communities internalize rape as an assault on their collective consciousness.
Keywords: rape, genocide, violence against women, sexual violence
Sexual violence against women is abhorrently prevalent in the modern world, and the
incidence of rape increases during active conflicts. Within this context, sexual violence
may be defined as sexual activity that manifests aggression or causes physical or
psychological damage. Rape is a particular type of sexual violence: a penetrative
sexual assault. Penetration may occur using an object or a human body part, and it is
not limited to vaginal copulation (oral and oral penetration may also be categorized as
rape). Men or women can be raped; men or women can be rapists. This analysis focuses
on sexual violence and rape against women and girls during armed conflict and
genocide.
Within the scope of this article, the term ‘‘mass rape’’ refers to the military strategy
of widespread, systematic sexual violence and rape perpetrated intentionally against
civilians. Although rape and sexual violence may be perpetrated against any member
of the population, including men and children, discussion in this article is limited to
the impact of sexual violence against women and girls. This focus on female rape
survivors allows the space needed to present a particular set of problems unique
to rape of women and girls, such as reproductive control through forced pregnancy.
In this analysis, living women who have been raped are referred to as survivors, while
those who died are referred to as victims.
Rape has characterized every contemporary and historical war: ‘‘rape, pillage, and
burn’’ is a familiar phrase in the modern and ancient vernacular.1 Common
terminology used to discuss sexuality, rape, and war belies the cultural connections
between the concept of sexual violence against women and the concept of war.
Symbolic conquests are made in the bedroom and the boardroom, while on the
battlefield brutal military invasions may be described as rapes.2 The rules or norms of
practice during wartime vary across time and place, but the soldiers’ prerogative to
rape conquered women has traditionally been an accepted rule of war. To the victor go
the spoils can mean that the victor has ‘‘the right to exert violence against women . . .
during campaigns of conquest or in the immediate post-war period.’’3
Allison Ruby Reid-Cunningham, ‘‘Rape as a Weapon of Genocide.’’ Genocide Studies and
Prevention 3, 3 (December 2008): 279–296. ! 2008 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
doi:10.3138/gsp.3.3.279
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Aside from the privilege offered to conquering soldiers, it is often assumed that
rape occurring in times of war is attributable to the wild abandon experienced by men
in the midst of societal collapse. While it is undoubtedly true that some men rape
during war or ethnic conflict for non-strategic reasons, including the general
breakdown of societal norms for appropriate behavior, rape is intentionally used to
pursue military, territorial, social, and political gains during war. Sexual violence is
increasingly employed as a tactic in violent conflict because of its destructive effects on
individuals, families, and communities.4
Feminists and other scholars assert that the act of rape regulates power through
sexual means. The rapist’s sexuality is not an end in itself but merely an instrument to
inflict damage through sexual means: rapists speak of the experience as an aggressive
act of dominance, associated with power, rather than as a particularly sexual act.
Because of this dynamic, rape and other forms of sexual violence may be used to
regulate power relations between genders, classes, or groups. Sexual mutilation and
torture during armed conflict plays a role in regulating social norms and behavior.
Sexual violence and rape are powerful social weapons that have been used by
government agents and other social movements in the perpetration of genocide and
territorial war. The sexual nature of the violence increases its impact because of the
cultural and social context in which the rape occurs.

Rape and Genocide
Sexual violence is often a cornerstone of genocidal campaigns because of its
devastating effects on women, families, and communities. Genocide is defined by
the United Nations as ‘‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’’5 These acts may include killing, causing
serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to
bring about the group’s physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent
births, or forcibly removing children from the group. Rape is a forced sexual
penetration that can cause death, lead to serious bodily and mental harm, bring
about the physical destruction of the group, and impede births. Thus rape can be
considered an act of genocide, and it has been recognized as such by international
criminal courts. Patricia Sellers, legal advisor for gender-related crimes at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has stated, ‘‘now
we can say rape is a crime, a crime against humanity, or a war crime, a constituent
part of genocide.’’6 These landmark prosecutions paved the way for future perpetrators
of genocidal rape to be held accountable for their actions.
The recent UN Security Council resolution on ‘‘Women and Peace and Security’’
(Resolution 1820) draws on the precedents set by previous ad hoc tribunals, statutes,
and resolutions on the protection of women from sexual violence during and after
armed conflict. This resolution, which was unanimously signed, draws attention to the
fact that women and girls are ‘‘particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence,
including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or
forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group.’’7 It categorically
condemns ‘‘in the strongest terms all sexual violence committed against civilians in
armed conflicts, in particular women and children,’’ and refers to previous documents,
such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, that echo this
condemnation.8
In addition to addressing the obvious consequences for individual women and girls
who are raped, the resolution calls attention to the important and often overlooked fact
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that sexual violence against civilian populations ‘‘can significantly effect situations of
armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security.’’9
Because ending sexual violence against women and girls contributes to ‘‘the
maintenance of international peace and security,’’ the resolution contains a demand
for the ‘‘immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of
sexual violence against civilians with immediate effect.’’10
Security Council Resolution 1820 clarifies in no uncertain terms that rape and
other forms of sexual violence ‘‘can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity,
or a constitutive act with respect to genocide.’’11 Sexual violence and mass rape in
particular are used as a strategy of genocide because they can bring about physical
destruction of the group through the desecration of individuals. Mass rape prevents
births within the target group through damage to the reproductive capacities or the
social fitness of women; in-group births may be prevented through forced impregnation. Children born of rape are seen by the mother’s community as a soiling the group’s
bloodlines, while the perpetrators may consider the woman and the child to have been
‘‘ethnically cleansed’’ through the assault.12 Many communities believe that the
survivor has been penetrated and thus tainted by ‘‘the enemy’’: a child born of rape is
generally considered an enemy or a pariah in the community.
Rape and sexual violence may be particularly destructive when they occur within
the context of ethnic cleansing or genocide, and it is necessary to attend to factors that
amplify the significance ascribed to these acts. Rape can be a strategy of war, ethnic
cleansing, and genocide because it reduces the civilian population through a variety of
practical means while instilling fear, submission, compliance, and flight from areas
of contested territory. During the Rwandan Genocide, there appear to have been
‘‘no specific orders for rape’’; however, ‘‘innuendo, jokes, and propaganda were
interpreted as intended’’ and provided a license for Hutu men to rape Tutsi women.13
The word kubohoza (‘‘to liberate’’) was used to refer to rape; this word was also heavily
associated with the political rhetoric of the extremist Hutu Power movement,
indicating the relationship between rape and the social control of Hutus over Tutsis
during the Rwandan Genocide.
Médicins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) describes rape as a ‘‘weapon
used to destabilize or even break a particular ethnic, national, or religious group or to
‘ethnically cleanse’ a whole society.’’14 Survivors, family members, and witnesses tend
to avoid traumatic reminders such as the location of the rape: brutal and public rapes
remove the desire to return to the areas where the traumatic events took place for
large numbers of people at once.15 When rapes are committed in a widespread and
systematic fashion, these assaults on individual women come to represent an assault
on the community.16
In the context of ethnic cleansing and genocide, the trauma of rape may be
intentionally maximized by the perpetrator(s) to cause damage or death and to send a
message. Physical abuse or torture, repeated assaults or gang rapes over a period of
days or weeks, forced pregnancy and childbirth, the combination of rape with the
murder or torture of the survivor’s loved ones, public humiliation of the survivor and
her family, and verbal abuse of the survivor and her community contribute to the
devastation.17 Mass rapes are combined with organized slaughter, looting, burning,
pillaging, and starvation for exponential impact.
Rape has always been committed during the wars of known history, and it
continues to be a pressing problem in modern genocides as its use becomes more
widespread and systematic.18 But women are more than just the spoils of war or the
281

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:3 December 2008

passive victims of genocide: civilian women are the material that war is waged with,
and women may be used in a variety of strategic ways. Many more civilians than
soldiers perish in modern wars, and women are ‘‘tactical targets of particular
significance’’ because of their role within the family and social structure.19 Women are
singled out as principal targets for the most effective destruction of a culture because of
the centrality of their social roles in the family and community.
In military conflicts, physical and sexual abuse of women is part of male
communication: displays of machismo are enacted through violence against women
who are associated with the target males. The rape of women carries a man-to-man
message, showing that the targeted men are not able to protect their women.20 This
male communication is especially salient in cultures that consider women to be the
property or the social responsibility of their husbands or fathers. Men may interpret
the sexual assault of ‘‘their’’ women as a direct attack on their manhood and their own
integrity. In this way, ‘‘women are used as political pawns, as symbols of the potency of
the men to whom they belong.’’21
‘‘Memories of wartime atrocities, like all memories, are local; they are embedded in
the psyche of individual survivors and witnesses and, through the process of retelling
and memorialization, they are deposited in the collective memory of the community.’’22
Rape survivors and the children born of rape evoke these memories for the community,
and the community’s desire to avoid or exclude survivors may be partially an attempt
to shield itself from the reminder of the cultural defeat and the internalization of the
assault of its members as an assault on the community. The experiences of individual
women are magnified and become applicable to the whole population through these
processes of collective memory, deterioration of family and social structures, and the
internalization of the assault against the community by its members.

The Scope of the Problem
It is a challenge to obtain an accurate census of any kind during armed conflict or
genocide, and collecting data about sexual violence is fraught with difficulties even
under ‘‘normal’’ circumstances. Thus, we do not know exactly how many women are at
risk for wartime rape; however, estimates reveal alarming trends for women’s health
and mental health in the context of global violence. In contemporary wars and
genocides, mass rape is used as a strategy to leave vast numbers of severely
traumatized survivors in their wake.
Sexual violence and rape occurred during World War I and were prevalent during
World War II. The Nazis are reported to have branded some women with the
inscription ‘‘Whore for Hitler’s troops,’’ and it was common for persecuted women to be
raped or sexually assaulted in concentration camps and elsewhere.23 The Tokyo
Tribunal stated that the Japanese Army raped between 20,000 and 80,000 women
during the ‘‘Rape of Nanking’’ in 1937 and enslaved 100,000 to 200,000 ‘‘comfort
women’’ who were forcibly imprisoned and raped to serve soldiers’ sexual needs during
the war.24 Soviet soldiers reportedly raped more than 2 million German women during
the final stages of World War II, and hospital statistics indicate that between 95,000
and 130,000 women were raped in Berlin alone. Other modern conflicts have featured
mass rape, but it is difficult to obtain credible statistics documenting these atrocities.
One well-documented crisis of mass rape occurred in 1971 in Bangledesh, where it is
reported that 200,000 women were raped during conflicts that erupted that year.25
An estimated 25,000 to 50,000 women were systematically raped during the
Balkan Wars of the 1990s; it has been reported that up to 20,000 of these women were
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forcibly impregnated and that more than 5,000 ‘‘bad memory babies’’ were abandoned
on hillsides or killed in the aftermath.26 The 1994 Rwandan Genocide left an estimated
250,000 to 500,000 rape survivors in a single summer; more than 2,500 infants were
born the following spring and abandoned. This continues to be a pressing issue, as
mass rape and genocide have recently been reported in the Darfur region of the Sudan
and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Reputable organizations such as
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and UNICEF have been describing the
dire situation for women in these conflicts for several years, yet both conflicts continue
to claim women’s lives.27
Rape has been recognized as a war crime, as a crime against humanity, and as an
act of genocide because of its use in conflicts including the collapse of the former
Yugoslavia (1991–1999), the Rwandan Genocide (1994), and the current situations in
Darfur, Sudan (2003–present), and the DRC (1996–present). These cases are
highlighted here because they are well-documented, contemporary ethnic conflicts
with a particularly sexualized method of perpetration. In all cases, perpetrators used
mass rape, forced impregnation, and sexual torture as strategies of cultural control
over ethnically different populations.

Rape during Genocide and Armed Conflict
Rape does not have constant functions over time and in all societies, because sexual
violence is highly contextualized by individual, situational, social, and cultural factors.
It is important to contextualize the meaning of rape in terms of these social and
cultural realities, as well as in terms of the individual and situational factors that
mediate the function of sexual violence. Most feminist discourse on rape has focused
on macro-system factors such as patriarchy and misogyny, but it is important to
investigate, describe, and discuss the impact of other factors. The social systems and
structures that form the framework of society influence all aspects of human behavior:
factors such as poverty, low socioeconomic status, unemployment, and isolation of
women and families have been linked to increased prevalence of sexual violence
against women.28 A nested, ecological model conceptualizes rape as a multifaceted
phenomenon grounded in the interplay among personal, situational, and sociocultural
elements.29
Underpinning every community or group is a broad set of cultural values and
beliefs that ‘‘permeate and inform the other three layers of the social ecology,’’
operating through their influence on the other levels.30 A cultural ethic of solving
problems with violence predisposes communities to high levels of violence against
women, and particularly of sexual assault. The context and history of war can provide
a cultural framework in which the primary strategy used to resolve conflicts is violent
or aggressive behavior, and civilian women become targets for sexual violence in
accordance with this cultural principle of violent problem solving. Active genocide can
be considered a period during which the cultural value of violent problem solving is
most strongly enacted and reinforced.
Sexual violence on the scale of mass rape could not be explained without some
accounting for the anger and hate directed against the women who are targeted for
these attacks. Theorists have asserted that the rape of women by men is made possible
by the undercurrent of anger, aggression, and hostility toward women that is part of
the cultural landscape. Rigid gender roles have been linked to a high incidence of rape
in a culture or community; similarly, low levels of rape are related to a lack of strongly
defined gender roles. A sense of male entitlement or ownership of women is another
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predictor of high levels of violence against women. Culturally ingrained norms
regarding male dominance over women allow men to rape without social consequences.
In cultures that generally approve of physical punishment for women (in many
societies, it is perfectly acceptable for a man to hit a woman for trespasses ranging
from forgetting a meal to committing adultery), the prevalence of rape and sexual
assault is correspondingly elevated.
Wartime rape has been strongly linked to constructions of masculinity offered to
soldiers and combatants. Social constructions of masculinity are essential to any
discussion of sexual violence against women, and constructions of masculinity during
wartime are particularly salient. Military service functions as a rite of passage
for many young men, through which they attain an adult male status and identity.
A military sociologist cited by Ruth Seifert describes how the values associated with
the ideal of sexual virility in the exclusively masculine surroundings of the army
become primary for the soldier’s conceptions of himself, as well as for his social
status.31
The social context also provides soldiers with norms that maintain perceived
masculine status by the other soldiers. These social values and ideals define the
identity of soldiers, and create inner tensions because the soldier is constantly
confronted with threats to masculinity (such as emotionality, empathy, horror, fear)
and must preserve the construction of masculinity in the face of these ‘‘non-masculine’’
experiences. These cultural conceptions of masculinity as sexually aggressive may
increase the likelihood of violence against women because of the normalizing of male
dominance and aggression, and the desire to be accepted by other sexually aggressive
males. It has been shown that males with sexually aggressive peers are more likely to
report having raped or sexually coerced a woman.32
Sexual violence includes attributes associated with hyper-masculinity (strength,
power, forcefulness, domination, and toughness), so the act of rape may be considered a
behavior that supports and validates this conception of masculinity. In some social
groups, particularly in the context of war and ethnic conflict, rape can also function as
a ritualized validation of a soldier’s male status and identity. The hyper-masculinized
version of appropriate behavior for men links power and sexuality with violence; these
linkages can have dangerous consequences for women, who may be the targets
of ‘‘masculine’’ displays of sexual violence and domination. Relating masculinity to
dominance or toughness (which are usually important constructions of a soldier’s
masculinity) is associated with cultures in which peacetime rape is prevalent. It stands
to reason that this value of hyper-masculinity could become exaggerated during an
active conflict and could increase rates of sexual violence against women. Social
pressure may function to spur on men’s hyper-masculinized acts of sexual violence in
an attempt to prove their manhood or to obtain the group’s esteem. Analysis of gang
rapes provides further corroboration of the role of peer pressure and social norms
of masculinity in the etiology of rape. The main purpose of gang rape appears to be
proving one’s masculinity to the group through the display of sexual violence.33
Attachment to other male peers who encourage abuse or violence against women is
a predictive factor for males who abuse women sexually, physically, and psychologically. In this way, the macro-system value of male dominance and the situational
factor of peer pressure (among peers who have all been exposed to the same violent
cultural construction of manhood) have a combined influence on individual men’s
choices about whether or not to participate in sexual violence. This provides a strong
rationale for the concept that men rape during war because of peer pressure or social
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norms relating to violence against women, and sexual violence in particular is a way to
demonstrate masculine power to the group.
Acknowledging the influence of situational factors or personal history in no way
exculpates the perpetrators of violence, nor does it reduce the salience of macro-level
factors such as cultural notions of masculinity and male dominance over women.
A comprehensive analysis of sexual violence must recognize the primacy of culturally
constructed messages about masculinity/femininity and gender/power roles while also
accounting for social, situational, and individual factors. Those who have experienced
abuse, witnessed violence, and experienced previous trauma during childhood are both
more likely to perpetrate sexual violence and more likely to be victims of sexual
violence. Individual factors such as upbringing, family of origin, genetics, and previous
experiences have been linked to levels of resilience and of post-traumatic stress.

Effects of Rape
The simplest and most direct way in which rape exerts control over communities is
through its impact on population demographics: mass rape directly decreases
population because many women are raped and beaten to death. It is common for a
woman to lose consciousness and die during or shortly after rape. Survivors abandoned
in varying levels of consciousness and distress may die of exposure, dehydration,
or starvation or from animal attacks. Many are beaten to death or shot after being
sexually assaulted; some victims even beg their abusers to kill them.34 Many survivors
of genocidal rape commit suicide following their ordeal; those who become pregnant
often die in an attempt to abort the fetus. It is also common in some cultures for a
woman to be killed by her own family or community after experiencing rape, because of
the shame the assault brings on the family and the community.
Many cultures consider rape worse than death, because the survivor lives through
the experience, causing further trauma and suffering to the individual. Many societies
consider a woman to be destroyed after a rape has occurred, so women are not
encouraged to heal or to consider that their lives can continue after such an assault.
Rape is used during genocide because it accomplishes two goals at once: the woman is
effectively ‘‘killed,’’ or loses the will to live, yet goes on living among her people as a
constant reminder of their downfall.35

Infection and Illness
Infections and illnesses such as HIV, hepatitis, and syphilis are common in survivors of
wartime sexual assault. Survivors are also more likely to experience acute and chronic
health problems such as diabetes, asthma, and arthritis. Somatic complaints,
especially unexplained abdominal pain, are common among survivors of sexual
assault.36 Sexually transmitted diseases take on a particular salience during ethnic
conflict and genocide. Transmission of HIV through mass rape may be used as a
strategy of population reduction, and unintentional spreading of HIV is also facilitated
by mass rape. The virus may be transmitted at elevated levels when violent sexual
attacks involving heightened contact with blood and other bodily fluids occur on
a large scale. In Rwanda, an estimated 70 to 90% of rape survivors have contracted
HIV/AIDS. Given that more than 500,000 women were raped, the health crisis created
by this epidemic is staggering. Advocacy groups argue that the 1994 genocide never
ended: it is still claiming victims today.
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Injuries
Sexual violence can have numerous medical consequences, including internal bleeding,
fistulas, incontinence, and life-threatening injuries. Survivors’ health and reproductive capacity may be damaged by physical injuries received during rape, including torn
vaginal walls that result in chronic fecal or urinary incontinence through the vaginal
canal. In all the contexts discussed here, extreme forms of genital mutilation were a
common feature of rape; their purpose was to cause pain and suffering as well as
to create permanent sexual scarring that would make the women unacceptable
as wives in their own communities. Breasts were often cut or severed (this practice was
particularly prevalent in Rwanda), and many women were gutted after their assault.
These sexualized scars made it impossible for survivors to hide the fact that they had
been raped. Some of these women survived, but there is little opportunity for proper
medical treatment or reconstruction. In areas where sanitation is questionable, such
injuries increase survivors’ vulnerability to infections. These physical consequences of
rape and sexual torture are painful, embarrassing, and stigmatizing. Often survivors’
future reproductive capacity is affected by violent physical injuries received during
their rape, which has significant consequences for the community’s ability to
repopulate.

Pregnancy
Children of rape and the mothers who bear them are stigmatized and socially punished
within their own communities. The children are rejected because they are viewed as
the ‘‘enemy,’’ thanks to their paternity and the circumstances of their conception.
Women and their communities reject babies born of rape because they represent
the humiliation of the mother and of the culture itself. Sometimes communities will
re-accept a raped woman if she aborts, abandons, or destroys her baby.
An estimated 5,000 infants were abandoned or killed in the aftermath of genocidal
rape in the Balkans.37 An estimated 2,500 ‘‘bad memory babies’’ were born following
the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, and many were abandoned.38 Many pregnant survivors
seek abortions, but obtaining an abortion is difficult in times of war and in
conservative, religious countries. Rape resulting in pregnancy during war exposes
women to potentially unsafe abortions and to traumatic, complicated childbirths in
areas without adequate medical care.39
Pregnancy may be an unintended consequence of rape, but forced impregnation
may also be used as a strategy of cultural control. The intention of forced pregnancy
is ‘‘to alienate women’s reproductive as well as productive rights [through] rape to
impregnate, making women bear children for the ‘enemy’ community’’ and making
them unfit or unable to bear children of their own ethnicity.40 Symbolically, forced
pregnancy represents the conquest of the woman’s body by ‘‘enemy sperm.’’41
Impregnated women cannot help delivering the raping culture’s message of conquest,
as they cannot help delivering the children of rape, and they are condemned for both.
Forced pregnancy was a central strategy of the Serb forces during the genocide in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991–1995), with detention camps established for the purpose of
sexually assaulting women. Bosnian rape survivors frequently reported Serbian
rapists ‘‘triumphantly jeering after reaching orgasm that the woman was now carrying
‘Serb seed’ and would produce a ‘Serb baby.’’’42 Pregnant Muslims were freed from rape
camps with the announcement, ‘‘‘You’re going to have a Serb baby’ . . . Buses filled with
women in the sixth, seventh, or later month of pregnancy [were] sent back over enemy
lines, usually with cynical inscriptions on the vehicles regarding the children about to
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be born.’’43 These forcibly impregnated women were living symbols of the conquest:
beaten and raped, barely alive, their abdomens swollen with so-called Serb babies,
they stumbled home only to be discarded, shunned, or killed.
Rape with intent to impregnate is a strategy used by the Janjaweed and military
officers perpetrating mass rape in Darfur. Sudanese children’s ethnicity is derived
solely from their fathers; it is believed that an Arab father produces an Arab baby. This
symbolic and cultural information becomes a weapon of genocide when applied in this
manner. As one aid worker in Darfur has stated, ‘‘Everyone knows how the father
carries the lineage in the culture. They want more Arab babies to take the land.’’44
One survivor reported that the Janjaweed said to her, ‘‘Black girl, you are too dark.
You are like a dog. We want to make a light baby . . . You get out of this area and leave
the child when it’s made.’’45

Psychosocial Problems
Sexual assault can affect long-term physical, psychological, and relational health, and
further inquiry will continue to elucidate the relationships between resilience,
vulnerability, and contextual factors in the development of the traumatic response.
Mass rape causes psychological and social problems for women and their families, but
it is difficult to assess the true level of devastation left in the wake of these brutal
campaigns. Assessment or intervention services may not be available to women in war
zones, refugee camps, or internally displaced persons camps.
Mass rape survivors have been exposed to ‘‘interactive traumatic stressors’’ such as
detention in rape camps, forced pregnancy, death of loved ones, threats to survival,
torture, war-related illnesses or injuries, ‘‘loss of home and community,’’ ‘‘stresses
of migration and dislocation, cultural shock, lack of familiar support systems, and fear
of deportation.’’46 The survivor’s sense of structure and safety may be shattered by the
compound traumas she has experienced. Rapes may be combined with physical abuse
and torture, starvation, verbal abuse, and other forms of domination and humiliation
in order to maximize the trauma to the survivor. Weapons such as guns, axes, and
whips have commonly been used to intimidate and threaten women in Darfur, while
machetes and AK-47s were wielded in Rwanda.47
The survivor’s psychological response may be influenced by the context and level of
brutality of the assault. Rapists often use dehumanizing epithets featuring racialized
or gendered slurs directed at the raped woman and her community. In Darfur, ‘‘slave’’
and ‘‘black slave’’ are common ways the perpetrators refer to African women from the
Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups; in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslims women
were commonly called ‘‘Turks’’ and Croats were called ‘‘Ustasha whores.’’48 This form
of ethnically oriented verbal abuse increases the suffering of the raped woman and is
considered a message to others of her group who may be forced to witness the assault.
The degree to which survivors’ mental health is affected by the trauma of sexual
assault varies by severity, type, frequency, and degree of physical injury and perceived
threat to life, as well as varying based on whether the survivor received medical or
mental-health intervention. The biological outcome of rape may influence the severity
of psychological symptoms: rape without impregnation, rape resulting in pregnancy,
and pregnancy followed by abortion or by childbirth result in differing levels of
emotional trauma for survivors. Pregnancy followed by childbirth is associated with
the most severe levels of distress.49
Increasingly severe levels of impairment may develop from the combination
of sexual assault and a ‘‘lifetime history of multiple traumas.’’50 The intersections of
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gender, class, ethnicity, and previous victimization history, combined with exposure to
a ‘‘pervasive toxic culture’’ that condones violence against women, may increase the
traumatic response.51 Individual and contextual factors such as genetics, resilience,
and social support may mediate the development of psychological problems following
exposure to trauma.
Dissociation, psychotic symptoms, sexual dysfunction, and self-harming behaviors
are commonly reported by survivors. Sexual abuse has been associated with the
development of borderline personality disorder or complex PTSD. Elevated levels of
substance abuse, depression, eating disorders, and anxiety have been noted.52
Survivors are also likely to experience other types of psychosocial distress, including
isolation; difficulty relating to others; low self-esteem or self-worth; and feelings of
objectification, guilt, and self-blame.

Post-traumatic Stress
The diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was adopted in 1980 to describe
the condition of Vietnam veterans who reported great psychosocial distress long
after the traumatic events causing distress had ceased. The most essential feature of
post-traumatic stress is exposure to a traumatic event in which the ‘‘person
experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved
actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self
or others.’’53 This traumatic stressor is generally outside the range of typical human
experiences.54 Although the sequelae of sexual assault are influenced by the social and
cultural context in which the assault occurs, one of the persistent characteristics of
rape survivors is the development of these re-experiencing, avoidant, and arousal
responses to post-traumatic reminders of the event.
Survivors of sexual assault constitute the largest group of people currently
diagnosed with PTSD, and rape is among the most salient PTSD risk factors.55 The
American Psychiatric Association notes that ‘‘survivors of rape, military combat
and captivity, and ethnically or politically motivated internment and genocide’’ have
been found to have the highest rates of post-traumatic stress disorder.56 People who
endure repeated, prolonged trauma or imprisonment are particularly vulnerable to the
development of intrusive symptoms that may linger for decades after the experiences,
as has been demonstrated among groups of Korean War prisoners and survivors of
Nazi concentration camps.57
Witnesses to rape and torture may also develop post-traumatic symptoms or
PTSD, particularly if they have a relationship with the survivor/victim or the
perpetrator. The terrorizing effects of rape are often exploited when perpetrators force
family members or others to witness acts of sexual violence and torture.58 A person
diagnosed with PTSD may have ‘‘witnessed or been confronted by a traumatic event,’’
without directly experiencing a threat to him- or herself.59
Public rape was regularly used in Bosnia-Herzegovina as an act of community
intimidation, because ‘‘the psychiatric consequences in [witnesses] can be very
pronounced, sometimes even greater than in primary victims’’ of rape.60 Rape
committed in front of the survivor’s immediate family results in severe trauma
for both survivor and witnesses; public violence and practices of sexual mutilation
exert extreme social pressure on local populations. Family and community members
may have varying responses to witnessing rape, and they often reject rape survivors
and children born of rape because of their power to remind witnesses of the collective
trauma.
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Traumatic Reminders Causing Flight
One of the hallmark features of PTSD is the sufferer’s tendency to avoid reminders of
the traumatic event, including places, people, and things that are associated with the
trauma. Survivors and witnesses of rape have a tendency to avoid the location where
the rape occurred. The perpetrators of these rapes use the common knowledge that
people tend to avoid places where terrible things have happened to them to encourage
flight from areas of contested territory. In this way, rape can be used ‘‘as an instrument
of forced exile’’ to drive the population from certain areas.61 Perpetrators of wartime
rape may deliberately maximize the level of trauma to survivors and witnesses in
order to disperse the civilian population.
Rape causes survivors, witnesses, and other community or family members to
leave their homelands. Bosnian women were raped in public in order to ‘‘spread fear
and induce the flight’’ of non-Serb inhabitants of contested lands: it was common for
the Serb-controlled Jugoslav National Army (JNA) to enter a village and rape every
girl and woman in succession, from the youngest child to the oldest grandmother.62
Survivors and witnesses do not wish to return to the scene of the crime, so public
displays of sexual violence initiate mass exodus from contested territory. After the
genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda, some perpetrators have continued to brutalize their
past victims, and many survivors are simply too afraid to return to their homes
because of what they experienced or witnessed there. Others have relocated to the
areas where the crimes occurred, and a large number report frequent traumatic
reminders.63
Public rapes are common in Darfur, with family members or the wider community
witnessing the rape and torture. Anyone who intervenes may be beaten, stabbed, or
killed. The rape survivor may feel betrayed by the witnesses who failed to protect her;
those who witnessed and did not defend the raped woman may feel shame, which they
may express as aversion, anger, or even hatred toward the survivor. Exposing the
community and family to the rape of women magnifies the intensity and complexity of
the traumatic response while exponentially increasing the number of survivors who
may be psychosocially affected by these events.

Social Problems Associated with Post-traumatic Stress
Survivors of sexual assault often experience social problems, which may be related
to the psychological trauma of rape. Some of the symptoms of PTSD have an impact
on the survivor’s ability to relate socially. Among the symptoms listed as criteria
for a PTSD diagnosis are ‘‘feelings of detachment or estrangement from others,’’
‘‘markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities,’’ ‘‘restricted
affect,’’ ‘‘a sense of foreshortened future,’’ ‘‘irritability or outbursts of anger,’’ and
‘‘hypervigilance.’’64
Survivors may experience dramatic mood swings or changes in personality because
of the profound sense of loss and grief that they experience; these changes can be very
upsetting for family members and friends, who may withdraw from the survivor in the
aftermath of these difficult mood swings or negative encounters. Sometimes the
survivor’s family members, friends, or neighbors do not comprehend the magnitude
of the assault’s impact on the survivor. This lack of understanding or awareness of
the traumatic response on the part of friends and family can make survivors feel
isolated and misunderstood. Because of the impact of these symptoms on their social
functioning and the reactions of others to their changed behaviors, survivors with
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PTSD may have difficulty in reestablishing relationships, and particularly intimate
relationships, after the violence.
Sexual assault is associated with ‘‘increased difficulties across several domains of
interpersonal functioning.’’65 Survivors tend to report smaller support networks,
more social isolation, and less emotional support than other women. Survivors often
report difficulty establishing and maintaining trusting relationships after the rape,
and this difficulty with trust may manifest itself in social isolation or self-harming
behaviors.
Within the realm of romantic and sexual relationships, this lack of trust can be
particularly problematic. Clinicians have reported that female survivors of maleperpetrated rape may identify all males with torturers and rapists.66 Sexuality may
be perceived as a threatening reminder of a brutal victimization, and the survivor may
be unwilling or unable to have sex with her husband or partner. One survivor, whose
perspective echoes those of many others, reported that ‘‘for me there’s no such thing as
sex anymore; that’s all in my past.’’67
PTSD symptoms may decrease or eliminate interest and participation in sex,
which can cause difficulties in intimate relationships. Sexual trauma, in particular,
may lead to an aversion to sexuality in both survivors and witnesses of rape. Because
aversion to sexuality is not a desired characteristic for wives in most cultures, this may
place survivors at risk for rejection by current or prospective spouses. Decreased
interest and participation in sex also reduces the likelihood that a woman will give
birth to children within her community.
Mass rapes may be designed to maximize trauma to survivors, witnesses, and the
targeted community as a whole. Sexual violence perpetrated in public or on a large
scale is ‘‘intended to disable an enemy by destroying the bonds of family and society’’
through the perpetration of trauma and stigma.68 Through these social means,
the psychosocial consequences of rape can have practical and long-term effects on the
community and its members.

Consequences for the Community
During genocide and ethnic conflict, women become ‘‘prime targets because of their
cultural position and their importance in the family structure.’’69 The trauma of rape
may prevent the survivor from assimilating back into her previous roles in her family
or society, which changes the community on the micro, meso, and macro levels.
‘‘Women hold communities together, and attacking them contributes to the defeat and
disintegration [of the community] in a number of ways’’—including the collapse of
basic societal structures, beginning with the family unit.70

The Stigma of Rape
Sexual violence is considered shameful in many cultures, and survivors are often
shunned or punished for being raped. A woman’s sexual virtue is highly valued by the
community as a marker of the purity and prestige of her family. When a woman is
raped, the cultural meaning behind that experience indicates that she has
been ‘‘spoiled,’’ which reflects poorly upon her and on her family. As one survivor
said, ‘‘After rape, you don’t have value in the community.’’71
To avoid the stigma associated with rape, survivors may attempt to conceal their
assault from others. Three adolescent survivors in Darfur reported attempting to
conceal their rapes by telling neighbors about the Janjaweed attack without
mentioning the sexual assaults. Assumptions and gossip spread. It was clear that
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neighbors knew the girls had been raped, because they changed their treatment of
the girls. One of the survivors told a journalist that when people discover a woman
has been raped, ‘‘They scorn you. They laugh at you . . . They look at you as if you are
strange, as if they haven’t seen you before.’’72
The perpetrators of genocidal rape use their knowledge of the social consequences
of sexual assault to maximize damage to the target population. Rapes are conducted
in such a way that they are difficult for survivors to conceal—for example, publicly,
in broad daylight. Women who become visibly pregnant after rape have no chance to
hide what happened to them, and this is one of the intentions of forced pregnancy:
to compel the woman to suffer the stigma her community deems appropriate for a rape
survivor.
Survivors and children of rape remind their families and communities of their
collective defeat, which can be both demoralizing and terrifying. The family or
community may cast the woman or child out, abuse them further, or even kill them—
causing deeper emotional damage to all involved and tearing at the fabric that holds
families and the community together. Perpetrators of mass rape maximize populationreducing effects over time by taking advantage of the social stigma of rape. The
consequences of this stigma against rape survivors effectively render a generation of
women unlikely to bear children within their own community.
In many cultures, particularly those espousing a patriarchal value system,
survivors of rape are not considered acceptable wives. Survivors may be cast out if they
are married at the time of the assault, especially if their injuries affect their
reproductive capacity. Care of the children and the household is the sole responsibility
of women in these cultures, and injured or traumatized women are considered less
valuable as wives. One survivor from Darfur described how excited she had been about
her engagement until she was raped; her fiancé then said he would not marry her,
because she was ‘‘disgraced and spoilt.. . . It is the wors[t] thing.’’73
The stigma of rape is a crushing burden because of the associated social and
economic disadvantages. Unmarried women do not have the financial and physical
protection that married women do in Darfur, Rwanda, the DRC, and BosniaHerzegovina, as well as in many other areas; this vulnerability is exacerbated by
active conflict and genocide. In Darfur, because of the widespread sexual assaults of
young women and girls, families worry that they cannot protect their young women’s
sexual virtue, upon which their basic safety depends. As a result, parents attempt to
marry off their daughters early in order to preserve the family honor. The ‘‘bride price’’
in the IDP camps has decreased to the point that families will marry their daughters to
anyone who can scrape together minimal compensation for the family. This exposes
young women and girls to potentially abusive spouses, early sexual intercourse
(with their husbands), and early marriages with few choices. Since marriage is
technically no protection against rape, the early marriage of daughters may not
ultimately protect the family’s honor if those daughters are raped after marriage and
subsequently abandoned by their husbands, which is common.
Mass rape during genocide draws upon existing gender dynamics and cultural
factors to increase the damaging effects of the assault. In patriarchal cultures, women
are considered ‘‘symbols of the potency of the men to whom they belong.’’74 The act of
rape robs the husband of his control over his wife’s sexuality during the rape, but it
also robs him of the ability to sexually enjoy his wife afterward, because she may be
injured, traumatized, or pregnant. In this way, the male ‘‘is emasculated
(and therefore dehumanized, rendered powerless) by being denied sole access to
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his woman.’’75 This has been described as ‘‘the final symbolic expression of the
humiliation of the male opponent.’’76
During the Bosnian genocide, Serb forces made use of cultural information about
women’s roles to maximize the impact of the psychosocial trauma of rape. It was
known that a Bosnian husband would divorce his wife if she was raped, and that an
unmarried woman who was raped would not be considered eligible for marriage.
Regardless of the women’s utter lack of complicity in their sexual victimization,
‘‘wartime rape victims’ husbands held their wives responsible for the deed or ended
their relationships because of the rape’’: a Muslim physician in Bosnia reported that
‘‘if a man has even the slightest suspicion that his wife may have cooperated
voluntarily, the marriage is over.’’77 These social rejections of rape survivors have longterm reductive effects on population.

Deterioration of Family and Societal Structures
Sexual violence is perpetrated against women during ethnic conflict because women
‘‘keep the civilian population functioning’’ through their roles as mothers, wives, and
caretakers.78 The suffering inflicted may cause permanent psychological symptoms
or have social consequences that affect women’s ability to relate, work, or care for their
children. Because large numbers of individual women experience the deterioration
of the familial structures in their lives, the social structures of the community crumble
as more and more individual women become traumatized. Thus the collapse of
community structures begins with individual and familial collapse.
In these ways, rape leads directly to the destruction of family and community
structures that is the ultimate goal of territorial war. Survivors of rape broadcast a
message of defeat to their families and communities, which can both demoralize and
terrify them. Family members may cast the survivor out or abuse her further, causing
deeper emotional trauma and tearing at the fabric that holds the family and the
community together.
During war and ethnic conflict, rape acquires a deeper meaning: rapes committed
in war may be intended to destroy the raped woman’s culture or community. The
deconstruction of culture—and not necessarily the defeat of an army—can be
considered one of the primary goals of rape warfare. Individual rapes translate into
an assault on the community through the social emphasis placed on women’s sexual
virtue: the shame of the rape humiliates all those associated with the survivor.
Combatants who rape during war often explicitly link their acts of sexual violence to
this broader social degradation through their words and actions.
When a woman is raped in the context of war, ethnic conflict, or genocide, the
symbolic message to the woman’s community is one of territorial conquest. The culture
has been symbolically ‘‘penetrated’’ by the enemy, and this is demonstrated through
the physical penetration of its individual female representatives. The humiliation of a
culture through the systematic violation of women is the primary goal of mass rape
during ethnic conflict.
The female body functions as a symbolic representation of the community: sexual
violence inflicted on women damages the ‘‘physical and personal integrity of the
group.’’79 The ‘‘rape of the women in a community can be regarded as a rape of the body
of that community,’’ and this symbolic assault is very much an intended consequence of
genocidal rape.80 It has been argued that men rape during war and genocide ‘‘because
the acquisition of the female body means a piece of territory conquered’’ in symbolic
terms: forced sexual penetration (especially when combined with ejaculation and
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insemination) represents conquest of the woman by the rapist and, by symbolic
extension, dominance of the raping culture over the raped culture.81
Mass rape furthers the goals of genocide because this kind of violence can destroy a
group ‘‘in whole or in part.’’82 Acts of mass rape are ‘‘deliberately calculated’’ to bring
about destruction and death, to impede in-group births, to undermine family
structures, and to severely traumatize the target population. Rape causes serious
bodily harm, often permanently disabling survivors or destroying their reproductive
capacities. The recent UN Security Council Resolution on ‘‘Women and Peace and
Security’’ explicitly links sexual violence to the goals of armed conflict and genocide
and publicly acknowledges of the role of rape in war.
Mass rape exists in the modern world: women and girls are being raped, tortured,
and killed today in Darfur, in the DRC, and elsewhere. Because we are aware that
people are suffering and dying, we must respond quickly and forcefully to protect their
human rights. It is imperative that we, as genocide scholars and as human beings,
work to protect these women from further harm and help to restore their lives, their
human rights, and their dignity.

Notes
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.

Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
Ruth Seifert, ‘‘War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis,’’ in Mass Rape: The War against
Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. Alexandra Stiglmayer, 54–72 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1994).
Ibid.
Rhonda Copelon, ‘‘Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes against Women in Times of
War,’’ in Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. Alexandra
Stiglmayer, 197–218 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Jacky Hardy,
‘‘Everything Old Is New Again: The Use of Gender-Based Terrorism against Women,’’
Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military, Summer 2001, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EXI/is_2_19/ai_84542211 (accessed 14 October 2008); Denise
MacDonald, ‘‘Hate Rape: A Look at the Many Ways That Civilian Women Become Targets
During a War,’’ Briarpatch 32, 2 (2003): 12; Shana Swiss and Joan E. Giller, ‘‘Rape as a
Crime of War: A Medical Perspective,’’ Journal of the American Medical Association
270 (1993): 612–15; Meredeth Turshen, ‘‘The Political Economy of Violence against
Women During Armed Conflict in Uganda,’’ Social Research 67 (2000): 803–24.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (accessed
15 September 2008), art. 2.
JohnHagan, Justice in the Balkans: Prosecuting War Crimes in the Hague Tribunal
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 201.
Women and peace and security, UN Security Council Resolution 1820, UN Doc. S/RES/1820
(19 June 2008), http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions08.htm (accessed 15 September
2008).
Ibid., 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. 3.
Catherine MacKinnon, ‘‘Rape, Genocide, and Women’s Human Rights,’’ in Violence Against
Women: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Stanley G. French, Wanda Teays, and Laura M.
Purdy, 43–54 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
Anuradha Chakravarty, ‘‘Interethnic Marriages, the Survival of Women, and the Logics
of Genocide in Rwanda,’’ Genocide Studies and Prevention 2 (2007): 237–48, 238.
293

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:3 December 2008

14.

15.

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.

Tine Dusauchoit, ‘‘Enough Is Enough: Why Sexual Violence Demands a Humanitarian
Response,’’ in International Activity Report (Brussels: Médicins Sans Frontières/Doctors
Without Borders, 2003), 3.
Azra Zalihic-Kaurin, ‘‘The Muslim Women,’’ in Mass Rape: The War against Women in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. Alexandra Stiglmayer, 170–73 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1994).
MacDonald, ‘‘Hate Rape.’’
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A catastrophe averted is likely not to be viewed as a catastrophe. A predicted event
that fails to materialize is a non-event, something that did not happen, and
politicians who expend wealth and lives on something that fails to happen cannot
expect to reap the rewards of their decisions. Quite to the contrary, politicians who
spend lives and treasure to prevent catastrophes such as genocide are likely to be
vilified and punished for their efforts: to the extent that their actions succeed in
averting a catastrophe, there is no proof of their success, only of the costs of their
efforts. This last point is especially intriguing, and it goes to the heart of the
paradox of genocide prevention.
Consider the famous case of Winston S. Churchill. Had he, instead of Neville
Chamberlain, been Britain’s prime minister in the 1930s, and thus gone to Munich
to meet Adolf Hitler in 1938, there is a good chance that World War II would have
been averted and the Holocaust prevented. The irony is that had Churchill been
successful in preventing war and genocide, the British public would not know
about his triumph, because there would be no evidence for it. All the public would
be sure of was that Churchill had brought the world to the brink of war, and he
would be blamed for that. The further irony is that, had Churchill succeeded in
preventing the war, he might have gone down in history as an erratic warmonger
rather than as the greatest war leader of the Western world.
Keywords: genocide prevention, Holocaust, World War II, paradox of genocide
prevention

I. Introduction
After World War II and the Holocaust, politicians in democratic societies professed
their commitment to the prevention of genocide; despite their claim of ‘‘never again,’’
however, they have seldom acted on their promises. Their excuse has often been that
they do not know enough about a particular situation, or that there is not enough
support for concerted action to prevent genocide. When war and genocide loomed in
Rwanda in 1993–1994, and concerted action could have prevented catastrophe, few
wanted to take the risk of prevention or intervention.1 As Samantha Power suggests,
politicians do not want to expend lives and wealth on a venture that will involve
great risk and very little political profit.2 Hence, despite appearances, the lack of
intervention to prevent genocide is not a recurring failure of policy—it is policy. It is a
successful policy of non-intervention. Following this line of thought, I argue here that
politicians hesitate to prevent catastrophe in general, and genocide in particular,
because if they act decisively and yet fail to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe they
can be blamed for the failure, whereas if they succeed at prevention they are likely
not to be rewarded for their success. On the contrary, in fact, they are likely to be
politically punished for prevention that succeeds. The last point is especially intriguing
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and goes to the heart of what I call ‘‘the paradox of catastrophe and genocide
prevention.’’
A catastrophe averted is likely not to be seen as a catastrophe. A predicted event
that fails to materialize is a non-event, something that did not happen, and politicians
who have expended wealth and lives on something that failed to happen cannot be
expected to reap the rewards of their decisions. On the contrary, politicians who risk
lives and wealth to avert catastrophes such as genocide run the risk of being vilified
and punished for their efforts: To the extent that their actions succeed in averting a
catastrophe, there will be no evidence of their success—only of the costs of their efforts.
This essay uses counterfactual—‘‘what if’’—arguments to explore some of the
structural obstacles to the prevention of genocide.3
Consider the famous case of Winston S. Churchill. Churchill believed that had he,
instead of Neville Chamberlain, been prime minister of Britain in the 1930s, and if he
had stood up to Adolf Hitler during the Rhineland crisis of 1936 or gone to Munich not
to mollify but to warn Hitler in 1938, there is a good chance that World War II would
have been averted and the Holocaust prevented. Unlike Chamberlain, Churchill
would never have sold out Czechoslovakia, and he could have rallied France and the
Soviet Union against the Nazis. Indeed, even as late as the Munich crisis, as he notes
in The Gathering Storm, Churchill believed that had the Allies been united, the
German military might have staged a coup against Hitler, and thus prevented the
war.4 Moreover, since most historians now believe that the Holocaust was a direct
by-product of the radicalization of Nazi policies during the war, it follows that averting
the latter would have prevented the former.5
Of course, even his was a counterfactual speculation—a ‘‘what if?’’ proposition—
and the great Churchill might have been proven wrong. Counterfactual constructions
lend themselves to many different possibilities. Had Churchill gone to Munich, he
might not have been able to prevent the war, and if war had started in 1938, the result
might have been the triumph of the Germans and the Nazi occupation of Britain.
Indeed, that is the speculation of Andrew Roberts and Niall Ferguson, two wellregarded British historians.6 If they are right, the timing of the war and the Holocaust
might have been different but the catastrophe would not have been averted.
In this essay I assume that Churchill and not his doubters had it right: that had
he been prime minister in the 1930s, he would have averted war and genocide
by containing and deterring the Germans through an alliance of Britain, France, and
the Soviet Union. What Churchill did not take into account, however, is the likelihood
that he would have paid a price at the polls in the next election for threatening war
or precipitating war—unlike Chamberlain, who claimed that he had ‘‘brought peace in
our time.’’ Pacifist, anti-Communist, and even some pro-German sentiment ran strong
in Britain in the 1930s. The likelihood is that Churchill would now be remembered not
as one of the greatest leaders of the Western world but as an adventurer and
warmonger, a very different Churchill from the one we know and praise today. That
would have been the paradox of Churchill’s prevention of World War II, and thereby of
the Holocaust.
In The Gathering Storm, the first volume of his memoir of World War II, Churchill
recalls that when President Roosevelt asked for suggestions about what the war
should be called, he unhesitatingly replied, ‘‘the Unnecessary war.’’ Churchill then
goes on,
There never was a war more easy to stop than that which has just wrecked what was
left of the world from the previous struggle . . . It is my earnest hope that pondering
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upon the past may give guidance in days to come, enable a new generation to repair
some of the errors of former years, and thus govern, in accordance with the needs of the
glory of man.7

The trouble is that no generation seems to know how to learn from the past and avoid
the catastrophes of the future. In the context of uncertainty, ambiguity, and
unintended consequences that is the future, political leaders do not wish to incur
the costs of prevention. These costs may be too high, endangering their political
survival, while the political benefits may be too low or even non-existent.
In what follows I briefly sketch the path to war and genocide and Churchill’s
warnings along the way, from Hitler’s rise to power through German rearmament, the
Rhineland crisis, the Anschluss of Austria, and the Munich Agreement to the start
of World War II. I conclude by suggesting—thereby illustrating the paradox of
prevention—that had he been successful in preventing the war, Churchill would likely
have been repudiated at the polls for his efforts.

II. Hitler’s Rise to Power
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Great Depression, the rise of the Communist
Party of Great Britain, and fear of Communism led many upper-class Tories to feel
sympathy for Fascism and for the rise of Nazism in Germany, which they viewed as a
bulwark against Bolshevism.8 Meanwhile, the Labour and Liberal parties, reflecting
public opinion, were thoroughly pacifist, even as the Nazis began their climb to power.
This was also the period when the United States, having rejected membership in the
League of Nations despite the support of President Woodrow Wilson, had taken a
politically isolationist turn under the subsequent administrations of Warren Harding,
Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. But the leaders of
other democracies were also pacifist or were disengaged from foreign affairs, leaving
the diplomats to draw up such largely meaningless international covenants as
the Treaty of Locarno (1 December 1925), which guaranteed German–French and
German–Belgian borders and provided for arbitration in international crises, and the
Kellogg–Briand Pact (27 August 1928) outlawing war, which was signed by fifteen
nations including Britain, France, and Germany.
In the election of 14 September 1930, the Nazis won 107 of 577 seats in the
Reichstag. This was the beginning of their breakthrough to power by legal means, and
from then on in Hitler played a major role in German politics. In the 30 July 1932
elections the Nazis won 230 seats and became the largest single party in the Reichstag.
On 17 October 1932, months before Hitler came to power, Churchill was already
warning in the Daily Mail about German rearmament: ‘‘Do not let his Majesty’s
Government believe . . . that all Germany is asking for is equal status . . . They are
asking for weapons.’’9 But the country was not yet ready to listen to him; nor was it yet
disgusted by Nazi anti-Semitism, as he already was by 1932.10
On 30 January 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. Ten days later, on
9 February, the Oxford Union voted 275 to 153 for the following resolution: ‘‘This
House will in no circumstances fight for King and Country.’’11 In the London Times of
18 February, Churchill called this expression of student opinion an ‘‘abject, squalid,
shameless avowal . . . a very disquieting and disgusting symptom.’’ Citing young Nazis
in Germany and fascisti in Italy, he said, ‘‘One can almost feel the curl of contempt
upon the lips of the manhood of all these peoples when they read this message sent out
by Oxford University in the name of young England.’’12 British elite public opinion had
not yet taken the measure of Nazism, but Churchill had.
299

Genocide Studies and Prevention 3:3 December 2008

III. Churchill’s Views on the Looming Crisis in British Rearmament
The military and diplomatic crisis with Germany in the 1930s involved Germany’s
cancellation of key provisions of the Versailles treaties, accelerated rearmament,
expansionism, and irredentism culminating in war. Meanwhile, in 1934 anti-war and
anti-rearmament candidates swept by-elections in Britain. Alarmed, Churchill warned
Parliament that unilateral disarmament would be madness, but Stanley Baldwin, then
prime minister, adjusted government principles and strategy to the country’s pacifist
mood. On 4 March 1935, His Majesty’s Government (HMG) announced increases
in appropriation for the air force that Churchill thought were too little too late. In
addition, the Labour Party moved to censure the government for even recommending
such increases, viewing them as unnecessary and provocative. On 16 March 1935, Hitler
announced that all German youths were subject to conscription, in violation of the
Versailles treaties. He gambled that neither the British nor the French would challenge
him, and he was right. Meanwhile, the League of Nations condemned German
rearmament but rejected all motions calling for sanctions.13 On 19 March 1935, HMG
announced that, given the new appropriations, British air power would be superior to
that of Germany. Citing his own sources, Churchill strenuously disagreed and warned of
Britain’s vulnerability: ‘‘At the end of the year, when we were to have had a 50 percent
superiority over Germany, they will be at least three and four times as strong as we.’’14
It was in this context of accelerated German rearmament that, on 12 March 1935,
Churchill addressed the Conservative Backbench Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House of Commons. In this address he formulated his opposition to the rise of Nazi
Germany in terms of traditional British interests, which historically were to oppose
the emergence of a powerful threat on the continent by leading an alliance of lesser
powers against the challenger. In effect, he outlined his strategic vision for a world
challenged by an aggressive Germany rising in the heart of Europe:
For four hundred years the foreign policy of England had been to oppose the strongest,
most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent, and particularly to prevent
the Low Countries falling into the hands of such a Power . . . Faced by Philip II of Spain,
against Louis XIV under William III and Marlborough, against Napoleon, against
William II of Germany, it would have been easy and must have been very tempting
to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always
took the harder course, joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination among
them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant whoever
he was, whatever nation he led . . . All our thoughts rest in that tradition today. I know
of nothing which has occurred to alter or weaken the justice, wisdom, valour, and
prudence upon which our ancestors acted.. . .
The question, therefore, arises which is today the power in Europe which is the
strongest, and which seeks in a dangerous and oppressive sense to dominate . . .
[Germany] is arming in a manner which has never been seen in [her] history. She is led
by a handful of triumphant desperadoes . . . Very soon they will have to choose, on the
one hand, between economic and financial collapse or internal upheaval, and, on the
other, a war which could have no other object, and which if successful, can have no
other result than a Germanised Europe under Nazi control. Therefore, it seems to me
that all the old conditions present themselves again, and that our national salvation
depends upon our gathering once again all the forces of Europe to contain and restrain,
and if necessary to frustrate, German domination.15

On 25 March 1935, Hitler announced that Germany had reached parity with Britain in
the air. The Baldwin government remained unresponsive.
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IV. Rhineland, 1936
On 7 March 1936 the Rhineland was reoccupied by Germany, in violation of the Treaty
of Versailles. It was then, Churchill believed, that, had he been prime minister,
he might have halted the march toward war. By Munich, in his view, it was probably
too late. On 26 March 1936, in the House of Commons, he noted that
in spite of the seriousness which I attach to this reoccupation of the Rhineland, I must
say that it seems to me the smallest part of the whole problem. What is the real
problem, the real peril? It is not the reoccupation of the Rhineland, but this enormous
process of the rearmament of Germany. There is the peril . . . I confess that I have been
occupied with this idea of the great wheels revolving and the great hammers descending
day and night in Germany, making the whole industry of that country an arsenal,
making the whole of that gifted and valiant population into one great disciplined war
machine . . . There is what is bringing the war.16

He went on to ask, rhetorically, ‘‘How are we going to stop this war which seems to be
moving towards us in so many ways?’’17
His answer, one to which he turned again and again, was to strengthen
Britain’s alliance with France and to create a system of collective security, including
the Soviet Union, under the League of Nations.18 Churchill sought to prevent the
looming war by what has come to be known in today’s parlance as deterrence
and containment. He did not seek war with Germany; he sought to prevent war, but
in vain.

V. Anschluss, 1938
To counter Hitler’s pressure on Austria to join the German Reich, Prime Minister Kurt
Schuschnigg of Austria called for a plebiscite. On 11 March 1938, Lord Halifax, who
had replaced Anthony Eden as foreign secretary, cabled Schuschnigg to warn him that
Britain would not come to his aid should the Germans strike. The same day, Italy
announced that it would not aid in preserving Austria’s independence. Schuschnigg
then resigned, and on 13 March German troops marched into Austria. The next day,
thousands of Jews and purported enemies of the Nazi regime were sent to
concentration camps. Many were killed.
Neville Chamberlain came to the House of Commons on 14 March and promised to
accelerate British rearmament. Churchill responded that unless actions followed
words, a strategy of collective security to stop the Nazis would be too late:
The gravity of the events of the 11th of March cannot be exaggerated. Europe is
confronted with a programme of aggression, nicely calculated and timed, unfolding
stage by stage, and there is only one choice open . . . either to submit, like Austria, or
else take effective measures while time remains.19

In the same speech he went on to warn about Czechoslovakia, which, after the
Anschluss, was surrounded by Germany on three sides. ‘‘No doubt,’’ he noted
ironically,
they are only a small democratic State, no doubt they have an army only two
or three times as large as ours, no doubt they have a munitions supply only three
times as great as that of Italy, but still they are a virile people; they have their treaty
rights, they have a line of fortresses, and they have strongly manifested a will to live
freely.20

Churchill was outraged by the Anschluss and the looming threat to
Czechoslovakia, not only because it fortified the Nazis and weakened Britain but
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because it undermined the world order created after World War I, which was best
expressed by the League of Nations:
I affirm that the Government should express in the strongest terms our adherence to
the Covenant of the League of Nations and our resolve to procure by international
action the reign of law in Europe . . . There must be a moral basis for British
rearmament and British foreign policy. We must have that basis if we are to unite
and inspire our people . . . and if we are to stir the English-speaking people throughout
the world.21

Churchill argued not for war against Germany but for collective security in the
context of the League of Nations, for a ‘‘grand alliance’’ that might deter Nazi
aggression and become the best guarantor of peace in Europe. This grand alliance
would be led by Britain and France and would include the smaller European states.
If that were sustained, as it would be by the moral sense of the world; and if it were done
in 1938—and believe me, it may be the last chance there will be for doing it—then I say
that you might even now arrest this approaching war.22

On 18 March 1938, a week after the German incorporation of Austria, the Cabinet
met to consider the implications of the Anschluss and its threat to Czechoslovakia.
Minister for the Coordination of Defence Sir Thomas Inskip saw no reason why
Britain ‘‘should take any steps to maintain such a unit [Czechoslovakia] in being.’’23
Commenting on the French declaration guaranteeing the independence of
Czechoslovakia, the prime minister wondered ‘‘whether it would not be possible to
make some arrangement which would prove more acceptable to Germany.’’24
In a speech to the Commons on 24 March 1938, Churchill urged stronger links to
France and warned about the future of Czechoslovakia:
Czechoslovakia will be forced to make continuous surrenders, far beyond the bounds of
what any impartial tribunal would consider just or right, until finally her sovereignty,
her independence, her integrity, have been destroyed.25

Churchill understood that Britain’s reaction to the Anschluss was a prologue to the
greater tragedy that was to befall Czechoslovakia in the near future. Six months later,
Munich proved him right.

VI. Munich, 1938
On 2–3 September 1938, Germany declared full mobilization, and Hitler warned that
Sudeten Germans needed protection from their Czech rulers. On 2 September, Ivan
Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to Britain, drove to see Churchill at his home in
Chartwell. There Maisky told Churchill that the Soviet government wished to invoke
Article II of the Covenant of the League of Nations, under which all powers, including
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, were obliged to consult to prevent an impending
war. He wanted to explore a joint resolution and a course of action defending
Czechoslovakia against an imminent German attack. On the following day Churchill
sent Lord Halifax an account of this conversation, but the foreign secretary did
not think that Article II ‘‘would be helpful.’’ HMG did not wish to become allied
with Russia against Germany.26 On 7 September 1938, the London Times, which
enthusiastically supported Chamberlain’s policies of appeasement, editorialized
in favor of separating the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. On 9 September, while
German troops massed on the Czech frontier, Chamberlain decided to seek
negotiations with Hitler, while excluding the Czechs.
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Unaware of Chamberlain’s decision of 9 September, Churchill went to Downing
Street to rally the prime minister and the foreign secretary against the German
aggression. Sir Samuel Hoare, who had once been foreign secretary and was at the
time home secretary, recalled that ‘‘he had come to demand an immediate ultimatum
to Hitler. He was convinced it was our last chance of stopping a landslide.’’27 That
night Churchill also called Lord Halifax, not knowing that the foreign secretary
had already backed the PM and had warned the French that Great Britain would
not support France in case of war with Germany. While Churchill had advocated for
a tripartite alliance against Hitler, consisting of Britain, France, and the Soviet Union,
Lord Halifax’s aim was to sever all British ties from such a pact.28 On 11 September,
Churchill returned to urge the prime minister and his foreign secretary to warn
Germany ‘‘that if she set foot in Czechoslovakia we should at once be at war with
her.’’29 This course of action was far from what Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had in
mind.
On 15 September, Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden for the first of three
meetings. There he assured Hitler that he was not opposed to the Sudetenland’s
joining Germany and would support a plebiscite of its German-speaking inhabitants.
On 21 September, the British and French pressured President Edvard Beneš to agree
to the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany. They made it clear that they would not
support Czechoslovakia should Germany invade. By then France was divided, and, like
Britain, intent on a policy of appeasement.
On 22 September, Chamberlain flew to Bad Godesberg to assure Hitler that the
British and French had decided to support a plebiscite in Sudetenland and were ready
for the transfer of this territory to Germany should the vote favor it. Seeing that he had
Chamberlain on the run, Hitler demanded the immediate transfer of the Sudetenland
to Germany. On the second day of the meeting, Chamberlain caved in. He agreed that
there would be no plebiscite where the Germans constituted a majority, and he acceded
to the transfer of all Czech fortifications and war materiel to the Germans.
Addressing the Commons on 28 September 1938, Neville Chamberlain expressed
his reluctance to help avert the destruction of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis: ‘‘How
horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas
masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we
know nothing.’’30
On 29 September, Chamberlain flew to Munich at Hitler’s invitation to attend a
four-power conference consisting of Germany, Britain, France, and Italy. Twelve hours
later they agreed that the German occupation of the German-speaking areas of the
Sudetenland would begin on the next day. The Czech delegation, though present in
Munich, was not party to the discussions. What happened in Munich in 1938
constituted a major political and military victory for the Nazis. They would take over
the Škoda Works, one of Europe’s major armament-producing installations, and the
democracies’ military strength would be reduced by thirty divisions. These were
resources and weapons that would be trained on Britain and her allies in less than
a year.
Three days after Munich, in answer to some pointed criticism in the Commons
from Duff Cooper and other anti-appeasers, Chamberlain said,
Ever since I assumed my present office my main purpose has been to work for the
pacification of Europe, for the removal of those suspicions and those animosities which
have so long poisoned the air. The path which leads to appeasement is long and bristles
with obstacles. The question of Czechoslovakia is the latest and perhaps the most
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dangerous. Now that we have got past it, I feel that it may be possible to make further
progress along the road to sanity.31

Speaking in the Commons on 5 October 1938, Churchill had a very different take
on what had happened in Munich:
I shall begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget but which must
nevertheless be said, namely, that we have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat,
and that France has suffered even more than we have . . .
All is over. Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the
darkness. She has suffered in every respect by her association with the Western
democracies and with the League of Nations, of which she was always an obedient
servant.. . .
I venture to think that in future the Czechoslovak state cannot be maintained
as independent entity. You will find that in a period of time which may be measured in
years, but may be measured only by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed by the
Nazi regime.
But we cannot consider the abandonment and ruin of Czechoslovakia in the light only of
what happened last month. It is the most grievous consequence which we have
yet experienced of what we have done and what we have left undone in the last five
years—five years of futile good intention, five years of eager search for the line of least
resistance, five years of uninterrupted retreat of British power, five years of neglect of
our air defences. Those are the features which I stand here to declare and which
marked an improvident stewardship for which Great Britain and France have dearly
to pay . . .
We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude which has befallen Great
Britain and France. Do not let us blind ourselves to that. It must now be accepted that
all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with
the triumphant Nazi power . . .
You will see, day after day, week after week, entire alienation of those regions. Many of
those countries, in fear of the Nazi Power, have already got politicians, Ministers,
Governments, who were pro-German, but there was always an enormous popular
movement in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia which looked to the Western
democracies and loathed the idea of having the arbitrary rule of the totalitarian system
thrust upon them, and hoped that a stand would be made. All that has gone by
the board. We are talking of countries which are a long way off and of which, as the
Prime Minister might say, we know nothing.. . .
And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning.
This is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us
year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise
again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden time.32

German forces marched into Prague on 15 March 1939. Bohemia and Moravia
were declared protectorates in which ethnic Germans became German citizens and
Czechs were defined as protectorate nationals. On 27 April Britain declared general
conscription, and Germany declared the nullification of its 1935 naval pact with
Britain. On 23 August the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, scheduled to last
for ten years, laid out the partition of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union.
On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland; on 3 September, Britain and France
declared war on Germany. On 10 May 1940, Germany invaded Belgium, Luxembourg,
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and the Netherlands. On the same day, Neville Chamberlain resigned and Winston
Churchill became prime minister.

VII. Conclusion
Churchill believed that had he been prime minister of Britain during the Rhineland
crisis in 1936 or in Munich in 1938, war might have been averted even at this late date.
Most historians, like Christopher Browning, suggest that World War II, and especially
the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, set the stage for the Holocaust.33 Hence it is
reasonable to infer that had the war been averted, the Holocaust would also have been
prevented.
Indeed, even had war broken out in 1938, though it might very well have provided
a context for countless atrocities against Jews and others, the Holocaust as we know it
likely would not have occurred. The Munich crisis preceded the euthanasia program,
which began in 1939, and the use of Zyklon B in 1941; it preceded the death camps at
Auschwitz, Belzec, Chelmno, Majdanek, Sobibor, and Treblinka; it preceded the
McDonald White Paper of 17 May 1939 and the closing off of Palestine as an escape
route for Jews. Despite the Nazis’ intention to destroy the Jews, the initial conditions
of 22 June 1941—the incredible early victories and the enthusiasm of the moment
when everything seemed possible, including genocide—would not have occurred, and
the Final Solution would have remained an ideological vision rather than the very real
catastrophe that we know.
However, had Churchill been able to avert World War II and the Holocaust, it is
unlikely that he would have been credited with preventing these two catastrophes.
Herein lies the irony, or the paradox, of prevention: because these events would have
been prevented, no one would have known their cost. The only thing Britons would
have known was the dangerous course that Churchill had navigated in Munich and the
risk he had run of provoking another world war. Before the war, although many
admired him, others saw him as an imperialist and as a dangerous adventurer who
lacked political judgment. Such views plagued him and undermined him politically,
beginning with the debacle of Gallipoli in 1915, for which he was wrongly accused of
having had sole responsibility, and continuing through his political blunders of the
1930s, which included opposing Dominion status for India and supporting Edward VIII
through his abdication.34 Standing up to Hitler in Munich, even if successful, might
have been viewed as a dangerous and foolish adventure that could have precipitated
war. Indeed, Churchill and his party might have gone down to defeat after preventing
both World War II and the Holocaust.
The lesson of Churchill and World War II is not that leaders who threaten the
international order must always be resisted by force, never appeased or mollified.
Some situations do call for caution, diplomacy, and even appeasement. I suspect that
most Americans today would have preferred that the United States not pursue a
preventive war against Iraq; President Dwight David Eisenhower’s refusal to attack
the Soviet Union in 1956, during the Hungarian revolution, to avoid a nuclear
exchange and his warning to the United States about getting bogged down in a land
war in Asia seem wise in retrospect. Indeed, Churchill, himself did not advocate war
with Germany. On the contrary, his strategy was to create a powerful coalition of
states, including Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, with the aim of deterring
German expansion and preventing the war and the destruction that he believed
would follow.
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What were Churchill’s own thoughts on the matter of prevention? Despite his hope
that future generations might learn from experience, a hope he expressed to Roosevelt
when he called World War II the ‘‘unnecessary war,’’ Churchill was pessimistic about
the ability of leaders to foretell the future and thus prevent looming catastrophes.
As early as 25 March 1935, speaking to the House of Commons about German
rearmament, he warned about the ‘‘unteachability of mankind’’:
When the situation was manageable it was neglected, and now that it is thoroughly out
of hand, we apply too late the remedies which then might have effected a cure. There is
nothing new in the story. It is as old as the sibylline books. It falls into that long dismal
catalogue of the fruitlessness of experience and the confirmed unteachability of
mankind. Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and
effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until
self-preservation strikes its jarring gong—these are the features which constitute the
endless repetition of history.35

To Churchill’s pessimistic assessment of the ‘‘unteachability of mankind’’ I have
tried to add the ‘‘paradox of prevention’’ as an obstacle to action. Even when leaders
can be persuaded that they may be able to prevent genocide, the paradox suggests that
they will not be rewarded for their efforts, and, knowing this, they will hesitate to act.
However, this analysis may be too narrow and too closely tied to a cost/benefit model of
decision making. Sometimes leaders do rise to the occasion, and, despite the costs to
their political fortunes, they do attempt to prevent war and genocide. Churchill himself
is a prime example. His political situation in the 1930s would have improved markedly
had he gone along with the Baldwin/Chamberlain strategy of appeasement. But he
acted out of moral considerations, mainly for the benefit of Britain and the Empire.
What we need for our time are leaders and populations with the will and the broad
moral vision to transcend narrow self and national interest, who are willing to act
in order to prevent the mass murder of people, whoever they are wherever they may
live.36 That vision should include even those ‘‘who live in another country,’’ as
Chamberlain remarked, and ‘‘of whom we know nothing.’’
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This article reviews the current state of comparative genocide theorizing,
focusing on theories that attempt to account for the causes of genocide and the
processes of genocidal killing. The literature is divided into three broad
categories, based on the relative weight given to (a) individual or group agency,
(b) structural factors, or (c) processes of identity construction in accounting for
the origins and unfolding of genocidal destruction. The discussion of agencyoriented approaches focuses on theories that suggest that genocide is driven, in
terms of decision making and perpetration, by elite decision makers, front-line
perpetrators, and societal behavior. The literature on structural approaches is
broken down into theories that stress the importance of culture, institutional
organizations, societal cleavages, structural crises, regime type, modernity, and
ideology. The final section reviews the literature on processes of collective
identity construction. The article suggests throughout and in conclusion that
although comparative genocide theorizing has come a long way in proposing
a number of different explanations for the onset of genocide and the nature of
genocidal processes, more work needs to be done with respect to the precise
operationalization and testing of theories according to more rigorous comparative methodological practices.
Keywords: comparative genocide, genocide theory, genocide studies, Holocaust and
genocide, mass killing

Introduction
Comparative genocide studies is a young discipline that seeks to understand an ‘‘old
scourge.’’ As the post-Holocaust plea ‘‘never again’’ consistently went ignored in the
latter half of the twentieth century, scholars in the social sciences and humanities
began to examine the origins and processes of what is arguably the worst form of
collective human behavior and to try to answer the vexing question of why human
beings do such terrible things to each other ‘‘again and again.’’ Much of what we now
call ‘‘genocide studies’’ began with single case studies of individual genocides, but in
the 1980s a small group of scholars began to engage in the comparative analysis
of multiple cases of genocide, in the hope of uncovering the underlying logic of
this terrible crime. Given the very real human suffering attached to the subject,
comparative genocide studies has evolved not only into an academic discipline
concerned with understanding and explaining past genocides but also into a goaloriented research project aimed at preventing the perpetration of genocidal violence in
the present and future.
This article focuses on the current state of comparative genocide theory,1
specifically the creation of theories intended to account for the causes of genocide
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and the processes of genocidal destruction. It does not cover the considerable body
of literature concerning the definition of the concept of genocide and what cases
of mass atrocities ought to be considered as such. The state of the genocide literature
in this respect has been well rehearsed elsewhere and, therefore, need not be
further rehearsed here. More importantly, however, the issue of definition is omitted
from the current discussion because the fixation among genocide scholars on how
to define genocide has diverted needed attention away from the creation and testing
of theories. Of course, defining core concepts is a central and necessary part of
the theorizing process, but it is not a substitute for theory or theorizing itself.
The obsession with definitional debates has arguably left comparative genocides
studies undertheorized relative to other disciplines in the social sciences and
humanities.2
What this article does do is attempt to categorize and critically evaluate the
most prominent theoretical approaches used to explain the origins and processes of
genocide. The list of approaches and authors considered is, admittedly, far from
exhaustive. Reviewing the theoretical literature on genocide is somewhat difficult,
given the interdisciplinary nature of the field and the lack of a unified theoretical
or methodological approach, an agreed-upon set of cases, or a preferred level
or unit of analysis.3 The lack of theoretical and methodological coherence in the
field is not necessarily a problem, however. Genocide is not only a horrible
phenomenon, it is also an exceedingly complex one that occurs across a wide
variety of times and places and involves different kinds of collective actors
(perpetrators, victims, bystanders, collaborators, rescuers, etc.) and a number of
different variables, structures, and processes that do not fit neatly into simple,
generalizable explanatory models. The heterogeneity of theoretical and disciplinary
approaches we find in genocide studies may be entirely appropriate for a discipline
that studies one of the most convoluted and seemingly unfathomable forms of
human activity. The failure of past grand theories in the social sciences to predict
many of the seismic changes of the past century should also serve as a cautionary
tale to comparative genocide scholars.
The review that follows does not divide the literature into disciplinary approaches,
in order to allow us to consider the evolution of theorizing in the field as a whole.
Instead, for the sake of clarity, the literature is categorized according to the relative
weight given to individual or group agency, structural factors, or processes of identity
construction in accounting for the origins and unfolding of genocidal destruction. This
approach allows us to concentrate on what individual authors and approaches suggest
is the initial source of the complex web of events, individual and collective actions, and
processes that produces genocide. Admittedly, this way of categorizing the literature
imposes on it a somewhat artificial structure, since many approaches either imply or
explicitly state a reciprocal or mutually constitutive relationship between human
agency, structure, and process. Nonetheless, the initial discussion of agency-oriented
approaches focuses on theories that suggest that genocide is driven, in terms
of decision making or perpetration, by elite perpetrators, frontline perpetrators, or
societal behavior. Next, structural approaches are considered; in this section the
literature is divided according to whether the theories espouse stress the importance of
culture, institutional organizations, societal cleavages, structural crises, regime type,
modernity, or ideology. The final set of approaches considers processes of collective
identity construction, namely the conception of the victim group as the ‘‘other,’’ as subhuman, and as a threat.
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Theories of Genocide
Agency-Oriented Approaches
Elites
One way in which scholars have tried to explain genocide is to look at the role played
by elite decision makers. For some authors who use this approach, analysis focuses on
the role played by specific individual leaders, from Hitler to Stalin to Pol Pot and
others, in the genocidal process. Here the argument is that the most senior decision
makers, for reasons of personal psychology, life and leadership experience, or
ideological beliefs, make the decision to exterminate whole groups of people, which
makes these individual leaders the ultimate source of genocidal policies. Some works,
such as Gerald Fleming’s Hitler and the Final Solution,4 were written explicitly to
counter the claims of genocide deniers and minimizers that specific elites, in this case
Hitler, did not sanction the killing, were lied to about it by their subordinates who were
really to blame, or simply were not aware of what was happening to the victims. Other
works are not specifically about a genocide at all but, rather, are biographical histories
that shed light on several aspects of an individual leader’s life, public and private,
including his role in committing genocide.5 As largely ideographic (i.e., single-casestudy) historical works, these explanations tell us in great detail the role played
by specific historical figures in the initiation and perpetration of genocide, but they
also raise a more general comparative question: Are genocides primarily the result of
the actions of individual leaders? Would the Holocaust have happened without Hitler,
or the ‘‘killing fields’’ without Pol Pot? Is there a not-so-great-man theory of genocide?
The answer to this question is that we simply do not know. Although senior political
elites are central to the genocidal decision-making process, we cannot turn back the
clock and factor out individual leaders from the equation to see whether a given
genocide would have happened without them. As a basis for comparison, it is
counterproductive to extrapolate from single case studies of individual leaders the idea
that these leaders are the only significant actors in the genocidal process. The role of
individual elites in a particular genocide may be highly idiosyncratic and, therefore,
not comparable to those of other elites in other cases.
Leaving the influence of specific historical figures aside but maintaining the focus
on elite agency, recent works by Benjamin Valentino and Manus Midlarsky, for
example, have adopted a strategic actor model to account for the conditions under
which elite actors make the decision to commit genocide.6 Valentino sees genocide, or
what he calls ‘‘mass killing,’’ as a barbaric, immoral, and seemingly illogical act but one
that is the product of a rational choice made by elites to achieve specific policy goals.
For Valentino, genocide is not an end in itself but a strategic means to achieve an end.
In the pursuit of radical policy goals, perpetrator elites commit genocidal violence
against a target group in order to force its members to do something they would
otherwise not do but which is required for the realization of specific policy goals.
The decision to commit genocide is made only when elites have concluded that other,
less violent forms of repression or concessions to the target group for achieving their
ends have failed or are impractical.7
Similarly, Daniel Chirot and Clark McCauley argue that, for elite perpetrators,
mass murder is the ‘‘cheapest’’ way to overcome resistance to policies favored by the
perpetrators or simply to dispose of groups that are perceived to be ‘‘in the way’’ of the
realization of desired policies. Chirot and McCauley suggest that indigenous
populations are most often the targets of genocide based on these kinds of strategic
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calculations because their presence on a given piece of territory is ‘‘troublesome,’’
decreasing the strategic and/or economic value of that territory. When elite
perpetrators calculate that the population ‘‘cannot be controlled or dispersed,’’
genocide becomes the policy option.8 In the Killing Trap, Midlarsky also links the
strategic choice to commit genocide to policy failure, but he suggests that genocide is
a response to external, particularly territorial, losses. For Midlarsky, genocide is
motivated by elite decision makers’ desire for ‘‘loss compensation.’’
Whether one accepts a strategic actor explanation (particularly of the Valentino
variety) as a useful basis for explanation and comparison hinges in part on one’s
position concerning the status of genocide as a means to an end or as an end in itself.
Scholars who see genocide as a policy goal in and of itself will be at odds with the
foundational premises of this approach, but those who take the opposite view may find
it useful for understanding how and under what circumstances political elites make
the policy choice to exterminate groups of people. As a broadly comparative theory of
genocide in general, however, a strictly elite decision-making model leaves out the
crucial role played by societal actors in the total process of destruction. If it takes a
village to raise a child, it takes the state and society to perpetrate a genocide.

Frontline killers
In taking up the actors missing from elite-centered approaches, other genocide
scholars who adopt an agency-centered approach have attempted to explain the
behavior of the state and societal actors who actually carry out the order to commit
genocide. Here the focus is still on explaining how human agency drives the genocidal
process, not in terms of why the decision is made to pursue genocidal policies but in
terms of how ordinary people can follow the brutal orders of their political and military
superiors and slaughter their fellow human beings in great numbers.
Early attempts at this kind of explanation by psychologists and social psychologists assumed that the low-level perpetrators of genocide and other atrocities were
outside the psychological norm because their actions were so beyond the pale of
‘‘normal’’ human experience. Theodor Adorno and his colleagues, for example, tried to
identify among Nazi perpetrators a specific ‘‘authoritarian personality’’ that allowed
these individuals to carry out genocidal policies.9 But research into individual and
group responses to authority and organizational structures, including the infamous
Zimbardo prison experiments at Stanford University, as well as later social
psychological research based in part on these experiments and on other research,
has determined that genocidal killing is perpetrated by quite ordinary people. One of
the first scholars to make this profoundly disturbing observation, historian
Christopher Browning, demonstrates in Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101
and the Final Solution in Poland that the low-level perpetrators in this specific case
were neither psychologically extraordinary nor highly ideological or fanatical believers
in Nazi racial policies. Recent works by Chirot and McCauley, James Waller, and Alex
Alvarez confirm Browning’s observations through their respective explorations of the
role of normal human psychology under extreme conditions and within particular
military/security and bureaucratic organizational contexts.10
Chirot and McCauley’s work concentrates on the central role of psychological
needs, goals, and emotions in motivating not only elites but, more importantly,
ordinary people to become killers. ‘‘Political killing,’’ as Chirot and McCauley call it, is
motivated by four often mutually reinforcing motivations. The first motivation,
convenience, is in fact a strategic motivation that involves the same strategic
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calculation made by elites, as noted above, to simply ‘‘get rid of’’ groups that are in the
way. The remaining three—revenge, ‘‘simple’’ fear (including fear of retribution by the
victim group and fear of extermination), and fear of pollution—are psychological
motivations that elites may feel but which they also manipulate in society at large.11
The ‘‘psychological foundations’’ for ordinary people’s actual participation in mass
killing lie in the confluence of a separate set of human emotions (again, often
manipulated by elites), appeals to a ‘‘sense of duty,’’ and the routinization of killing,
training, ‘‘and good organization’’12 that foster obedience and provide incentives that
‘‘undermine personal responsibility.’’13 Chirot and McCauley cite some very basic
human emotions in their explanation, including fear, anger, love, hate, shame, and
humiliation, although they suggest that fear is the ‘‘key emotion for understanding
genocide.’’14 The authors also include in their explanation the human tendency toward
what they call ‘‘essentializing others’’ and ‘‘double essentializing,’’ described as a
‘‘battle of good and evil, of two incompatible essences in which love of the good [one’s
own group] means necessarily hate for the threatening out-group.’’15
What Waller calls his ‘‘four-pronged’’ process model of ‘‘extraordinary human evil’’
concentrates on the psychological and organizational contextual foundations of
individual and collective behavior. Underpinning human behavior (extraordinarily
evil or otherwise) is the first prong, our ‘‘ancestral shadow’’ that shapes our responses
to authority (ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and the desire for social dominance) and is
held in common by all human beings across time and space. The second prong
identifies three forces that ‘‘mold the identity’’ of frontline killers: cultural belief
systems that determine how one evaluates ‘‘controlling influences on one’s life,’’ ‘‘moral
disengagement of the perpetrator from [the] victim’’ (facilitated by the use of moral
justifications, euphemism, and ‘‘exonerating comparisons’’), and individual rational
self-interest. The third prong concentrates on the ‘‘immediate social context of
the culture of cruelty’’ and how this influences the way individuals ‘‘think, feel, and
behave.’’ Here Waller cites three central factors: the role of professional socialization
into military and security organizations, the binding factors of the group that
‘‘reinforce commitment to the group and its activities,’’ and the ‘‘merger of role and
person,’’ that is, how ‘‘evil-doing organizations change the people within them.’’
Finally, Waller’s fourth prong, to be considered later, deals with the construction of
the collective identity of the victim group, a process that leads to the ‘‘social death’’ of
the victims.16
Drawing on criminological approaches to explaining youth delinquency, Alvarez
disputes the idea that humans are naturally aggressive and prone to violence. For
Alvarez, the real question is not ‘‘Why do they kill?’’ but ‘‘How do ordinary people
overcome internalized norms against violence and become the executioners of
genocidal regimes?’’ Alvarez argues that, like delinquent youths, low-level perpetrators defer, repress, or neglect personal beliefs and feelings17 so that their actions are
reframed as acceptable to themselves and others through several ‘‘neutralization’’
techniques. These techniques include ‘‘denial of responsibility,’’ in which the
perpetrator claims that he or she was following orders or was otherwise coerced into
killing and, therefore, does not bear responsibility for killing; ‘‘denial of injury’’
through the use of euphemistic language that cognitively sanitizes killing and
brutality as ‘‘special treatment,’’ ‘‘purification,’’ ‘‘cleansing,’’ and the like; ‘‘denial of
[the] victim’’ such that killing becomes an act of self-defense against a threatening
enemy and not the wanton destruction of innocent and defenseless men, women, and
children; ‘‘condemning the condemners,’’ whereby the perpetrator attempts to
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neutralize external criticism by arguing that similar acts have been perpetrated
throughout history, even by the critics themselves; ‘‘appeals to higher loyalties’’ that
characterize genocidal killing as a distasteful but necessary activity carried out not for
personal gain, or based on personal motives, but for the greater good of the nation,
race, or revolution; and ‘‘denial of humanity’’ through the dehumanization of the victim
group and the deliberate creation of conditions of life that turn the victims into little
more than animals, thus confirming the perpetrator’s conception of the victims as
subhuman.18
The great strength of Waller’s analysis is his careful attention to the results of
individual and social psychological research, which he uses to great effect to debunk
any notion that, at least with respect to adult perpetrators, genocidal killers are
psychologically abnormal or that their actions can be explained by the effects of
indoctrination (i.e., ‘‘brainwashing’’) or socialization (e.g., Daniel Goldhagen’s notion of
a particularistic ‘‘eliminationist’’ anti-Semitism in Germany). Waller, Chirot and
McCauley, and Alvarez19 also all effectively spell out the complex interrelationship
between human agency based on psychological characteristics and emotions, on the
one hand, and the influence of organizational structures, particularly military and
bureaucratic organizations, on the other. Although human psychology is key to
Waller’s and Chirot and McCauley’s explanations and remains ontologically prior,
these authors, particularly Waller, carefully demonstrate that institutional structures
shape and reshape, sometimes permanently, human behavior under extreme
conditions. Where Waller’s argument is less convincing is in his insistence that
there is a hard-and-fast human nature shared by all human beings, regardless of
culture, historical experiences, and the like. The evidence he presents to substantiate
this point involves a high degree of inference from rather sketchy theories of early
human development. The inferences he draws from these theories may not be
warranted, since theories on their own do not constitute evidence. Moreover, Waller’s
references to experimental research on human subjects seems to confirm his main
theses, but the research to which he refers involves, as far as the reader can tell, adult
subjects only. With the advent of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Interahamwe
in Rwanda, and the use of child soldiers in a large number of atrocity-laden conflicts in
parts of Africa and Asia, the perpetrators of what Waller calls ‘‘extraordinary human
evil’’ are now often children and teenagers. Such young, vulnerable, and likely
impressionable killers may in fact be motivated to kill by indoctrination, abuse, and
alcohol and drug use inflicted on them by their adult masters. Further research is
required to determine whether Waller’s conclusions about adults hold for child
perpetrators as well or whether the behavior of child perpetrators is explained by other
exogenous factors.
Like Waller’s, Chirot and McCauley’s model is rich in variables and, to a greater
extent than Waller, these authors include references to a wide variety of cases of
genocide to substantiate their claims. Leaving aside criticisms that could be leveled
based on Chirot and McCauley’s and Waller’s use of broad dependent variables such as
‘‘political killing’’ and ‘‘extraordinary human evil’’ instead of the narrower variable of
genocide, Chirot and McCauley’s reliance on such a large number of independent and
intervening variables and their use of mostly emotive variables makes comparative
testing of their claims somewhat problematic. Since we are dealing with human
emotions such as anger, hate, love, and revenge, it is not clear how one is to go about
operationalizing these emotions into variables that can actually be measured and
compared across cases, in stable comparisons by which the researcher can be confident
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that he or she is measuring and comparing the same thing. How does one measure
human emotions, particularly in historical cases? The authors do not give us much
methodological guidance, and their very general and often brief references to historical
case studies similarly does not show us in a convincing way how emotions of the kind
they believe are significant can accurately be gleaned from historical sources. Surveyand interview-based research into perpetrator behavior in more recent cases of
genocide may be a preferable way to tap the variables the authors find important, but,
again, this kind of research would have to include an extended discussion of how the
survey was constructed in order to accurately measure the existence and the precise
effect of the emotional variable(s) under investigation.
Further, because emotions like anger, hate, fear, and revenge are commonly held
by ordinary people and are often manipulated for instrumental reasons by political and
other elites, under all sorts of circumstances and for all sorts of different reasons, one
can question whether the explanation of political killing offered by Chirot and
McCauley might also just as effectively explain other phenomena, such as terrorism,
civil war, or ethnic conflict. To develop a comparative theory of genocide, we need to
highlight the variables that lead specifically to genocide and not to other dependent
variables.

Society
Agency-centered approaches also focus on a third collective actor in genocide—society,
namely the role ordinary people play as bystanders who, through their acquiescence or
tacit consent, allow genocide to happen. Early attempts to explain societal behavior
argued that societies that have gone on to experience genocide are psychologically
predisposed toward the victimization of specific marginal groups. Such predispositions
are said to be linked to aspects of early childhood development such as authoritarian
parenting or to commonly held psychological characteristics in what some analysts
have labeled ‘‘national character.’’20 Rejecting the assertion that certain societies have
the same psychological make-up or are socialized into exactly the same cognitive
orientation toward a specific victim group, Ervin Staub compares different societies in
which genocide has occurred and suggests that many members of societies that
experience genocide become psychologically distressed as a result of severe crises and
are therefore willing to accept the victimization of marginal groups. These same
societies also have a history of antipathetic relationships with what are perceived to be
marginal groups. Once crises take hold, members of the society project their own
frustrations and hardships onto these groups. Crises are perceived by ordinary people
as events that create ‘‘winners’’ and ‘‘losers’’; marginal groups are identified as the
‘‘winners,’’ while the members of the majority group see themselves as the ‘‘losers’’ who
are suffering at the hands of a distrusted minority. As crises deepen, and as the state
begins to use repression and violence against the victim group, the wider society
gradually becomes psychologically disposed to accept the victimization of the group
and, in the case of some individuals, ripe for recruitment into the genocidal process as
low-level killers.21
By employing an explicitly comparative approach, Staub avoids the central
problem of the Goldhagen study: the labeling of specific societies and specific groups of
people as ‘‘natural born killers,’’ so to speak. Staub is more interested in the general
conditions under which ordinary people are willing to accept the perpetration of
genocidal violence against members of their own society and in the social psychological
orientation toward the victim group that is required for a population to become
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bystanders to genocide. But, like that of Chirot and McCauley, Staub’s work lacks
explicitly stated methodological guidelines that would leave the reader confident that
his research, which—again like Chirot and McCauley’s—is quite general in many
cases, is based on the operationalization and comparison of equivalent variables and
sound inferences.
In sum, agency-oriented approaches, mostly focused on psychology, offered by
scholars in recent years give us a foundation upon which we can try to understand and
explain elite, individual, and societal behavior in genocide. But they cannot account for
what the structural explanations give us—the macro cultural, social, economic,
political, security, and ideational contexts that also shape genocidal policies and
behaviors.

Structural Approaches
Culture
Culture can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition to explain genocide.
Cited by some scholars as an important background condition, culture is regarded,
depending on the author, as either a macro- or a micro-level variable. While culture is
an important variable, its use in explaining genocide is fraught with difficulties, both
because culture is hard to define and measure and because of the problem of overgeneralization, particularly at the macro level when the culture variable concerns the
culture of a whole society. Nonetheless, the idea of trying to find which long-standing
beliefs, norms, attitudes, and practices underpin genocide continues to be an
attractive, if partial, approach in the literature.
At the macro level, perhaps the most ambitious and controversial use of the culture
variable is that of Daniel Goldhagen in Hitler’s Willing Executioners. In this book
Goldhagen attributes the Nazi genocide of European Jews to the thorough cultural
indoctrination of Germans into what he calls ‘‘eliminationist anti-Semitism.’’22
Goldhagen’s thesis is a study in what can go wrong in an overly simplistic culturebased argument, namely the uncritical assertion, backed by insufficient or distorted
evidence, that all Germans were socialized or indoctrinated into exactly the same form
of anti-Semitism and that the eliminationist anti-Semitism of Germany was unique
to that country and its people. Goldhagen’s analysis has been widely criticized on a
number of grounds, not the least of which is his tendency to essentialize the identity of
the perpetrators.
A much more effective use of culture is Alex Hinton’s examination of the
importance of local cultural influences on how low-level perpetrators in Cambodia
were able to turn with such brutality against not only the country’s ethnic minorities
but other Khmers from the cities and inward against suspect cadres within the Khmer
Rouge itself.23 Hinton shows that the Khmer Rouge leadership was able to skillfully
employ culturally salient language and appeal to cultural practices to motivate
ordinary Khmers to commit genocidal violence. He argues, for example, that one
enduring cultural practice called kum—a long-standing grudge as a result of real
injury or a public loss of face—has often led historically to the meting out of
karsangsoek, or ‘‘disproportionate revenge.’’24 Hinton suggests that the cultural model
of disproportionate revenge is a ‘‘form of knowledge which most Cambodians have
internalized and may be inclined to enact in given circumstances’’—usually in the
aftermath of individual or collective injury or loss of face. The ‘‘cultural knowledge’’ of
disproportionate revenge ‘‘constitutes a crucial site upon which genocidal regimes
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can work,’’ with perpetrator elites ‘‘us[ing] these highly salient cultural models to
motivate individuals to commit violent atrocities.’’25
The importance of local culture and genocidal violence has also been noted by
Christopher C. Taylor in his examination of mass participation in the Rwandan
Genocide. For Taylor, the perpetrators in Rwanda conceptualized the victim group,
and the threat they were believed to pose to the Hutu majority, along culturally
specific lines that referred to commonly held beliefs in the deleterious effects of
‘‘obstructions’’ in the body that interrupted the proper ‘‘flow’’ of bodily fluids. The
Tutsis were characterized, according to Taylor, as ‘‘sacrificial victims’’ in a ‘‘mass
ritual purification, a ritual intended to purge the nation of obstructing beings.’’
This conceptualization of the threat posed by the victim group was ‘‘imagined through
a Rwandan ontology that situates the body politic in analogical relations to the
individual human body.’’26 These culturally specific reference points not only
motivated the killing but informed the manner in which the killing was manifested
in the Rwandan case, which included dumping victims (dead or alive) into latrines or
rivers.
From a historical perspective, Omer Bartov also calls for a detailed examination of
local contexts so that we can understand ‘‘much of the reality of genocide’’ that occurs
at the local level, including ‘‘the interaction between friends and neighbors’’ and
‘‘encounters with reception of forces [tasked with committing the genocide] arriving
from outside the community.’’ Bartov continues that ‘‘the conduct of the community is
often crucial to the success or failure of state-organized genocide in a given area.’’27 Jan
Gross’s study of the destruction of almost the entire Jewish community in the Polish
village of Jedwabne by their non-Jewish neighbors on a single day of bloodletting
in 1941 is a leading example of this kind of micro-level history.28
Although Hinton’s, Taylor’s, and Gross’s studies are ideographic examinations of
the role of culture, appeals to culturally significant language and practices, and local
historical contexts in three specific cases, we need not rule out the search for cultural
or local comparisons across cases. Such comparisons can be made at the societal or
the local level, provided that attention is paid to establishing with sufficient evidence
the relationship between cultural beliefs and practices, on the one hand, and genocidal
behavior, on the other, both within and across cases, and that equivalent
(not identical) beliefs and practices can be found in other cases upon which we can
base reliable comparisons.
One way to further develop comparative cultural approaches at the macro level
is to focus on the role of political culture specifically as a precursor to genocide.
Two dimensions of the pre-genocide political culture lay the ideational foundation for
later genocidal policies: beliefs and attitudes concerning membership in the political
community and elite political cultural perceptions of the meaning of conflicts in society
and the state’s response to conflict. The first, purely attitudinal, dimension taps how
members of the dominant society and political elites conceptualize membership in the
political community. Societies that have historically maintained a restrictive
conception of who constitutes ‘‘genuine’’ or ‘‘authentic’’ membership, even in the face
of formal legal recognition of membership, may be more likely (though by no means
certain) to commit genocide against ‘‘inauthentic’’ marginalized members who are
later redefined as completely alien and a serious threat to the survival of the
community. The second dimension shifts the analysis toward an examination
of historical elite conceptualizations of real and perceived conflicts, either within
society or within the state, as zero-sum struggles that cannot be solved through
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dialogue or compromise but only through the exercise of state power, possibly
including the use of force.
In sum, although cultural explanations of this or any other kind fill in part of the
genocidal puzzle, they cannot, on their own, explain why genocide happens. Values,
beliefs, norms, and practices at the macro and micro levels can, under the right
conditions (see the discussion of crisis below), set the stage for genocide and, once the
killing begins, shape the course and character of the genocidal process at the state,
societal, and local levels.

Divided societies
Another structural approach found in the literature suggests that societies riven by
ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, or other cleavages are particularly vulnerable to
genocide. One of the first comparative genocide scholars, Leo Kuper, took the prior
existence of what he labeled ‘‘plural societies’’ as the ‘‘structural base for genocide.’’29
As a necessary condition, but one that does not make genocide inevitable, Kuper
argued that plural societies in which cleavages are particularly ‘‘persistent and
pervasive’’ are more likely to experience genocide, especially when political or
economic inequality is ‘‘superimposed’’ on ethnic, religious, racial, or socioeconomic
‘‘differentiation.’’ This kind of social structure, in turn, ‘‘aggregate[s] the population
into distinctive sections, thereby facilitating crimes against collectivities. The divisions
being so pervasive, and relatively consistent in so many spheres, issues of conflict may
move rapidly from one sector to another, until almost the entire society is polarized.’’30
Applying a similar argument to the Armenian Genocide, Richard Hovanissian argues
that the existence of a plural society ‘‘with clearly defined racial, religious, and cultural
differences’’ in Ottoman Turkey was one of the preconditions for the genocide of 1915.31
Kuper cautions, however, that simply because a society is characterized by moderate
or even extreme pluralism, it does not follow that it will automatically fall victim
to genocidal violence. Genocide is unlikely if a plural society does not experience
‘‘the subjective reactions and opportunities to sustain a destructive conflict’’ that mark
genocidal violence.32
Hinton argues that societies that go on to experience genocide are marked by
severe ‘‘social divisions’’ that arise because of ‘‘segregation and differential legal,
sociocultural, political, educational, and economic opportunities afforded to social
groups.’’33 Helen Fein also notes that societies that are marked by ‘‘ethnic
stratification’’ are more likely to be predisposed to ethnic, racial, or religiously based
genocides34 but that political revolutionary or anti-revolutionary genocides, such as
those in Cambodia or in Indonesia during Suharto’s attack on the Indonesian
Communist Party in 1965, are the product of other factors (legitimacy problems, moral
exclusion, blaming the victim, ‘‘tolerance’’ of an international patron for a regime’s
genocidal policies, social unrest due to economic conditions, and the onset of war).35
Critics of the ‘‘divided society’’ approach contend that large-N, mostly quantitative
empirical evidence shows that not all plural societies go genocidal and that some
societies that do experience genocide, such as Cambodia’s, are not characterized by
deep ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic cleavages.36 While the first observation is
accurate, scholars who cite societal cleavages as an important variable do not argue
that such cleavages directly cause genocide, or that they do so alone. Rather, such
divisions create the potential for genocidal violence, but only in concert with other
intervening variables such as severe destabilizing crises or radical eliminationist
ideologies espoused by equally radical genocidal elites.
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No matter what the source of societal cleavages, the important contribution of this
approach is the recognition that divided societies are fragmented societies in which
there is a relative lack of solidarity, trust, and, sometimes, tolerance between groups.37
Just as political scientist Robert Putnam feared for the health of American democracy
because Americans were ‘‘bowling alone,’’ genocidal societies are often (but not always)
societies whose members tend to ‘‘bowl with their own kind.’’ Genocidal elites skillfully
play on and exploit these divisions, while groups within society are unable or unwilling
to rally together to resist such entreaties and to protect targeted members of their own
community.

Crises, revolution, and war
The fact that serious political, economic, or security crises have frequently preceded
genocide, at least in the modern era, has not been lost on many genocide scholars.
While it is recognized in the literature that most societies that endure destabilizing
crises of one kind or another do not go on to perpetrate genocide, there is a strong sense
among some genocide scholars that there is a connection between crises, revolutionary
upheavals, warfare, and genocide.
In her pioneering work Accounting for Genocide, Helen Fein lists reduction of a
state’s ‘‘rank’’ as a consequence of defeat in war or of internal strife as one of several
‘‘predisposing conditions’’ that can propel a state toward a ‘‘crisis of national identity’’
in which elites become more likely to ‘‘adopt a new political formula to justify the
nation’s domination and/or expansion’’ as well as ‘‘idealizing the singular rights of the
dominant group.’’38 For Fein, crises, and elite responses to them, do not directly cause
genocide; rather, crises are part of a longer process that can, under certain
circumstances, culminate in genocide. In his analysis of elite responses to crises,
Midlarsky argues that political elites make the strategic decision to commit genocide in
the face of a loss of territory and other external security crises as a form of ‘‘loss
compensation.’’39 Approaching the effects of crises in a more general way, Florence
Mazian identifies in another early work in the field the role of ‘‘internal strife’’ as a
‘‘social condition’’ that may contribute to the ‘‘value added process’’ that results in
genocide, since internal strife—including ‘‘real or threatened deprivations,’’ various
economic shocks, real or imagined or anticipated frustration, and what Mazian calls
‘‘normative upheavals’’ such as rapid social and institutional change or modernization—can ‘‘heighten social cleavages such as ethnic, political, class, and religious
divisions.’’40 With respect to ordinary members of society, Staub suggests that crises
create psychologically ‘‘difficult life conditions’’ that induce feelings of distress and
frustration, which are then projected onto a marginalized group, particularly any such
group that has recently enjoyed a greater degree of socioeconomic success.41 For
Hinton, crises create a ‘‘hot’’ and ‘‘volatile’’ context in which genocidal processes are
more likely to be ‘‘set off.’’ Socioeconomic, political, and security upheavals produce
‘‘anxiety, hunger, a loss of meaning, the break-down of existing social mechanisms,’’
and often presage a ‘‘struggle for power.’’42 Barbara Harff’s large multi-case
quantitative analysis of genocides and politicides since 1955 confirms that political
upheaval and a prior history of genocide or politicide are strongly predictive of similar
atrocities.43
Conceptualizing crises as opportunities that are seized by elite actors, Chirot
and McCauley suggest that crises create the conditions under which genocide and
mass killing are more likely to occur. A crisis is a disruptive event during which moral
inhibitions against killing are loosened, especially when political elites manipulate
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the crisis. As such, crises give rise to ‘‘the potential for mass killing’’ that can quickly
reach ‘‘genocidal proportions.’’44 In this argument, elite responses to crises are largely
instrumental, in that crises are opportunities that elites grab to mobilize support for
their own destructive policies. Another crisis-as-opportunity argument suggests
that crises allow radical political elites both to come to power and to implement
previously developed genocidal policies against a target group. In this case crises are
what Sidney Tarrow calls, in another context, a ‘‘political opportunity structure.’’45
Lucy Dawidowicz’s ‘‘intentionalist’’ thesis that Hitler’s Nazis developed their plan
to exterminate European Jewry during the turbulent interwar years before their rise
to power, used the upheavals of that period to come to power, and initiated a continentwide war to realize their pre-existing genocidal policies stands as a prime example of a
political opportunity approach.46
We can see, then, that authors who link crises to genocide do not generally suggest
that destabilizing crises necessarily lead to genocide. Rather, crises are conceptualized
as an intervening variable, as a precursor that acts as a trigger for genocide. What is
important about crises is not so much the specific nature of the crises themselves but
how they are perceived by ordinary people and elites: Why did they happened, who is
to blame, and, most importantly, how can the state and society be protected from
similar events in the future? To borrow Alexander Wendt’s phrase about anarchy in
the international system, crisis is what elites and society ‘‘make of it.’’47 What elites
and society ‘‘make’’ of crises rests, at least to some degree, on prevailing cleavages,
attitudes, beliefs, and practices. In genocidal situations, crises are interpreted as
illustrating an ongoing struggle between the political community, on the one hand, and
a specific group, on the other. This group is seen to be responsible for the current
situation and to benefit from it. Taken together, crises and elite (and popular)
reactions to them serve to animate the more virulent anti-group features of the pregenocide political cultural norms, attitudes, and practices, turning what were hitherto
relatively benign manifestations of exclusionary beliefs and authoritarian political
practices into an extremist construction of the identity, interests, and potential actions
of the target group. This reconstruction of the victim group culminates in the
formation and implementation of genocidal policies designed to bring about the
physical or biological destruction of the target group.
Opportunities for genocide can also arise in the form of revolutions. While noting
the central importance of revolutionary ideology (see below) and political myth in
explaining genocide, Robert Melson also argues that a key structural condition for the
revolutionary recasting of society and the ‘‘total domestic genocides’’ that resulted in
Ottoman Turkey, Bolshevik Russia, Nazi Germany, and Khmer Rouge Cambodia was
the collapse of the old regimes and their fragile successors—the collapse not only of the
state’s political institutions but also of its legitimacy. Key crises for Melson are
military defeat and domestic political and economic upheavals.48
In a more recent book, however, Edward Kissi notes that not all revolutions give
way to genocide and that while revolution turned genocidal in Cambodia, it did not in
socialist revolutionary Ethiopia. In Kissi’s view, revolutions turn genocidal only under
very specific conditions: when the targets of mass political killing are fragmented and
atomized to such an extent that they cannot defend themselves against an aggressive
state; when the state is able to successfully dominate society; and when the state
targets for liquidation ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, and inactive or already
defeated political groups, not political groups that genuinely and actively resist
a revolutionary regime. In Ethiopia, which Kissi believes experienced ‘‘politicide’’
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(as defined by Barbara Harff) and not genocide, revolution gave way to severe
repression, political violence, and terror directed at the many armed opposition groups
(but not at ethnic or religious groups) and their supporters.49
Wars, as other scholars have argued, can also act as a structural condition that can
lead to, and facilitate, the perpetration of genocidal violence. Eric Markusen and David
Kopf, for example, have argued that while total war and genocide are not identical
phenomena, they nonetheless share a number of characteristics. Total wars and
genocides are pursued by political elites to protect national security, are underpinned
by ideologies that dehumanize the targets of violence, are bureaucratically organized,
and are perpetrated with sophisticated technologies that kill large numbers of people
easily and efficiently in a manner that insulates the killers from the suffering of their
victims.50 Aside from these commonalities, Markusen and Kopf also suggest that war,
as a form of extreme security crisis, creates social and psychological conditions
‘‘conducive to the outbreak of genocide and genocidal killing.’’ By exposing societies to
severe crises and threats to national survival, wars
create the potential for pre-existing inter-group tensions in a culturally or
racially diverse society to flare into violence directed by the majority against
members of a minority group. The threat of disruption is not only blamed on the
external enemy but can also be directed at members of a minority group within the
society.51

Further, war can give governments the tools to commit genocide and to cover its
tracks. Markusen and Kopf thus note that governments engaged in total war ‘‘tend to
become more centralized, secret, and powerful’’ and tend to use dehumanizing
propaganda to vilify their enemies. ‘‘The result can be diminished popular awareness
of, and resistance to, ruthless governmental actions against both external and internal
enemies.’’52 Governments at war also have at their disposal combat-ready soldiers in
the field who can be diverted to perpetrate genocide. Meanwhile, the conditions of war
leave victim groups isolated and vulnerable and perpetrators and bystanders
psychologically desensitized to violence as a result of their exposure to the violence
of war.53 Similarly, Scott Straus argues that in Rwanda the renewed civil war in 1994
helped drive the genocide because the war was constructed by the perpetrators as a
security crisis in which violence had to be used to overcome a threat; all Tutsis were
constructed as ‘‘enemies’’ along with the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The civil war also
created a circumstance of uncertainty and insecurity within which mass violence was
legitimized and ‘‘specialists in violence’’ such as soldiers, gendarmes, and militias could
be mobilized for genocidal killing.54
Omer Bartov, focusing on the construction of the meaning of war, notes that defeat
in war can lead not only to the search for, and punishment of, internal ‘‘enemies’’
responsible for the catastrophe but also to the conceptualization of combat in modern
industrialized total war as a necessary and glorious form of destruction in which
the ‘‘destruction of others’’ is believed to bring about one’s own ‘‘resurrection.’’55 In
the German case, ‘‘the Great War’s new fields of glory were the breeding ground
of fascism and Nazism, of human degradation and extermination, and from them
sprang the storm troops of dictatorships and the demagogues of racial purity and
exclusion.’’56 When war came again on a much wider and more horrific scale, German
soldiers
expressed pride and satisfaction in finally being able to destroy their enemies, be they
soldiers, prisoners, civilians, or provoking the greatest glee, Jewish men, women, and
children. It was at this point that massacre and glory became synonymous.57
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For scholars like Markusen and Kopf, Kuper, and, more recently, Martin Shaw,
war not only sets the stage, and acts as a cover, for genocide but can devolve into
genocidal violence. Genocide, for Shaw, is in fact a distinctive form of war against
civilians and is intertwined with other forms of war, particularly what he calls
‘‘degenerate war.’’ Degenerate war involves ‘‘the deliberate and systematic extension of
war against an organized armed enemy [what Shaw identifies as legitimate or ‘‘real
war’’] to war against a largely unarmed civilian population’’58 in conflicts such as
guerrilla wars, counter-insurgencies, or wars that involve the aerial bombardment of
civilian populations. Although Shaw defines genocide as ‘‘the destruction by an
organized armed force of a large unarmed civilian group (or groups)’’ in which civilians
are regarded as enemies ‘‘in themselves’’ and not ‘‘through their relationship to an
armed enemy,’’ genocide, because of its ‘‘definition of civilian groups as enemies to be
destroyed,’’ utilizes the logic of war and is, therefore, an extension of degenerate war.
Genocides are often perpetrated, Shaw notes, within the context of military (war) and
political (revolutionary and counter-revolutionary) struggles and are frequently ended
by war.59 War, and the preparation for it, can also help, in Shaw’s view, to turn the
corner from degenerate and other forms of war to genocide. Perpetrator states are
often militarized states that have experienced war in the recent past and consequently
have in place the military and paramilitary institutions and a militaristic ideology that
legitimizes the use of military force against defined enemies.60 Because Shaw sees
genocide as a form of war, he claims that genocides, wars, and revolutions are all forms
of conflict defined by two commonly held characteristics: that ‘‘opposing sides aim to
destroy each other’s power’’ and that each side is ‘‘prepared to engage in mass killing of
the enemy in order to achieve their goal.’’61 Like war, genocide is a form of conflict in
which the perpetrator aims to ‘‘destroy’’ the ‘‘social power’’ (economic, cultural, and
political power) of a group and their ability to fight back.62 While the conflict usually
begins as an unequal struggle in which the victim group (a term Shaw conspicuously
does not use) is initially unarmed, it evolves into a more balanced confrontation once
the victims begin to resist and find more powerful domestic or international allies.
Shaw offers the fact that wars fought by internal forces (e.g., the Rwandan Patriotic
Front) or by external forces (e.g., the Allies in World War II) frequently end genocide as
evidence of this position.
As the literature shows, revolution and war are the extremist contexts within
which modern genocides are often perpetrated. But it would be a mistake to equate
or conflate genocide with either. Both revolutions and wars occur without going
genocidal; some genocides occur after a war is over (e.g., in Cambodia) or do not occur
during warfare at all (e.g., the Stalinist purges of the 1930s—assuming, of course, that
one classifies the latter as genocide). Shaw’s contention that genocide is a form of war
because ‘‘opposing sides aim to destroy each other’s power’’ and each side is ‘‘prepared
to engage in mass killing of the enemy in order to achieve their goal’’63 conflates
genocide with something it clearly is not: a contest between two opposing forces that
possess the intention to defeat each other in a struggle over something concrete
(economic, political, and cultural sources of ‘‘social power’’ as Shaw puts it) fought by
two opponents with actually existing offensive and defensive power capabilities.
Part of the problem with Shaw’s thesis is the confusion over the status of the
perpetrators’ and victims’ intentions. The UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and many genocide scholars argue that genocide
is defined by the ‘‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part’’ the victim group ‘‘as such.’’64
This is an intention that is held only by the perpetrators, not the victims, which is
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precisely why the two main collective actors in genocide are referred to not as
‘‘combatants’’ but as ‘‘victims’’ and ‘‘perpetrators.’’ Physical and/or biological destruction of the members of the victim group is the policy goal of genocidal regimes, not
simply the stripping of the group of it power capabilities, which could be accomplished
by all sorts of other policies that fall short of genocide. On the other side of the ledger,
confronting a regime as an opposing force bent on depriving the state of its power
capabilities, possibly through resort to ‘‘mass killing,’’ was not the intention of the
Ottoman Armenians, European Jews, the various victims of the Khmer Rouge, or
Rwandan Tutsis (save members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front).
As for the use and deployment of force by the victim group, the victims of genocide
are victims of this particular crime precisely because of their helplessness and the lack
of real (as opposed to perceived) threat and opposition they pose to the perpetrators.
In her definition of genocide, Helen Fein tells us that genocide is a
sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity
directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of
group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the
victim.65

For Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, genocide is a ‘‘form of one-sided mass killing in
which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group’’;66 Israel Charny, in what
he calls his ‘‘generic’’ definition of genocide, similarly notes that genocide is
characterized by the
mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military
action against the military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential
defenselessness and helplessness of the victims.67

Whether we argue that genocide and war are distinct phenomena or that genocide is in
fact a form of warfare, we must recognize that the victims of genocide are just that:
victims who do not pose a real threat to their tormentors, who are not combatants in an
equal or even an unequal contest with a state or other authority, and who do not
possess actually existing power capabilities that they can deploy to defend themselves
and fight their enemies. The fact that small numbers of victims may actively resist
their destruction, sometimes through force of arms, neither transforms these people
into regular combatants nor turns the attempted destruction of their own group by a
predatory state into a two-sided conflict.

Regime type
Other structural explanations focus on how the structure of political regimes
determines the adoption (or not) of genocidal policies. One of the earliest comparative
explanations of genocide, offered by Irving Horowitz, argues that genocide is inherent
to totalitarian political systems. Because totalitarian regimes attempt to exert total
political, economic, and social control over all aspects of life and over all members of
society, such regimes inexorably end up liquidating whole groups of people who are
deemed to be outside of, or hostile to, the totalitarian order.68 Similarly, for Hannah
Arendt (although her work predates Horowitz and does not deal explicitly with
genocide but with totalitarianism) the fullest expression of totalitarianism—that
practiced by the Nazi and Stalinist regimes—was the exercise of ‘‘total domination’’ in
the death camps, in which ‘‘everything,’’ including the extermination of superfluous
peoples, became possible.69
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The main weakness of the totalitarian regime thesis is that it is overly
deterministic. As we will see below, although the ideologies that animate what
have been labeled totalitarian regimes70—namely, Communist regimes and Nazi
Germany—were radical and highly exclusionary, not all totalitarian regimes have
perpetrated genocide against segments of their own population. Pol Pot’s Democratic
Kampuchea certainly did so, but other so-called totalitarian regimes, such as unified
socialist Vietnam, did not single out whole groups of people for destruction, although
the first decade of Communist rule after Vietnam’s unification in 1975 was marked by
repression and serious human-rights abuses against elements of the former regime.
Given the different experiences of totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century with
respect to the perpetration, or not, of genocide, we cannot definitively argue that
the structures and processes of totalitarianism invariably result in the genocidal
killing of specific groups.
Looking at the opposite side of the political spectrum, Rudolph Rummel links
regime type to genocide and other forms of mass violence by suggesting that while
democratic regimes are liable to inflict violent death on citizens of other states through
combat operations, bombings, or isolated atrocities, they are very unlikely to target
their own citizens for mass repression or killing. Based on a detailed statistical
examination of deaths caused by governments, Rummel argues, according to what he
calls the ‘‘power principle,’’ that
the more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the
whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and murder its
foreign and domestic subjects. The more constrained the power of governments, the less
it will aggress on others.71

Taking Rummel’s analysis further, Harff’s statistical analysis shows that failed
authoritarian states are three and a half times more likely to lead to genocide or
politicide than state failure in democratic regimes.72
As Rummel’s empirical investigation tells us, regime type, at least for twentiethcentury genocides, is related to whether a regime is more or less likely to commit
genocide. Non-democratic regimes have a higher incidence of committing atrocities,
including genocide, against their own people, than democratic regimes, which in the
past century have not perpetrated genocides against their own people. But because
there is also a large number of authoritarian regimes, historical and current, that have
not perpetrated genocide, Rummel’s study tells us only that there is a correlation
between authoritarian regimes and genocidal policies, not that there is a causal
connection between the two phenomena. The most we can say, then, is that nondemocratic states are more likely than democracies to commit genocide. This is so not
simply because a state is authoritarian but because states that go on to commit
genocide historically have used authoritarian methods, such as repression and
sometimes violence, to manage domestic conflicts and confront real and perceived
enemies. Elites’ strategy of habitually using confrontational or violent methods of
conflict management is underpinned by a long-standing elite political culture that
frames conflicts as zero-sum struggles in which the state must win or be completely
defeated.73 This history of authoritarian practices and perceptions, in turn, creates an
ideational and experiential context that sets the stage, during genocide, for the targets
of destruction to be perceived as a mortal threat by elites. Following historical and
political cultural precedent, the victims are dealt with not through concessions or
lesser forms of repression but through violent processes of extermination intended
to secure the survival of the state and the majority society.
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Modernity, the modern state, and modern exclusionary ideologies
The final group of structural arguments links the onset of genocide to broad processes
of modernization, particularly the rise of the modern bureaucratized nation-state, as
well as to the creation of radical exclusionary nationalist, racist, or revolutionary
ideologies. The former argument suggests that it is the material structure of the
modern nation-state that facilitates genocide, while the latter argument concentrates
on ideology as an ideational structure that produces genocidal behavior.
Zygmunt Bauman argues in his analysis of the structural foundations of the
Holocaust that the increased division and specialization of bureaucratic functions
within the modern nation-state and society allows the thousands of people involved in
genocidal programs to remove themselves conceptually from any moral responsibility
for their small and specialized part in the extermination process.74 Thus the killing of
whole groups of innocent human beings has become conceptually, psychologically, and
morally unproblematic in the modern age.
Influenced by modern conceptions of inferior and superior races or exploited and
exploiting classes, coupled with a proclivity for powerful, centralized, bureaucratic
states to conceive of grand projects of social engineering and their capacity to
implement such policies, modern states have the potential to become genocidal
‘‘gardener states,’’ according to Bauman. For the gardener state, genocide is not a
policy of destruction but a grand project of construction. Recalling Arendt’s totalitarian
everything-is-possible thesis, Bauman argues that the gardener state seeks to
construct new social, economic, demographic, or political orders as a landscaper
plants and tends a garden. Just as gardens inevitably grow weeds that do not belong in
a meticulously designed garden, so new racial, national, or revolutionary systems
contain human beings who do not belong in the new order. As weeds are pulled by a
gardener to maintain the intended design and composition of the garden, groups of
human beings who do not belong to the new order must be exterminated by the
gardener state.75
Although Bauman offers a compelling metaphor congruent with the spirit of many
radical ideologies and genocidal elites’ desire to construct completely new societies, his
analysis does not tell us why the pulling of human weeds—that is, the removal of
certain groups who do not belong to the new order—necessarily involves physical
extermination. Simply understanding a group as misfits who upset the composition of
the new order cannot explain why genocide becomes a policy option for some elites,
rather than apartheid-like segregation and repression, internal deportation, or
expulsion. The latter policies accomplish exactly what Bauman suggests the gardener
state wants to do: the removal of groups of people who are thought to deviate in some
way from the rest of the newly constructed order. His metaphor is not irrelevant, but it
is too benign. We must remember why gardeners get rid of the weeds in their gardens.
It is not just because weeds do not look right, or were not in the flat of flowers the
gardener planted; it is because, if left unchecked, they will choke off and kill the
garden. That is why gardeners do not just pull off the tops of weeds, or replant them
somewhere else, but instead are careful to thoroughly dig weeds out by their roots or
use herbicide to ensure that the weeds can never grow again.
Alvarez also focuses on the role of the state and state institutions as the principal
perpetrators of genocide, but without explicitly linking this role to the consequences of
modernity itself. For Alvarez, genocide is a form of ‘‘state criminality’’ that is
underpinned by two ‘‘constructs of belief,’’ sovereignty and nationalism.76 Because
sovereignty rests on the principle of non-interference by states in the domestic affairs
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of other states, and because there is no higher authority in the international system
above and beyond the state, states encounter few, if any, restrictions on their domestic
policies and are unlikely to be faced with intervention by other states.77 Nationalism,
meanwhile, is the ideological mechanism that ‘‘assures loyalty to and belief in the
state.’’78 Alvarez acknowledges that nationalism exists in a variety of forms and that it
is the most extreme forms of ethnic nationalism, particularly in multiethnic states,
that fuel state-sponsored genocide. Citing Michael Ignatieff, he contends that ethnic
nationalism ‘‘exacerbates perceived differences among people, and transforms
divisions into all-important definitions of identity.’’79 Alvarez’s account of why states
perpetrate genocide extends beyond these two foundational conceptions, however,
to include the connection between genocide and war (in a manner similar to that
discussed above) and the law, which he identifies as a ‘‘set of resources’’ that the state
mobilizes and uses as a tool to translate its power into genocidal policies.80 Expanding
on Bauman’s analysis, Alvarez also discusses in detail the role of state institutions,
both military/security and civilian bureaucratic, in the perpetration of genocide.
For Alvarez, state institutions are perpetrators of genocide, because their role is
to implement specific genocidal policies. Once genocide begins, the members of
these institutions engage in criminal activity (i.e., genocide) not as individuals but as
members of what have essentially become criminal organizations. Members
of military, paramilitary, and state security organizations perpetrate genocidal killing
because ‘‘their training is geared toward providing recruits with the technical skills of
violence and socializing them into a value system that supports fierceness, aggression,
and solidarity with their comrades.’’81 Civilian state bureaucracies, with their
emphasis on technical efficiency, depersonalization, and the strict application of
rules and procedures, produce desk killers who faithfully apply the ‘‘rules’’ of genocide
to unseen depersonalized ‘‘units’’ without having to think about or witness the very
real consequences of their small, often specialized, but entirely lethal actions.82
Bauman’s and Alvarez’s insights into bureaucratic specialization and the moral
distancing of perpetrators from the genocidal process do help explain how it was that
large numbers of public and private employees, managers, and administrators in Nazi
Germany could continue to play their own small but deadly parts in keeping the
machinery of destruction in motion, unmolested by moral qualms about the program’s
outcome. This kind of argument, however, cannot explain other genocides, such as
those in Cambodia and Rwanda, where the killing was not bureaucratized but instead
involved face-to-face public killing, albeit directed by the state,83 sometimes by
ordinary people who were not members of a state security organization. Nor can the
modern bureaucratic state thesis explain why political elites decide to perpetrate
genocide in the first place, only how it was that a modern Western state like Nazi
Germany, with desks full of killers like Adolf Eichmann, had the capacity to execute
genocidal policies.
Other genocide scholars suggest that the main product of modernity that has
produced the genocides of the twentieth century and beyond is not the modern state
itself but modern revolutionary ideologies that are inherently genocidal.84 These
ideologies rest, Eric Weitz argues, on modern conceptions of the world as naturally
divided into races and nations, or on Marxist notions of class conflict between
exploiting and exploited classes,85 or, as Hinton contends, on a more general turn
toward an ‘‘emphasis on the individual, empiricism, secularism, rationality, progress,’’
and the potential of science. For Hinton, the latter can produce genocidal processes of
social engineering in which ‘‘human societies, like nature, could be mastered,
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reconstructed, and improved.’’86 In modern societies, our innate capacity to identify
differences between peoples becomes ‘‘reified’’ in a world in which modern nationstates ‘‘covet homogeneity.’’ Modernity also gives rise to the crafting of hierarchical
scientific typologies that identify groups as inherently inferior or superior, to the use of
science as the ‘‘legitimating rationale for slavery, exploitation, and ultimately
genocide,’’ and to conceptions of progress that are used as a standard against which
peoples are judged or can be manipulated or even exterminated ‘‘to achieve [a] desired
end.’’87
In his account of twentieth-century genocides, Weitz concentrates specifically on
the evolution of, and appropriation into, radical eliminationist ideologies of a number
of specifically modern concepts. Influenced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s and Johann
Gottfried von Herder’s conception of nations as primordial entities with a common
language, culture, and history, nationalism by the nineteenth century, according to
Weitz, morphed into a racialized understanding of nationhood as an ethnic and racial
community and not simply a locus of political rights.88 Primordial and exclusionary
understandings of race and nation gained particular prominence in Germany and
elsewhere on the European continent by the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Weitz further argues that the rise of race thinking and ethnic nationalism coincided
with the rapid expansion of European imperialism and the resulting exposure
of increasing numbers of Westerners to indigenous and other peoples who were
physiologically and culturally different from themselves. These encounters only
seemed to confirm the idea that some races, namely white Europeans, were superior to
others, namely Africans, Asians, and the indigenous peoples of the Americas already
colonized by European settlers in previous centuries.89 The felling of Western colonists
by tropical diseases and the simultaneous rise in support for eugenics and the ‘‘theory’’
of social Darwinism (the struggle for the survival of the fittest races) culminated in a
conception of society as
analogous to the body and race as a biological organism, whose health needed constant
attention, whose vitality was continually in danger of being sapped by killer bacteria
borne by the weaker members and by those of completely alien races.90

When added to the dehumanization of the enemy during World War I, all of these
ideational factors produced, according to Weitz in the case of the Holocaust, the idea
that the Jewish ‘‘disease’’ in Germany weakened the German ‘‘body’’ and should be
removed through radical eugenicist measures in order to preserve the racial purity of
Aryans.91 Similar revolutionary ideas that societies are divided based on the
ownership of the means of production into classes, and the inevitability of class
conflict, inspired genocidal revolutionary movements and regimes that identified
certain classes as exploiters and counter-revolutionaries who did not fit into the new
revolutionary system and, therefore, had to be eliminated in genocidal purges in states
such as the Stalinist Soviet Union and Democratic Kampuchea.
Ideological explanations are not always tied to modernity or the ideologically
driven creation of radically new societies, however. Ben Kiernan’s treatment of
ideology suggests that while certain elements such as race thinking and the
homogenization of populations on newly acquired or desired territories are modernist
parts of the radical ideologies that underpin genocide, other elements of genocidal
ideology are fundamentally anti-modern. For Kiernan, many genocidal regimes
conceptualize the peasantry as the most ‘‘authentic’’ members of the political
community, while cosmopolitan urban areas and their populations are considered to
be ‘‘contaminated with foreign and decadent elements.’’92 The goal for these genocidal
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elites is to recreate a glorious rural past through the genocidal destruction of peoples
who are supposedly contaminating the pure peasantry and the countryside.
Ideology-based explanations point to the importance of ideas in the genocidal
process as well as to the propensity for genocidal elites to categorize groups in society
and to conceptualize their victims as alien and hostile to new or old revolutionary
systems that must be purified of all deviant behavior, thought, or unworthy or inferior
human beings. More than other explanations of genocide, the ideology approach also
picks up the central role of threat perception, namely that genocidal elites come to
see their victims not just as inferiors or misfits but as dangerous ‘‘enemies within.’’
But, as with the modern state approach, the ideology variable cannot on its own
account for why genocide, and not some other policy of repression or violence, occurs.
Weitz, for example, lays out in great detail the conceptual origins of Nazi and radical
Communist thought, but then, when it comes to the case studies of individual
genocides, does not really account for why genocide was perpetrated against some
groups and not others. In the case of the Holocaust, Weitz ties the Nazis’ racist, social
Darwinist ideology to the T4 eugenics program that targeted physically and mentally
ill patients in Germany; the harsh treatment meted out against Poles, who were slated
to became a vast pool of slave labor for the Nazis in the new German East during and
after the war; and the Jews, who from the summer of 1941 onward were the objects of
total extermination. thus, in his analysis, the same ideology explains three different
policy outcomes.

Process Explanations: Identity Construction
While the approaches discussed thus far do at times refer to the processes by which
genocide comes to be perpetrated, theories that concentrate on identity construction as
the main explanatory variable are much more explicitly process-oriented approaches.
When discussing the identity construction of the victim group by the perpetrators of
genocide, the literature tends to group a number of different constructions under
one generic label, such as ‘‘dehumanization’’ or ‘‘demonization.’’ If we look carefully we
can, in fact, identify three distinct yet interrelated processes of identity construction
that scholars suggest lead to genocide: conceptions of the victims as an ‘‘alien’’ other; as
sub- or non-humans; and as threatening ‘‘enemies within.’’

Victims as other
From a social psychological perspective, Chirot and McCauley argue that human
beings have the capacity to ‘‘single out for genocide any kind of self-reproducing social
category.’’93 Humans categorize other human groups as ‘‘others’’ because we naturally
divide the world into in-groups and out-groups characterized by their own distinct
‘‘essences.’’ These essences, either one’s own or another’s, are regarded as ‘‘an
unchanging quality that makes a group what it is.’’94 For the authors, this dynamic of
essentializing the identity of the other as different or foreign is a necessary part of the
process of identity construction that leads to genocide, but it is not a sufficient
condition on its own. Developing a similar social psychological approach, Waller notes
the innate capacity of humans to divide the world into ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them,’’ which, under
the right contextual and institutional conditions, helps lead to what he calls the ‘‘social
death’’ of the victim, whereby the victim group is psychologically removed from the
wider society. One of the features (along with dehumanization and blaming the victim)
of the social death of the victims is the persistence of ‘‘us–them thinking.’’95 Waller also
cites moderate, rather than radical or ideologically driven, feelings of antipathy toward
328

Theorizing Destruction: Reflections on the State of Comparative Genocide Theory

the victim group and a ‘‘lack of emotional connection’’ with the victims as part of a
dynamic that, in genocide, neutralizes popular aversion to authoritarian politics in
general and the genocidal destruction of other groups in particular.96
In a frequently cited reference, Fein argues that one of the key preconditions for
genocidal destruction is the removal of the victim group from the ‘‘sanctified universe
of obligation.’’ Referring specifically to the Armenians and Jews, Fein continues that
the universe of obligations from which these groups were excluded was traditionally
constituted by ‘‘that circle of people with reciprocal obligations to protect each other
whose bonds arose from their relationship to a deity.’’ The historical exclusion of the
Armenians and Jews based on religious criteria set the precedent for the later secular
conception of these groups as ‘‘strangers.’’97 Fein’s sociological analysis is significant
because it points to two important dynamics. First, the exclusion of groups from society
and their definition as aliens is not ahistorical but, rather, flows from already existing
exclusionary practices and beliefs in society, although the exact content of these
practices and beliefs may change over time. Second, the emphasis on reciprocity goes
beyond inquiring into the tendency of human beings to see other human groups as
simply different and imbeds the meaning of that conception of difference in a wider
social context in which those who are deemed to belong are extended rights and mutual
support while, as Herbert Hirsch and Roger W. Smith point out,98 those who are not
are stripped of any protection, formal or informal, that membership in the community
provides against a predatory state. The definition of the victim group as outsider,
therefore, allows us to understand why bystanders wash their hands of a group to
whom they believe they owe nothing and why perpetrators come to believe they can
pursue their genocidal policies unopposed.
Taking the analysis further, Hirsch and Smith argue that defining the out-group
through the use of myths not only marks one group off as different from other groups
and apart from the wider society but also involves the dehumanization of the members
of the group and culminates in calls for concrete action to bring about the group’s
extermination.99 For Waller, defining the victim group as other produces the ‘‘moral
disengagement’’ of bystanders and perpetrators from the victims. This process entails
an ‘‘active but gradual process of detachment’’ from the victims that exceeds mere
moral indifference or invisibility and instead leads to the conceptual placing of the
victim group ‘‘outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of
fairness apply.’’100 As in Fein’s analysis, this conception of the victim group leaves it
cut off from society and thus vulnerable to all manner of abuses.

Victims as sub- or non-human
Categorizing groups into ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them,’’ or even into the more normative ‘‘us’’ versus
‘‘foreigner’’ or ‘‘stranger,’’ is insufficient in and of itself to account for genocide.
To understand why the physical destruction of the group becomes necessary from the
perspective of the perpetrators, scholars who focus on identity construction look
further, to conceptions of the victim groups as non-human. Once the victims are so
conceived, the perpetrators can do anything to them, because the victims are seen to
stand not only outside a particular political, national, ethnic, or racial community but
outside of humanity itself.
In his pioneering work on the psychology of genocide, Israel Charny defines
dehumanization as the act of redefining the victims of genocide as ‘‘not being part of
the human species.’’101 For Chirot and McCauley, the perceptions of the different
‘‘essences’’ that mark off groups from one another can further give rise to more
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malevolent conceptions of the victim group as ‘‘not quite human.’’ Conceptualized as
non-human, the victims can thus be ‘‘used, abused, and eliminated as if they were
another species of animal.’’102 In his ‘‘eight stages of genocide’’ early-warning
taxonomy, Gregory Stanton identifies dehumanization as integral to the genocidal
process because the conception of the victim group as non human not only ‘‘denies the
humanity of the other group’’ but also performs the crucial function of overcoming ‘‘the
normal human revulsion against murder.’’103 As for which groups are most likely to be
the target of dehumanization, Waller argues that the dehumanization of victim groups
is most easily projected onto people belonging to different racial, ethnic, religious, or
even political groups who are ‘‘regarded as inferior or threatening.’’104 Chalk and
Jonassohn similarly contend that genocide cannot happen to people who are regarded
by their tormentors as equal to themselves or as fully human. The tendency to see outgroups as non-human is most apparent when ‘‘the differences between the people and
some other society [are] particularly large.’’ The tragic consequence of conceptualizing
particular groups as ‘‘less than fully human,’’ as ‘‘pagans, savages, or even animals,’’ is
the consequent understanding that the ‘‘values and the standards of the people’’ are
not applicable to the out-group.105
The dehumanization of the victim group is likewise a necessary step in the
genocidal process, for Waller, because it facilitates the ‘‘moral disengagement’’ of the
perpetrator from the victim. This process involves not just indifference to the plight of
the victims but ‘‘an active [. . .] gradual, process of detachment by which some
individuals or groups are placed outside the boundary in which moral values, rules,
and considerations of fairness apply.’’106 Charny similarly argues that dehumanization
‘‘aims at a redefinition of the other person as not deserving the protection due members
of our species. Hence, anything and everything that is destructive of the other person,
even killing, does not violate nature’s design.’’ Charny considers dehumanization to be
both the ‘‘ideological justification’’ for genocidal killing and its ultimate ‘‘rationale.’’107
With respect to the perpetration of violence against the victims, Herbert Kelman
contends that dehumanization is one of the processes by which the ‘‘usual moral
inhibitions against violence become weakened,’’ which, in turn, creates a context in
which moral principles are believed to no longer apply to the victim,108 thus facilitating
smooth and guilt-free killing.

Victims as threat
Finally, the identity construction literature focuses on perpetrators’ conceptions of the
victim group as a source of danger or threat that the perpetrators believe they must
counter through the physical destruction of the victims. For strategic choice theorists
like Valentino, the victims of genocide are conceptualized as a threat because they are
seen to stand in the way of the realization of radical policy goals. For scholars
who focus on identity construction specifically, perceptions of the threat believed to be
posed by the victim group are said to be manifested in fear of the victim group,
including fear of death in general and fear of lethal contamination and extermination
in particular.
Charny argues that genocidal killing is an extreme but logical product of an all-toohuman process of projecting onto others that which we fear most. In genocide, the
overwhelming fear of death itself is projected by the perpetrators onto the victims. The
perpetrator thus kills his or her victims because ‘‘he believes he is justified in sparing
himself death’’ by causing the death of others.109 Sharpening Charney’s rather general
explanation, Chirot and McCauley suggest that genocidal killers are motivated
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by specific fears that grow out of a more general fear of death. For these authors, fear
of ‘‘pollution’’ is the ‘‘most extreme reason’’ for genocidal and mass killing and for other
policies such as deportation. Here the victim group is seen to represent a ‘‘mortal
danger’’ that must be removed from society in some way. This fear of pollution stems
historically from concerns with religious purity, and in the twentieth century from
concerns with racial and class purity.110
Perceptions of threat can also, according to Chirot and McCauley, produce other
powerful emotions such as hatred of the victim group. Because the victim group is seen
to be possessed of a ‘‘bad essence’’ (see above), that essence produces a hatred of the
victim group grounded in a conception of the group as so ‘‘fundamentally flawed’’ that
it ‘‘cannot be fixed.’’111 As noted earlier, Chirot and McCauley point to a dynamic they
call ‘‘double essentializing,’’ in which a ‘‘battle’’ ensues between ‘‘good and evil,’’
between the ‘‘two incompatible essences’’ of the perpetrators and the victims, in which
the love for members of the in-group necessarily engenders hate for the threatening
out-group. For Chirot and McCauley, the double essentializing dynamic is at the heart
of the most extreme genocides.112
The conception of victims as threat is amplified by the perception of the victims as
a powerful force bent on the extermination of the perpetrators, the state, society, the
nation, the race, or a new revolutionary order. Given what is perceived to be the very
real possibility of one’s own extermination at the hands of the victim group, the latter
must be exterminated first. Psychologist Robert Jay Lifton, for example, concludes his
study of Nazi doctors at Auschwitz by suggesting that ‘‘[w]here the threat is so
absolute and so ultimate [. . .] genocide becomes not only appropriate but an urgent
necessity.’’113 Lifton continues,
thus perceived as an absolute threat to the continuous life of one’s own people,
the victim group is seen as the bearer of death and therefore the embodiment of evil.
More than merely non-human or heathen, it is dangerously anti-man and anti-God.
Its disease takes the form of infecting others with death taint and deadly weakness. [. . .]
Only genocide, total elimination of the disease will protect one from that weakness.

The victim group ‘‘threatens one’s own people with extinction so one must absolutely
extinguish [them] first.’’114 Chirot and McCauley argue that genocidal killers are
motivated by the short-term fear that ‘‘failure to enforce vengeance will ultimately
allow the enemy to regain strength and inflict further punishment’’ and by long-term
fears of collective extermination at the hands of the victim group.115
The literature on identity construction contributes to our overall understanding of
why and how genocide happens by demonstrating that perceptions of the victim group
matter. Elites and ordinary people base their actions toward the victim group on
how they perceive the identity of the victim group, because the interests and actions
(past, present, and future) of the victim group are believed to rest on the group’s
collective identity. The existing literature, while promising, needs to be developed
further to flesh out the exact relationship between collective identity construction,
on the one hand, and the initiation and acceptance of genocidal policies, on the
other. As it is, how exactly perceptions of the victim group lead to genocide, and
not some other form of repression and violence, is treated in a rather general way.
One possible avenue of inquiry is to explore the proposition that the relationship
between collective identity construction, interests, and actions is a linear one
whereby perpetrators believe that the identity of the victim group determines the
group’s interests, which, in turn, determines its actions. This perceived relationship
between identity, interests, and actions could be what links perceptions of difference,
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non-humanness, and threat to the initiation, implementation, and acceptance of
genocidal policies.
The identity construction literature also needs to consider more carefully how
the identities of the victim group are constructed in the first place and how this
construction can change over time. The works of Fein and of Hirsch and Smith serve as
a starting point for exploring how the historic relationship between groups and
perceptions of the nature of that relationship, particularly exclusionary attitudes
toward the eventual victims of genocide, underpin later, more malevolent constructions of the victims as foreigners, enemies, threats, and subhuman vermin. We must
also search for the triggers that turn generalized long-standing anti-group feelings,
attitudes, and practices into the specific kinds of identity construction that are linked
to genocide. Crises and the rise to power of highly ideological radical political elites
are likely candidates for the transformation of the eventual victims of genocide from
marginal insiders seen in a negative light to pernicious, threatening ‘‘enemies within’’
requiring extermination.
Finally, the literature sometimes appears to conflate what are in fact different but
interrelated conceptions of the victim group. This conflation obscures our understanding of the specific functions that each of these conceptions plays in the genocidal
process. Although this review groups the literature into three categories of identity
construction (victims as outsiders, victims as non-humans, and victims as threat),
genocidal scholars have a tendency to refer to disparate conceptions simultaneously, in
an undifferentiated list of labels, as if they were all one and the same. Hirsch and
Smith, for example, begin their stimulating analysis of language, myth, and genocide
by suggesting that the first function of exclusionary language and myths is ‘‘defining
the out-group.’’ The label ‘‘defining the out-group’’ would seem to suggest a specific
conception of the victim group as outsiders or foreigners, but the section begins with
language that defines the victims not just as other or foreign but as ‘‘vermin, infidels,
traitors, heretics, enemies of the people,’’ all of which are said to loosen inhibitions
against mass killing.116 Chalk and Jonassohn likewise argue that one of the key
precursors to genocide is the perception that the victim group is not equal to, and
fundamentally different from, the wider community. The conceptions of the victim
group in the authors’ analysis subsequently include references to the victims as
‘‘less than fully human’’ (‘‘pagans, savages, and even animals’’), ‘‘worthless, outside the
web of mutual obligations, a threat to the people, immoral sinners, and/or sub/
human.’’117 If we look at Hirsch and Smith and Chalk and Jonassohn’s lists of
conceptions of the victim group, we find that some of the conceptions are rather
different from others. Some of them conceptualize the victims as outsider (‘‘infidels,’’
‘‘heretics,’’ ‘‘outside the web of mutual obligations’’), some as sub- or non-human
(‘‘vermin,’’ ‘‘less than fully human,’’ ‘‘pagans,’’ ‘‘savages,’’ ‘‘animals,’’ ‘‘worthless,’’
‘‘sub-human’’), and some as threats (‘‘enemies of the people,’’ ‘‘a threat to the people’’).
Drawing distinctions among different perceptions of the victim group rather than
treating them as different names for the same perception is important if, as suggested
earlier, we argue that perceptions of identity determine perceptions of interests and
future actions. Victims who are defined by the perpetrator group as outsiders or
foreigners are seen to have fundamental interests that do not fit with those of the
wider community. Victims who are defined as subhuman or as animals are seen to be
so base as to be completely expendable. Victims who are conceptualized as threats are
seen as powerful forces, as mortally imperiling the survival of the entire political
community. It is this latter conception of the victim group that motivates genocide,
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not the dehumanization of the victims or seeing the victims as outsiders and
foreigners. The last two conceptions are a necessary part of the genocidal process
because they facilitate killing and because they separate the victims from the rest
of society, respectively. But neither of these conceptions serves as the motivator
for genocide, because they are too benign: non-humans are so low as to be nothing
and, therefore, cannot constitute an overwhelming threat; groups conceived of as only
outsiders or foreigners are believed to be non-members of the community and,
therefore, are not owed rights or obligations, but this conception on its own does not
threaten the community and does not require a genocidal response. Only the ‘‘mortal
threat’’ conception of the victim group leads elites to initiate, and society to accept,
genocidal policies, because only this conception requires elites and society to act to
protect themselves from a threat whose continued existence is perceived to portend
their own destruction if it is not first neutralized through genocidal policies.

The Way Forward
Comparative genocide theorizing has flourished over the last twenty years. Scholars
from a variety of disciplines have produced theories to explain the genocidal behavior
of elite and societal actors and have identified the big and small structures and
processes that lead to genocide. What we need to do now is concentrate on how we
theorize, specifically how we create comparative theories and how we test those
theories using the comparative method.
As the review above has shown, many genocide scholars have already begun to
generate theories in which the exact variables at play in the genocidal process are
spelled out in great detail. We must continue this trend, and we must think very
carefully, as we theorize, not just about the variables we think are associated with
genocide but about precisely what the relationship is between the variables we think
are important and under what conditions these variables produce genocidal policies or
behavior. In doing so, we should clearly state whether we are making deterministic
claims (A, B, and C cause D) or whether we are making probabilistic claims (D is more
likely to occur when A, B, and C occur under a specific set of circumstances). Once the
relevant variables and the relationship between them are identified, we should further
indicate precisely what empirical indicators we will use to illustrate each variable and
to measure the effect of each variable. Here we need to demonstrate what evidence in
each case will be used as a measure of a given variable and why we think that evidence
is comparable to evidence measuring the same variable in other cases. If we do this,
scholars and readers can be more confident that the evidence cited really does measure
the variables under investigation and that we are making valid and stable comparisons across cases, rather than telling general narratives in support of theoretical
claims.
Methodological discussions, to date, have tended to revolve for the most part
around which cases we can compare based on a specific definition and which cases we
cannot compare because they do not constitute genocide. This is always an important,
albeit divisive, part of the comparative process and needs to continue. Beyond this,
however, we need to begin to evaluate the comparison of cases based on other, more
strictly comparative methodological criteria. Scholars need to explicitly consider the
relative merits and limitations of ideographic (single-case-study) versus nomothetic
(multiple-case-study) theorizing and comparisons. Ideographic studies can still be
comparative, so long as the theories they generate and test can be generalized, at least
to a certain degree, to explain similar cases. Nomothetic comparisons, of which we are
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seeing more and more, should contemplate the relative advantages and disadvantages
of intensive comparisons (a small number of cases and a large number of variables)
versus extensive comparisons (a large number of cases and a small number of
variables). The former approach currently represents most genocide case comparisons.
These sorts of comparisons allow for the ‘‘thick’’ description and analysis of a small
number of cases using theories that include a number of variables designed to explain
the vast complexity of the cases; this approach, however, is limited in terms of
generalizability. The latter approach, adopted by Barbara Harff, for example, eschews
‘‘thick’’ description in favor of relatively parsimonious theories of genocide and
politicide tested against a very large number of cases in order to construct and test
much more general theories of genocide and politicide. Whichever approach scholars
use, we need to justify why we have taken the approach we have and why we think it
contributes to our knowledge of genocide.
Finally, when we choose our cases, we should state whether we are engaging in
what Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune call ‘‘most similar systems’’ or ‘‘most
different systems’’ comparisons.118 As Przeworski and Teune tell us, most similar
comparisons are the most effective and reliable comparisons, because they control for a
wide number of variables, allowing the researcher to test the effect of variation in only
a small number of variables. Most different comparisons, on the other hand, are
comparisons in which there is a number of differences across each case but where a few
key variables are the same. This kind of comparison also tests how much variation
across cases of genocide a theory can explain. Like ideographic versus nomothetic
comparisons, most similar and most different comparisons have their pros and cons.
It is up to genocide scholars to decide which approach is most appropriate and, again,
to justify why a most-similar or most-different approach is amenable to each scholar’s
research question, theoretical approach, and available evidence. Manus Midlarsky’s
The Killing Trap (a nomothetic study) and Scott Straus’s The Order of Genocide (an
ideographic study) are leading examples of the ways in which genocidal scholars in the
social sciences should be thinking through comparative theoretical and methodological
issues and problems when creating and testing comparative theories.
Sound theory, methodology, and research in comparative genocide studies are of
value as an academic enterprise, but they should also be an important foundation for
the formulation of effective strategies for genocide prevention and reconciliation after
genocide. As a goal-oriented project, genocide studies must find a way to bridge the gap
between abstract theorizing, on the one hand, and concrete policy making and
implementation, on the other. Although our theories may tell us that factors such as
human social psychology, societal fragmentation, various forms of crises, radical
exclusionary ideologies, and conceptions of collective identity lead to genocide, how to
turn this knowledge into concrete workable policies in real life and real time is not
entirely obvious. Generalizability, while a desirable goal for comparative research, is
not necessarily the goal with respect to crafting policies for prevention and, when
required, intervention. Grand schemes to remake societies at greater risk of genocidal
violence will be futile if they are one-size-fits-all policies or if they envision massive
and sustained intervention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states by other states,
intergovernmental organizations, or non-governmental organizations. No matter how
passionate genocide scholars are about finding ways to prevent genocide, prescriptions
for prevention that fail to take into account the realities of sovereignty, the cold hard
realpolitik of international relations, and the real economic costs (not to mention the
question of who will pay those costs) are not worth the effort. Genocide scholars,
334

Theorizing Destruction: Reflections on the State of Comparative Genocide Theory

activists, and policy makers may also have to confront the very real possibility that
regimes bent on waging ‘‘final solutions’’ against their perceived enemies may not be
swayed by what the outside world thinks or does.
Similarly, strategies for fostering reconciliation in societies that have experienced
genocide must avoid totalizing approaches that fail to recognize the particularities of
individual cases. Approaches to reconciliation must, of course, take into account what
we know in general about group dynamics in genocidal situations in order to move
beyond them, but our prescriptions must first and foremost focus on culturally and
situationally specific conditions and the concrete reality of individual and group
dynamics on the ground. We must also take a good hard look at what reconciliation
strategies have and have not worked, why they have or have not worked, where they
have been successful and not, who has benefited and who has not. As in the case
of prevention, crafting strategies for reconciliation is not the exclusive purview of
genocide scholars. Prevention and reconciliation are collaborative projects that, by
necessity, involve policy makers, activists, professionals, survivors, victims’ families
and communities, and the perpetrators or would-be perpetrators.
In sum, comparative genocide theory has come a long way in a short time. As in all
disciplines and subjects in the social sciences and humanities, there is more work to do.
But we should never forget that comparative genocide studies is far more than the
scholarly pursuit of theory, testing, and generalization. We must remember the harsh
reality of what it is we are really trying to do: to discover, bit by bit, why humanity
continues to perpetrate this terrible crime, and why it is that innocent men, women,
and children, simply because they continue to exist, fall victim to this ‘‘old scourge.’’
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‘‘Why are we learning this?’’: Does
Studying the Holocaust Encourage
Better Citizenship Values?
Henry Maitles
Faculty of Education, University of Strathclyde
The relationship between learning about the Holocaust and the development
of positive values may seem common sense, but in reality there is a complex level of
development and understanding. The research reported here, which was sponsored
by the Scottish government, was designed to ascertain whether learning about the
Holocaust has an impact on young people’s general citizenship values and
attitudes; does learning about the Holocaust allow them to extrapolate from the
events of the Holocaust to present-day issues, such as racism and discrimination?
The study followed a cohort of approximately 100 pupils (aged 11–12) who had
studied the Holocaust and compared their values one year later both to their earlier
attitudes and to those of their peers who had not studied the Holocaust. As we
might expect, the results were not always as predicted, particularly when it came to
the pupils’ understanding of anti-Semitism or genocide; in general, however, the
study’s core group maintained more positive values than they had before their
lessons on the Holocaust and showed more positive values than their peers who had
not studied the Holocaust.
Keywords: Holocaust, values, citizenship

Introduction
Education alone cannot be a panacea for racism in general and anti-Semitism in
particular. Nonetheless, there has been some evidence in Britain that learning about
the Holocaust can have a positive impact on the outlook of young people.1 The
Holocaust has been taught piecemeal in Scottish primary and secondary schools for
many years, depending on the individual initiative of the teacher, but the introduction
of Holocaust Memorial Day in 2001 has made such teaching more mainstream and
easier. In curricular terms, this was because the announcement of UK Holocaust
Memorial Day was accompanied by the commissioning of curricular materials for
teaching Holocaust history to primary pupils aged ten to eleven years,2 as well as a
separate resource for secondary schools,3 which were later distributed to every
primary school in Scotland in preparation for the first commemorative event. Both sets
of resources make links with contemporary manifestations of racism, prejudice, and
discrimination. The Scottish Executive has continued to fund curricular materials
on the Holocaust.4
The content of these curricular resources shares a strong focus on the areas of
knowledge and understanding relevant to the development of active and responsible
citizenship. Currently a national priority, ‘‘Values and Citizenship’’ involves teaching
pupils ‘‘duties and responsibilities of citizenship in democratic society’’ and ‘‘respect for
self and one another.’’5 Further, the Education for Citizenship proposal,6 implemented
from August 2003, has added impetus to the development of teaching about the
Holocaust in schools. As in England and Wales, the proposal is for education for
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citizenship to be an entitlement for all pupils at all stages. In Scotland, however,
because of the cross-curricular scope of the 5–14 proposals (which cover the primary
years and the first two years of the secondary curriculum), the existence of Modern
Studies in the secondary schools, the development of Social Subjects in Environmental
Studies in the primary schools, and the incorporation of ‘‘responsible citizenship’’ in
the Curriculum for Excellence proposals,7 citizenship is not a separate subject but is
taught in a cross-curricular approach. Despite some fears that the responsibility of all
can become the responsibility of none, the suggestion is that many subjects will have
input into education for citizenship.
In this citizenship agenda, the Holocaust is mentioned only as an example of the
kinds of teaching content that could be employed, and the desire to develop positive
attitudes toward other cultures, faiths, and ethnic groups means that a study of the
worst genocide in history can be an important part of a child’s development. Teaching
about the Holocaust provides a suitable context for attainment in many key areas
specified in proposals for Education for Citizenship in Scotland, including human
rights and the need for mutual respect, tolerance, and understanding of a diverse and
multicultural Scotland.
As a result of these curricular developments, government and local authority
support, and research into Holocaust teaching, Scottish teachers in the upper primary
and lower secondary stages now have more opportunities to teach the Holocaust and
greater access to Holocaust teaching resources than before. Further, an additional 20%
‘‘flexibility time’’ allows schools to enhance the time spent on a curricular area for
which they consider the minimum time insufficient and which has been prioritized for
development by the school and the local authority.
However, we must remain aware that while education policy may stress positive
values such as understanding, empathy, and tolerance, there can be a countervailing
impact from other policy areas, such as economic and housing policies, the holding of
terrorist suspects, and scaremongering (e.g., about numbers of refugees), that can
produce effects opposite to the aims of the education policy agenda.
These countervailing issues have meant that despite increased education in the
area, there are some worrying signs of increases in anti-Semitism, particularly in
Europe:8 the Community Security Trust reporting that 2006 saw the highest-ever total
of 594 reported incidents in Britain, of which sixteen were reported in Scotland.
Further, there are some disturbing changes in the pattern of anti-Semitic activities, in
that there have been large increases in number of violent assaults and in damages and
desecration to property.9 It is important not to overstate the level of these activities,
which do not reach the level of racism faced by some other ethnic minorities. While
there are some worrying cases of continued neo-Nazi violence in these reports, there is
debate over a new form of anti-Semitism in which hostile acts against Jewish targets
are related to events in the Middle East.

School-Based Holocaust Education
In responding to pedagogical issues such as Jean Piaget’s theories of children’s
intellectual and moral development, which suggest that children are unable to abstract
and satisfactorily understand this kind of topic, Geoffrey Short and Carol Ann Reed
cite a number of Piaget’s critics who have influenced teachers to raise their
expectations of children’s abilities.10 The contribution of Holocaust education in the
primary school includes developing pupils’ understanding of justice, stereotyping, and
discrimination,11 as well as providing opportunities for developing positive values of
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empathy, awareness of antiracism, and an understanding that the individual can
make a difference.
A contrasting viewpoint is conveyed by Samuel Totten, on the grounds that
the Holocaust is inappropriate and too complex for this age group to study, and
by Lionel Kochan, who objects to its teaching to the ‘‘immature and unsophisticated,’’
claiming that such teaching can have deleterious consequences for pupils.12
The former viewpoint is challenged by Cowan and Maitles in their case study of the
response to Holocaust Memorial Day of an educational authority in which Holocaust
teaching was already the norm for the upper primary classes (ages 10–12 years) and
which provided a variety of appropriate curriculum materials and staff development.13
The latter viewpoint is challenged by the study reported here, together with its phase 1
study, which suggested that teaching the Holocaust has a positive short-term impact
on pupils’ values and attitudes.14 In this article, which presents some of the findings
from three surveys, we suggest that evidence exists that further supports the teaching
of the Holocaust to upper primary pupils.
Previous research in secondary schools15 provides evidence that Holocaust
education can make a significant contribution to citizenship by developing pupils’
awareness of human-rights issues and genocides and the concepts of stereotyping and
scapegoating, as well as their general political literacy, including the exercise of power
in local, national, and global contexts. Ronnie Landau asserts that Holocaust teaching,
‘‘perhaps more effectively than any other subject, has the power to sensitise [pupils] to
the dangers of indifference, intolerance, racism and the dehumanisation of others.’’16
Short asserts that one of the lessons the Holocaust teaches pupils is that their own
attitudes are, ‘‘to some extent, culturally determined’’ and that its teaching should
encourage pupils to examine whether any harmful stereotypes may emanate from an
aspect of their culture.17
Holocaust education is part of the English National Curriculum at Key Stage 3
(S1/2 Scottish equivalent age group, or 12–14 years of age), and there are currently
debates as to its effectiveness. In particular, Lucy Russell suggests that history
teachers are inconsistent in their methodologies, as some teach the Holocaust as
history while others focus on the social and moral perspectives without applying
historical inquiry.18 In Scotland, as we have pointed out, although there are plenty of
opportunities in the curriculum for teaching about the Holocaust, too often ‘‘Holocaust
teaching . . . depends on individual school policy, and/or interested teachers’’ who
integrate it into modes of the curriculum.19 Although the Holocaust is not specifically
included in the Scottish curriculum, the 5–14 National Guidelines, or the new
Curriculum for Excellence, there is plenty of scope and flexibility within this
curriculum for teaching it. Traditional curricular areas are Religious and Moral
Education, Environmental Studies, and Personal and Social Development.
A further concern relates to raising controversial issues in schools in the first
place. In primary schools there is a perceived lack of specialist subject knowledge on
the part of teachers.20 Paradoxically, a 2001 study of political consciousness in twentyeight European countries found that in many countries more specialized secondary
teachers are similarly afraid to tackle controversial issues because, almost
by definition, the discussion becomes multidisciplinary, and they are uncomfortable
in that zone.21 However, in analyzing how high school students understood the place of
classroom discussion, Carole Hahn found that students in the Netherlands did not try
to persuade each other, even when discussing highly controversial issues that they felt
strongly about, whereas in German and US public schools and in English private
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schools there was strong argument and persuasion. Interestingly, Hahn found that
there was virtually no discussion on political issues in the state sector in England, even
in social science classes, where she gathered that ‘‘the primary purpose was to prepare
for examinations.’’22 There are other general issues involved, affecting both school
sectors, that militate against the discussion of controversial issues. First, teachers
worry about their skill in handling open-ended discussions that they may not be able to
control or direct. For example, it was reported that one school’s history department
‘‘avoided selecting the Holocaust as a topic for GCSE coursework for fear of confronting
anti-Semitic sentiment and Holocaust denial among some Muslim pupils.’’23 Second,
there are structural constraints in schools, from the lack of tradition in discussion to
the physical layout of classrooms. Third, there are worries about what parents might
think about controversial discussions, and the fears expressed by some politicians and
parents, and in the mass media, that such discussions will influence pupils one way
or another. Discussions around sectarian issues are particularly problematic in
Scotland because there exist strong religious and cultural identifications with both
communities in Northern Ireland.
Alan Smith raises a further question: Can a concept of citizenship ‘‘based on equal
rights and a shared sense of belonging . . . moderate, transcend or displace identity
politics and concepts of nationality?’’24 And, as if this were not problematic enough,
there is the point of limitations to compromise and consensus. Learning in this area
suggests to pupils that there is not always a compromise available, no matter how hard
we try, and it is this inability that leads to the kind of violent scenes we see on our TV
screens and, sometimes, on our streets. This is a valuable lesson, and one that can be
extrapolated to other conflicts (such as the war in Iraq) across the world. The role of
the teacher becomes crucial here. As has been suggested elsewhere, the teacher needs
to be confident enough and have the honesty and confidence to suggest to pupils that
he or she is not just an independent observer but has a particular point of view, which
also can and should be challenged.25 While this is an area of continuing discussion and
debate in Britain, Terry Wrigley points out that in Germany, teachers are encouraged
to allow discussion around controversial issues, to present a wide range of views, and
to be open about their own standpoint while allowing for all views to be challenged.26
In the very slim curriculum guidelines in Denmark, teachers are encouraged not to
‘‘overplan,’’ so that, in discussions with their pupils, issues deemed relevant for
discussion can be included. Indeed, it is crucial, according to Elizabeth Ashton and
Brenda Watson, that teachers understand their proactive role, where necessary;
otherwise, backward ideas can dominate the discussion.27 Further, teachers must
gently point out that the issues being discussed have not yet been resolved and are
open-ended in terms of outcome. Pupils have little problem with this and are less
dogmatic than adults when it comes to changing attitudes and political understanding.

Methodology
To investigate the value of Holocaust education, the author devised a longitudinal
strategy that examined whether there are ‘‘immediate’’ and ‘‘lasting’’ effects on the
attitudes and dispositions of pupils that result from Holocaust teaching; further,
the values of this cohort were compared to their peers who did not have the
opportunity to study the Holocaust in primary school. The results provide empirical
evidence of the contribution of Holocaust education in developing positive attitudes
relating to citizenship.
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This small-scale study involved some 100 pupils in Primary 7 (aged 11–12 years)
and a total of 238 pupils in Secondary 1 (aged 12–13 years). In order to avoid aspects of
familiarity, to move beyond the multicultural milieus where studies on this topic have
most often been conducted, and to explore issues such as attitudes toward Gypsy
Travellers and Jews, a small rural local authority some 30 miles from Glasgow was
chosen for the study. The school sample was chosen in collaboration with the local
authority, which identified two primary schools in the area that taught the Holocaust
as part of the World War II topic in Primary 7. School A has only one class per year;
School B, a larger school, has three classes in Primary 7. Both primaries are nondenominational, have socioeconomically mixed catchment areas, are predominantly
white, and have no Jewish pupils; pupils at both schools go on to attend the same
secondary school. Class sizes were similar in both schools.
In consultation with the schools and the local authority, a survey was devised that
aimed to ascertain changes in some of the values and attitudes outlined as central in
national documentation on citizenship.28 The survey was administered before and
immediately after the lessons on the Holocaust, in November 2004 and March 2005, to
investigate the immediate effect of Holocaust education on pupils’ values and attitudes
(Surveys 1 and 2).
Ten months after Survey 2, we followed this cohort into the secondary school and
issued Survey 3 to compare pupils’ attitudes with earlier findings. This survey was also
administered to Secondary 1 pupils who had not previously studied the Holocaust, in
order to compare their attitudes with those of the core group. The timing of Survey 3
fitted in with teachers’ forward planning of Holocaust teaching and meant that
the impact of the media coverage leading up to the national Holocaust Memorial Day
could not influence the findings. It is worth noting that the number of anti-Semitic
incidents reported in the United Kingdom during this period rose from 375 (2004) to
532 (2005).29
Elsewhere we summarize the results of the first stage of our findings as follows:
It is important not to take too much from the first stage of this study. There is evidence
that pupils’ knowledge and values/attitudes improved (excepting pupils’ attitudes
towards English people) after their learning about the Holocaust. At the very least,
numbers of pupils who put ‘‘don’t know’’ for survey 1 came off the fence in survey 2 and
came down in favour of tolerance and understanding. Yet, surprisingly few (only 28.3%
overall) knew (or thought they knew) what anti-Semitism was. Analysis of the ways in
which teachers in our schools put the Holocaust in the citizenship context is likely to
contribute to an understanding of this. For example, did teachers teach the Holocaust
as a specific topic linked to genocide or as an example of racism per se? In terms of our
general aims, the first stage suggests that there are some significant immediate
benefits of learning the Holocaust; the longer lasting effects are yet to be ascertained
and will be done so following our third survey.30

It is to this final point that we now turn. We obtained findings based on many more
questions than are reported here; our principal interest at this stage of the study was
to find out, first, whether the general improvements in knowledge and positive values
and attitudes of the pupils after their learning about the Holocaust were maintained in
the first year of secondary education; and, second, whether these pupils’ understanding of the Holocaust and positive attitudes in aspects of citizenship were similar
to or different from those of their peers who did not have an opportunity to study the
Holocaust during primary school.
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Findings and Discussion
In terms of their own self-understanding, as Figure 1 shows, the core sample (those
pupils who learned about the Holocaust in Primary 7) maintained their perception of
their knowledge of the Holocaust and that it was substantially higher than that of
others (their peers from primary schools that did not teach about the Holocaust). The
fact that 61.9% of these other pupils knew about the Holocaust shows that there are
opportunities—through the media, through other lessons, via Holocaust Memorial Day
activities, or through parental comment—for young people to find out about this topic;
but the fact that nearly 40% did not recognize the term or know anything about it
means that Holocaust education clearly has a major role to play.
A similar trend can be found in terms of perceived understanding of anti-Semitism.
Only 3.5% of other pupils could define this term, whereas the proportion of the core
sample who could do so stayed at approximately 22%. Yet, although the core sample
had a stronger understanding of this concept, perhaps the most significant factor is
that there is such low awareness of the term overall. To investigate this question
further, the author interviewed the teachers concerned. The teacher at School A
developed lessons on the Holocaust without using this term; rather, she talked about
‘‘racism towards Jews.’’ Similarly, Short’s study of secondary students found that
teachers were not including the critical role of anti-Semitism in their teaching of the
origins of the Holocaust.31 While the teachers claimed that pupils understood what
anti-Semitism was, despite not knowing the term, it is perhaps incumbent upon
teachers to mention the terminology more clearly, so that pupils who come across
media headlines relating to anti-Semitism will know what the story is about and relate
it to their learning.
Similarly, there was very low awareness of the meaning of genocide on the part of
other pupils, and, indeed, only 29% of pupils in the core group considered that they
understood the meaning of this term. The findings suggest that teaching the Holocaust
is a contributory factor to pupils’ understanding of genocide, but only if the lessons
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Figure 1. Pupils’ perceived knowledge of the Holocaust
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make the links clear. Interview data show that School B included a great deal of
content on the contemporary nature of the Holocaust, making relevant links with
human-rights issues, introducing more recent genocides (in Bosnia, Rwanda, and
Darfur), and discussing the current situation of refugees and asylum seekers in
Scotland, while School A had only touched upon these contemporary links in a vague
way.
These results have implications for the link between learning about the Holocaust
as a historical event and contemporary issues relating to anti-Semitism and genocide.
In particular, if one rationale for teaching the Holocaust in schools is to enable pupils
to better understand contemporary genocide,32 the choice of teaching methodology and
making explicit links become crucial.
Although there was a high level of agreement about not making racist comments,
there was a more variable response to the statement ‘‘I think there are too many . . . in
Scotland’’ (see Figure 2). As Figure 2 shows, pupils’ attitudes more or less remained
where they had been after their lessons on the Holocaust; nonetheless, a much larger
number of pupils claimed they were unsure. Interestingly, attitudes toward refugees
held up better than the other variables, although this was the category that showed
the most negative attitudes overall. The issue of refugees is a current one that was
discussed both within and outside the classroom; it is unlikely that the other groups of
people mentioned in the survey would have aroused similar interest.
Core Sample: I think that there are too many...in Scotland
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Figure 2. Opinions within the core group on the numbers of minority groups in
Scotland
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Given that more than 95% pupils now consider that they know what the Holocaust
is (see Figure 1), and that there are only about 5,000 Jews in Scotland, pupils’ attitude
toward Jews is rather puzzling: pupils’ new knowledge appears to have had no longterm positive effect on their attitudes in this area. One possible explanation may lie in
pupils’ understanding of anti-Semitism. It may also be that anti-Semitism is perceived
as something that happened in history and not as an issue relevant to contemporary
Scottish society. It is also possible that pupils do not perceive Jews as an oppressed
minority group in today’s society. What we do know is that there was little discussion
of the contemporary nature of anti-Semitism.
Another explanation may be found in Short’s implication that successful Holocaust
teaching is dependent on pupils’ perceptions of Jews and Judaism and of the
relationship between Judaism and Christianity.33 Data obtained from interviews show
that School A had introduced Judaism in Primary 3 and studied another aspect of it in
Primary 7, albeit after their teaching of the Holocaust; Primary 7 students at School B
had studied Judaism the previous year. This suggests that pupils’ perceptions of Jews,
Judaism, and the Judeo-Christian relationship will have begun to form, but these
perceptions were not examined in the present research.
Finally, it is feasible that the results may relate to the perceived differences
between prejudice and discrimination; the pupils may have felt that there are
‘‘too many’’ minorities in Scotland but also believed that there should not be any abuse
toward them.
One of the most contentious areas from the first stage of the survey was the voting
potential of the sample and, in particular, the group’s attitudes toward English people.
While it is possible that pupils may have considered the Scottish Parliament an
institution for Scottish people, irrespective of their ethnicity, we have previously
concluded that
The research uncovered some anti-English feeling—the only area that significantly
declined in the course of the two questionnaires. This requires further investigation and
has two significant implications for teachers. Firstly, it raises a serious question as to
whether anti-English feeling is endemic in Scottish culture. When the class teachers
were notified of these results they were concerned and committed to acting upon this by
including it in their education for citizenship programme. Secondly, if teaching the
Holocaust and anti-racism suggests that the only victims are persecuted peoples [e.g.,]
Jews, Gypsies, Tutsis, there can be a danger of ignoring prejudice against other peoples,
[e.g.,] English people, Italians.34

A comparison of the three surveys (see Figure 3) show that the improvements found
after learning about the Holocaust were generally maintained (e.g., attitudes toward
voting for a Catholic versus a Protestant) or continued to improve (e.g., attitudes
toward voting for a woman versus a man). An exception is pupils’ attitudes to black
people; although attitudes in this category were better in Survey 3 than in Survey 1,
they had fallen back significantly from the position found in Survey 2. Interestingly,
attitudes toward English people improved most of all, although, with 52.3% agreeing
and 36% disagreeing that they would be as likely to vote for an English candidate as
for a Scottish one, they were still significantly poorer than in any other category.
Comparing the core group to their peers in terms of voting preference, we found
that in every category our core sample was more tolerant. This suggests that their
Holocaust learning had an impact here.
Finally, Figure 4 compares our core sample with their peers in terms of the
statement ‘‘I think racism has nothing to do with me.’’ Survey 3 found a significant
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difference between the two groups: the core group had a more positive attitude in their
answers to this question, suggesting that these pupils have a greater understanding
of collective responsibility for racism than their peers who did not learn about
the Holocaust.
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Conclusions
As in much research examining values and opinions, the results are not particularly
clear-cut. In some areas, there does seem, less than one year on, to be a welcome
maintenance of the positive dispositions ascertained in the immediate aftermath of the
lessons on the Holocaust. Yet this effect remains uneven: our core group still had much
tolerance for and sympathy toward minorities, but had ‘‘fallen back’’ in their opinion of
the numbers of minorities in Scotland (perhaps reflecting a general increase in
intolerance in British society). In most categories, however, attitudes were still better
than they had been before the lessons on the Holocaust. There is still a worrying
hostility toward English people, and this is something that needs to be watched and
combated, although it may be that these pupils have a quite sophisticated understanding of the differences between oppressed and oppressors and that English people
do not fit into the category of ‘‘oppressed.’’ Another possibility, however, is that the idea
of English people in the Scottish Parliament needed more explanation for these
students. With hindsight—and for a future project—it might have been useful to ask
about, for example, Polish or French candidates for the Scottish Parliament in this
type of question.
When we compared our core group with their peers who had not had the
opportunity to study the Holocaust, we found evidence, as outlined above, that the core
group had stronger positive values, were more tolerant, and were more disposed to
active citizenship because of their understanding of individual responsibility for
racism.
This study suggests that learning about the Holocaust can have both an immediate
and a lasting impact on pupils’ values; that is, that studying the Holocaust teaches
citizenship targets that are central to the development of well-rounded young people.
It is worth making the case to teachers that at some stage in their education—perhaps
as young as is deemed feasible—pupils should have the opportunity to undertake
structured learning experiences about the Holocaust, generalized to reflect the various
forms that racism can take in society and linking the Holocaust to other genocides.
While the main focus of the research was not directly related to the training of
teachers, there are clear implications for both initial teacher education and continuing
professional development.
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Counteracting Hate Speech as a Way of
Preventing Genocidal Violence
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Hate speech regularly, if not inevitably, precedes and accompanies ethnic conflicts,
and particularly genocidal violence. Without such incitement to hatred and the
exacerbation of xenophobic, anti-Semitic, or racist tendencies, no genocide would be
possible and persecutory campaigns would rarely meet with a sympathetic response
in the general public.
In order to successfully prevent genocidal crimes and violence, therefore, it is
indispensable to effectively address the problem of systematic incitement to hatred.
While less virulent forms of hate speech may be adequately addressed by humanrights law obligations on governments to prohibit such acts, vicious, systematic,
and state-organized hate propaganda should be criminalized under international
law. Before discussing how hate speech can be treated as an international crime,
this article assesses the most important justifications for proscribing hate speech,
including the need to protect the human dignity and equality rights of the victims of
such speech as well as the need to protect the public peace and the dangers of hate
speech in that it may contribute to the creation of a climate of hatred and violence
directed against a specific group. The article supports treating systematic
incitement to hatred as a form of persecution, an approach recently upheld by the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Such an
approach most adequately reflects the nature of hate speech and the motivations
underlying its criminalization, while also respecting the important right to freedom
of speech.
Keywords: hate speech, persecution, genocide, freedom of speech, human dignity

Introduction: The Role of Hate Propaganda in Preparing the Ground
for Genocides and Mass Violence
Hate speech is an integral part of any state-organized persecution and serves to
psychologically prepare the population of a state for certain crimes planned by its
leaders. It has therefore been recognized—particularly in the years since the Rwandan
Genocide—that the presence of hate propaganda may indicate an impending genocide
or, at least, impending violence and conflict.
Thus, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) has issued a decision on the subject of early-warning procedures, in this
case elaborating a ‘‘special set of indicators related to genocide’’ that would allow the
committee ‘‘to detect and prevent at the earliest possible stage developments in racial
discrimination that may lead to violent conflict and genocide.’’1 The committee
explained that the list of indicators would allow it to evaluate the presence of ‘‘factors
known to be important components of situations leading to conflict and genocide.’’2
Two of the indicators mentioned are of particular relevance: first, the ‘‘[s]ystematic and
widespread use and acceptance of speech or propaganda promoting hatred and/or
Wibke Timmermann, ‘‘Counteracting Hate Speech as a Way of Preventing Genocidal Violence.’’
Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, 3 (December 2008): 353–374. ! 2008 Genocide Studies and
Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.3.3.353
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inciting violence against minority groups, particularly in the media,’’ and, second,
‘‘[g]rave statements by political leaders/prominent people that express support for
affirmation of superiority of a race or an ethnic group, dehumanization and
demonization of minorities, or condone or justify violence against a minority.’’3
It is well documented that major genocides of the twentieth century, such as the
Holocaust and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994,4 were preceded and prepared by
extensive hate propaganda, a major technique of which was the dehumanization of the
intended victims. In Germany, hate speech played a major role in the creation of a
persecutory climate that, together with other persecutory measures, prepared
the ground for the Shoah, as the District Court of Jerusalem acknowledged in the
Eichmann case when it stated that ‘‘[o]ut of this soil of hatred for the Jews grew the
actions of the Accused.’’5 Hitler was well aware of the powers of propaganda and,
together with Joseph Goebbels, the ‘‘master manipulator of crowds,’’6 exploited it to the
fullest. Goebbels himself recognized the influence of the radio, without which
he believed it would be impossible for the Nazis to seize and hold onto total power;
he described the radio as the ‘‘first and most influential intermediary between [. . .]
movement and nation, between idea and man,’’7 and claimed that ‘‘films constitute one
of the most modern and scientific means of influencing the masses.’’8 He was proved
right when, after seeing the propaganda film Jud Süß, which, while not directly calling
for the murder of Jews, was nonetheless intended to prepare the German public for
exactly that,9 some people were so frantic that they left the Berlin cinemas ‘‘screaming
curses at the Jews: ‘Drive the Jews from the Kurfürstendamm! Kick the last Jews out
of Germany!’’’10
Fifty years later, in Rwanda, symbolic language was used to stigmatize and
dehumanize the Tutsi ‘‘by attributing to [them] a set of characteristic labels, each one
more horrific than the next: cockroach, feudal lord, snake, subversive, enemy.’’11 This
rejection of the Tutsi minority from the Rwandan community was achieved, moreover,
by depicting them as ‘‘une race irre´me´diablement dominatrice et comploteuse dont la
force de nuisance transcende les frontie`res, au de´triment de Hutu voue´s au rôle de
victimes.’’12 These characterizations created a climate of fear in which the Hutu were
convinced of the need to take pre-emptive action in order to defend themselves.13
The specific danger of hate speech lies in the fact that, by dehumanizing and
denigrating the victim group, it begins a ‘‘continuum of destruction.’’14 This is achieved
mainly by separating and excluding the victims from the community of humankind
or the ‘‘human commonwealth.’’ The victims are treated as an ‘‘out-group,’’ and
hate speech thus builds an insurmountable wall between the victim group and
those remaining in the ‘‘in-group,’’ rendering sentiments of empathy or identification
with the victims impossible.15 Metaphors comparing the victimized group to insects or
disease-carrying animals regularly accompany the dehumanization: in Rwanda, the
Tutsi were called inyenzi, or cockroaches.16 This contributes to the creation of the
climate of violence, as Jonathan Glover explains: ‘‘[s]uch images and metaphors create
a psychological aura or tone which [. . .] may be at least as important as explicit beliefs
which can be criticized as untrue.’’17 Similarly, David Kretzmer argues that such
hostile beliefs are a ‘‘necessary condition’’ for racist acts.18 The capacity of human
beings to convince themselves that others (the members of the victimized group) are
not fellow human beings but subhumans or animals has also been noted by biologists
and sociologists. Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt regards the ability of humans to demonize
their fellow human beings as their most dangerous characteristic, because only this
can turn them into merciless killers.19
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The dangers of vicious and systematic incitement to racial, ethnic, or religious
hatred are thus readily perceived, and the need to restrict such incitement or to
penalize it in one form or another is widely recognized. The best manner in which to do
so and the precise constituent elements of the act are contested, however, and in
certain countries, notably the United States, the debate is over whether and in what
form it may be restricted at all. This article focuses on assessing the circumstances in
which hate speech can be considered a crime in international law. An analysis of the
philosophical debate surrounding the justifiability of criminalizing hate speech assists
in adequately circumscribing and defining its components and its status under
international law. First, however, a brief overview of the status of hate speech in
human-rights law is provided, since this is where the international debate over hate
speech has generally centered in the past.

Human-Rights Law Prohibitions and Freedom of Speech
Human-rights treaties and declarations place states under an obligation to prevent
and prohibit hate speech. Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for
example, guarantees the right not to be discriminated against and states that ‘‘All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration
and against any incitement to such discrimination.’’20 Article 20(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifically proscribes ‘‘any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence.’’21 The ICCPR has been widely ratified; as of 18 April 2008, there
are 161 states parties,22 only seven of whom have entered reservations with respect to
art. 20(2).23
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD)24 contains the most extensive and elaborate prohibition of
hate speech, albeit limited to racial grounds.25 It is significant that 173 states are
currently parties to this convention,26 and are thus bound by its provisions.27 Article 4
enjoins states parties to
condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of
superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination.

Specifically, states parties must criminalize ‘‘all dissemination of ideas based on racial
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence
or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or
ethnic origin.’’28 In requiring states to declare incitement to hatred punishable by
law—that is, to impose individual criminal responsibility for such acts—it goes much
further than art. 20 of the ICCPR, which only obligates states to prohibit such acts.
Prohibiting or otherwise restricting hate speech plainly conflicts with the
important right to freedom of speech. Generally, this right ‘‘include[s] freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
[one’s] choice.’’29 Its purpose effectively is to protect an individual’s freedom to
communicate in public. ‘‘Communication’’ encompasses ‘‘any act of symbolic expression
undertaken with the intention that it be understood to be that by the public or part of
the public.’’30 In essence, it is ‘‘a right actively to participate in and contribute to the
public culture.’’31
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Freedom of speech is an extremely important right. Natural rights theory as
developed by John Locke, for example, takes as its premise that the human being in a
state of nature is fundamentally free to act, and voluntarily gives up a certain part of
that freedom when entering into a social contract with other human beings.
Consequently, society is justified in restraining people’s only actions insofar as they
injure others.32 John Stuart Mill believed that freedom of speech was a necessary
instrument in the pursuit of the truth.33 Similarly, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
argued in Abrams v. United States that ‘‘the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’’34 Various other
arguments have been advanced in favor of freedom of speech;35 one that appears
particularly relevant in the present context is based on the fact that the language used
to describe the discriminating speech will necessarily be vague, which means that it
may easily be abused.36 Consequently, there are important reasons for prohibiting or
criminalizing only the worst kinds of hate speech, in clearly defined circumstances.
It should be noted, first of all, that certain restrictions on this right have generally
been accepted in domestic jurisdictions, as well as in the jurisprudence of international
courts and adjudicatory bodies such as the UN Human Rights Committee. Even the
United States, traditionally the most outspoken supporter of the right to freedom of
expression, recognizes that limitations are necessary in certain cases, albeit only
where there is an imminent danger of harm.
The European Court of Human Rights has developed an elaborate test designed
to ascertain whether or not a restriction of the right to free speech is justified. Firstly,
the interference with the right must be ‘‘prescribed by law’’: it must have an adequate
basis in domestic law, which means that it must be ‘‘adequately accessible’’
and ‘‘formulated with sufficient precision.’’37 Second, the interference must pursue a
legitimate aim, that is, it must be in the interests of national security, public safety, or
any other of the listed goals. Third, the restriction is subject to a proportionality test: it
must be ‘‘necessary in a democratic society,’’ which has been interpreted to imply that
it must correspond to a ‘‘pressing social need’’ and that it must be ‘‘proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued.’’38 With respect to this balancing exercise, states are accorded
a certain margin of appreciation, which may vary; generally, it is likely to be broad
where a case presents a controversial political, economic, or social issue (e.g., the
control of obscene publications).39
The European Commission on Human Rights has held, in accordance with art. 10
of the European Convention on Human Rights, that freedom of speech can legitimately
be restricted for the purposes of protecting the rights of others. Thus, in X v. Germany,
the commission found that while § 130 of the German Criminal Code, which prohibits
an individual from displaying pamphlets describing the Holocaust as a lie, involved an
interference with the right to freedom of expression, it was founded on the legitimate
purpose of protecting the rights of others, as it was designed to prevent a ‘‘defamatory
attack’’ directed against the Jewish people, individually and as a group.40
The rights most likely to be infringed by hate speech are equality rights,41 such as
the right to be free from discrimination,42 as well as the right to respect for human
dignity. Hate speech denies the members of the victimized group the right to
participate as members of equal worth in the social life of the community of the
state; they are viewed as less worthy, as subhuman, and are thereby excluded.43
It discriminates against them44 and humiliates them, thus violating their human
dignity, a value whose importance is expressly recognized in the Preamble to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
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equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world.’’ In the case of hate speech, therefore, a
balancing exercise must be undertaken, weighing the speaker’s interest in being able
to express his opinions freely against the victim’s interest in preserving his or her
human dignity and not being discriminated against.45

The Need to Criminalize Violent and Systematic Hate Speech
While states’ obligation to prohibit hate speech is thus laid down in international
human-rights conventions, under certain circumstances, the dangers of incitement to
hatred and the extent of the responsibility of those who plan and engage in such speech
acts for the ensuing massacres are such that mere human-rights obligations do not
suffice. In certain situations, such obligations are inadequate in terms of preventing
genocides and other ethnically based violence as well as in bringing to justice those
who are properly seen as the true instigators and originators of such crimes. Such
circumstances exist where hate speech is systematically and strategically deployed by
the state or by the leadership of a state-like organization as part of a planned process of
persecution directed against a particular group that is discriminated against on the
basis of its members’ religion, race, or ethnicity.
This article argues in favor of an approach involving the criminalization of
systematic hate speech that is part of a concerted policy of persecution organized by a
state or by a state-like organization. Such an approach respects the important
rationales underlying the right to free speech; moreover, such an approach takes
account of the two most important rationales for limiting hate speech, which are
particularly pregnant in the case of the systematic incitement to hatred at issue here:
the need to prevent the grave violation of human dignity that such speech entails, and
the need to avert the risk of harm.
In the United States, a danger of imminent physical harm has generally been seen
as the only justification for restricting freedom of speech in cases of hate speech. In the
famous 1919 Supreme Court case Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes formulated
what came to be known as the ‘‘clear and present danger test’’: ‘‘The question in each
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.’’46
Subsequently, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court fine-tuned this theory
by explaining that mere advocacy of violence and crime is not protected where it is
‘‘directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.’’47 Clearly, then, in US jurisprudence, the only justification for
restricting hate speech lies in its inherent danger; where such danger of ‘‘imminent
lawless action’’ is not present, US courts do not regard a restriction of the speech in
question as justified.48
In Germany, the public peace has also been regarded as a fundamental value,
which incitement to hatred is likely to infringe, and has thus provided a justification
for criminalizing hate speech in that country. The justification for limiting hate speech
because of its likelihood to disturb the public peace corresponds, to a certain extent, to
the American concern with ‘‘clear and present danger,’’ in that it is concerned with the
potential consequences of hate speech. The dangerousness of hate speech lies in its
tendency to create a particular culture or climate—a ‘‘specific pattern of popular
assumptions and beliefs stigmatizing specific groups as inferior and harmful.’’49
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In Germany and internationally, the need to protect human dignity has been
considered another particularly important reason for criminalizing hate speech. Thus,
in several reports, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has
evoked the ‘‘fundamental principle of respect for human dignity’’ when reminding
states parties of their obligations under the CERD, stressing that this principle
‘‘requires all States to combat dissemination of racial hatred and incitement to racial
hatred.’’50
In Germany, human dignity is specifically mentioned in one of the provisions
criminalizing incitement to hatred: § 130(2) of the German Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), or
Criminal Code, criminalizes incitement to hatred directed against parts of the
population or against a national, racial, religious, or ethnic group by means of public
writings or through the media, as well as attacks on the human dignity of others by
insulting, treating with scorn, or libeling parts of the population or a predetermined
group through the same means of communication. Additionally, § 130(1) makes it a
crime to incite hatred against parts of the population or invite others to commit violent
or arbitrary acts against them,51 or to attack their human dignity by insulting,
maliciously heaping scorn on, or libeling them,52 if this is done in a way that is likely to
disturb the public peace. Thus, the values that are to be protected by § 130 are the
public peace, on the one hand, and human dignity, on the other.
The concept of human dignity is of central importance within the framework of the
German constitution (Grundgesetz) in that human dignity represents the fundamental
principle on which the system of basic rights is founded. It is guaranteed in the first
article of the Grundgesetz, which declares that an individual’s dignity is inviolable.
The German Constitutional Court has held that human dignity cannot be lost through
undignified behavior.53 Moreover, human dignity is not measured against an
individual’s capacity to act in a self-determined way, nor against his or her capacity
to reason, but instead is determined by humanness as such, that is, by the
‘‘menschlichen Sein angelegten potentiellen Fähigkeiten.’’54
Under German law, the definition of an attack against an individual’s human
dignity requires that the people under attack be denied their right to live as persons of
equal worth in the community of the state and that they be treated as beings who are
less worthy. The attack must thus be directed against the core of their personality,
which constitutes their human dignity, and not merely against particular personality
traits.55 Courts have interpreted this requirement differently. While the Frankfurt
District Court (Oberlandesgericht) found in a 1995 case that an attack on human
dignity should primarily be interpreted as a denial of the right to life in a biological
sense, that is, the right to exist as a human being as such,56 the Bavarian District
Court rejected this interpretation, arguing that it is sufficient that the perpetrators
deny the victims their social right to live as people of equal worth in the community.57
It appears that the latter interpretation has been preferred in the literature.58
In order to more fully understand the idea of human dignity and its significance in
the context of hate speech, it is useful to draw on the theories of the philosopher
Avishai Margalit, who has defined dignity as ‘‘the expression of the feeling of respect
persons feel toward themselves as human beings.’’59 Margalit submits that human
beings deserve respect because of their capacity for ‘‘radical freedom,’’ that is, the
ability to ‘‘reevaluat[e] one’s life at any given moment, as well as the ability to change
one’s life from this moment on.’’60 Even the worst criminals are conceivably able to
re-evaluate their lives and decide to live in an honorable manner in the future.
As Margalit explains, ‘‘respecting humans means never giving up on anyone, since all
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people are capable of living dramatically differently from the way they have lived
so far.’’61 By contrast, humiliating human beings consists in treating or seeing them as
‘‘nonhuman’’ or ‘‘subhuman.’’62 Hate speech does exactly this; often it goes even further
and engages in demonization. All these forms of humiliation involve the rejection of an
individual or a group from the ‘‘human commonwealth.’’63 Such a rejection includes the
idea of loss of control; that is, humiliation represents ‘‘the deliberate infliction of utter
loss of freedom and control over one’s vital interests.’’64 Humiliating acts ‘‘show the
victims that they lack even the most minuscule degree of control over their fate—that
they are helpless and subject to the good will (or rather, the bad will) of their
tormentors.’’65 Hate speech, especially when it is part of a concerted state policy of
persecution that also includes a range of other discriminatory measures, has precisely
this effect: it excludes the victim group from the ‘‘human commonwealth’’ by means of
stigmatization and, through its influence on the addressees who are incited to hatred
against the victim group, demonstrates to the latter their utter helplessness and lack
of control. As with other forms of humiliation, there is ‘‘a constant threat of living a life
unworthy of a human being.’’66 This threat is increased exponentially and becomes
imminent when it is the state itself or a similarly powerful organization that engages
in hate propaganda in a systematic manner as part of a general policy to persecute the
victim group.
The idea of humiliation as excluding an individual from the ‘‘human commonwealth’’ is linked with the denial of his or her human rights, which, as we have seen, is
also an effect of hate speech. Human rights are those rights that an individual
possesses merely by virtue of being human, and their denial therefore expresses an
attitude that regards the victim as less than human and consequently conveys his or
her rejection from the human community.67
An exploration of the thought processes and emotions of those who have committed
hate crimes and been actively involved in mass atrocities reveals how the
stigmatization of the victims and their exclusion from the human community enabled
the perpetrators to engage in these acts while simultaneously remaining convinced
that these acts were necessary and, in fact, corresponded to what the prevailing
morality required of them.68 As Harald Welzer writes, many German concentrationcamp officials believed themselves to be decent, upright, and morally correct agents
who, while sending human beings to the gas chambers with no psychological or moral
qualms (either then or later), were nonetheless upset and showed indignation when it
was suggested to them years afterwards that, in their dealings with particular
individuals, they had failed to act with moral integrity.69 For example, to demonstrate
how he had remained a decent and compassionate man, Franz Stangl, the commander
of the Treblinka camp, recounted how he granted a camp inmate’s request for a more
humane death for his father, who had been designated for the gas chamber, thus
easing the father’s (inevitable) death.70 The reason for this paradox lay, to a large
extent, in the fact that they believed themselves to be doing what was necessary, as
well as in the conviction that they were acting against an ‘‘out-group’’ created through
prior stigmatization,71 which, in turn, was achieved primarily by means of hate
propaganda. This conditioning of the minds of the perpetrators, which meant that the
majority of them would not suffer feelings of guilt or other psychological problems,
whereas those victims who survived were plagued by traumata and feelings of guilt
(often for having survived while so many others perished) for years afterwards,72 can
easily be recognized as extremely dangerous. As Welzer argues, the fact that the
perpetrators of genocides and crimes against humanity are socio-psychologically
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normal people is more terrifying than the idea that they might have had any
socialization deficits, that they were sadistic, brutalized, or the like: ‘‘Es war viel
schlimmer: Sie haben einfach etwas getan, von dem sie glaubten, dass es von ihnen
erwartet wurde.’’73 In the case of Nazi Germany, the perpetrators’ minds had been
thoroughly conditioned by the prevailing Nazi morality, without which the genocide
would not have been feasible.74
With these considerations in mind, we now turn to the question of whether hate
speech can, under certain circumstances, also be considered an international crime,
rather than merely being prohibited under international human-rights law. Antonio
Cassese has defined the purpose of allocating an act the status of an international
crime as the protection of ‘‘values considered important by the whole international
community and consequently binding all States and individuals.’’75 As there is
therefore a ‘‘universal interest in repressing these crimes,’’ they are prima facie subject
to universal jurisdiction.76 An argument can therefore be made that were hate speech
considered an international crime, it could be prevented and stigmatized more
effectively. It is submitted, however, that only the worst kind of hate speech ought to
be considered an international crime, for various reasons. First, this is necessary in
order to protect the important right to freedom of speech from excessive infringement.
Second, because international crimes are the worst kinds of crimes, including mass
killings and atrocities such as genocide and crimes against humanity, anything but the
worst and most dangerous hate speech would not be comparable in gravity with
the other international crimes, and consequently would not deserve to be placed in the
same category. Lastly, it makes sense to deal with hate propaganda of a lesser degree
through prohibition rather than criminalization, as this arguably allows for more
effective prevention. This is because the burden of proof is much higher in the case of
crimes than in the case of civil law prohibitions; while the prosecutor’s burden in a
criminal case is to prove his or her case beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of proof in
a civil law case is the balance of probabilities.

Hate Speech as the Crime against Humanity of Persecution
The Elements of Persecution
The most adequate and sound approach to the criminalization of systematic hate
speech is to treat it as the crime against humanity of persecution. In Kunarac, the
Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) outlined the different chapeau elements of crimes against humanity.77 First,
there must be an attack, which has been said to encompass ‘‘any mistreatment of the
civilian population.’’78 Second, the accused’s acts must be part of the attack; this does
not mean that they must be committed in the midst of the attack but, rather, requires
that they not be isolated acts.79 Third, the attack must be directed against a civilian
population. It need not be directed against the entire population, but it must be
directed against a population rather than ‘‘a limited and randomly selected number of
individuals.’’80 The population must be the primary object, not an incidental target.81
Fourth, the attack must be widespread or systematic. While ‘‘widespread’’ alludes to
the ‘‘large-scale nature of the attack and the number of victims,’’ ‘‘systematic’’ denotes
the ‘‘organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random
occurrence.’’82 Fifth, the perpetrator’s acts must form part of a pattern of widespread
or systematic crimes directed against the civilian population, and the perpetrator must
know that his or her acts fit into such a pattern. The perpetrator must possess the
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intent to commit the underlying offense and know that, or be reckless as to whether,
his or her acts form part of the attack.83
The crime of persecution has been recognized as a crime against humanity since
the Statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. In Kordic´ and
Cˇerkez, the ICTY Appeals Chamber summarized the elements of this crime, explaining
that persecution consists of any act or omission that discriminates in fact, denies or
infringes upon a fundamental right laid down in either treaty or customary law, and is
carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on a listed ground.84 The
listed grounds in the Statutes of the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) are political, racial, and religious grounds,85 while the Statute of the
International Criminal Court adds ‘‘national, ethnic, cultural, gender [. . .] or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.’’86
Furthermore, the acts must be of a gravity equal to that of other crimes against
humanity. They can reach such a level of gravity if their effects are similar.87
Therefore, acts of persecution must be evaluated ‘‘in their context by looking at their
cumulative effect.’’88 The protected interest in the case of persecution has been held to
lie in all ‘‘elementary and inalienable rights of man.’’89 This is implicit in the definition
of ‘‘persecution’’ laid down in the Rome Statute, which describes it as ‘‘the intentional
and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason
of the identity of the group or collectivity.’’90
The Tadic´ Trial Chamber found that persecution included a large variety
of acts that could, inter alia, be physical, economic, or judicial, so long as they
infringed upon an individual’s right to equal enjoyment of his or her fundamental
rights.91

Hate Speech as Persecution
International tribunals have recognized that hate speech can, if certain conditions are
fulfilled, constitute the crime against humanity of persecution. In fact, this treatment
of vicious hate propaganda goes back to the Nuremberg trials. The Nuremberg
Tribunal convicted Julius Streicher, founder and editor of the anti-Semitic propagandist newspaper Der Stürmer, holding that his
incitement to murder and extermination at a time when Jews in the East were being
killed under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and
racial grounds [. . .] and constitutes a Crime against Humanity.92

Of course, in that case, it was incitement to crimes—‘‘murder and extermination’’—
that was considered to constitute persecution, whereas the present argument is that
incitement to hatred should be regarded as persecution.
Similarly, the ICTR found in Ruggiu that the accused had committed acts of
persecution, namely
direct and public radio broadcasts all aimed at singling out and attacking the Tutsi
ethnic group and Belgians on discriminatory grounds, by depriving them of the
fundamental rights to life, liberty and basic humanity enjoyed by members of wider
society. The deprivation of these rights can be said to have as its aim the death and
removal of those persons from the society in which they live alongside the perpetrators,
or eventually even from humanity itself.93

Ruggiu was convicted of both persecution and direct and public incitement to genocide
for the same acts. What is particularly important about the cited paragraph is that the
tribunal recognized the particular evil of hate speech, which lies not only in the danger
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that it may lead to further crimes but in the fact that it severely violates the victims’
human dignity by rejecting them from the society in which they live and, eventually,
even from the ‘‘human commonwealth’’ itself.
The United States Military Tribunal in the Ministries Case, in its judgment
convicting Otto Dietrich, a Nazi propagandist who held the post of Reich press chief
from 1937 and state secretary of the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda under Joseph Goebbels from 1938 to 1945, appeared to go farther. It
convicted Dietrich of crimes against humanity, holding that he implemented such
crimes and participated in them through his anti-Semitic press and periodical
directives.94
The case of Hans Fritzsche, one of the accused before the Nuremberg Tribunal, is
particularly interesting. Fritzsche, a senior official in the Ministry of Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda and head of the ministry’s Radio Division, had been
charged with crimes against humanity for having ‘‘incited and encouraged the
commission of War Crimes by deliberately falsifying news to arouse in the German
People those passions which led them to the commission of atrocities.’’95 The tribunal
acquitted him, explaining, inter alia, that it was ‘‘not prepared to hold that [his
broadcasts] were intended to incite the German people to commit atrocities on
conquered peoples.’’96 Subsequently, however, a German court convicted Fritzsche and
sentenced him to nine years’ forced labor.97 The conviction was upheld by the court of
appeals, which found that although Fritzsche had not directly called for the
persecution or extermination of the Jewish people, he had nonetheless contributed
in a significant way to the creation of an atmosphere among the German people that
favored such persecution and extermination.98 The German court thus recognized that
Fritzsche’s hate speech was an integral part and, indeed, a supporting pillar of the
Nazis’ system of persecution.
The Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide prepared
by the UN Secretariat in 1947 also included an article criminalizing ‘‘[a]ll forms of
public propaganda tending by their systematic and hateful character to provoke
genocide, or tending to make it appear as a necessary, legitimate or excusable act.’’99
Hate propaganda was considered punishable where it was ‘‘charged with hatred’’ and
‘‘systematic, that is to say, repeated methodically,’’ as well as public.100 Comments
made by delegates during the Sixteenth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, which
had been established by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to prepare a
draft genocide convention taking into consideration, inter alia, the Secretariat’s draft
convention, confirm this view.101 In arguing in favor of the criminalization of such
propaganda, delegates appear to have been motivated by the need to prevent
widespread and systematic propaganda of the kind employed by Nazi Germany.102
These characteristics of propaganda closely correspond to the chapeau requirement
of crimes against humanity that the acts committed be part of a ‘‘widespread
or systematic attack,’’ the public nature of hate propaganda rendering it likely to be
widespread.
During the subsequent debates in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly,
remarks by the Polish delegate arguing in favor of the incitement provision indicate
that he viewed such incitement as a form of persecution:
[H]ow could protection against incitement to genocide be denied to certain groups,
particularly in view of the fact that the groups to be protected by the convention were
for the most part extremely weak and helpless to defend themselves against their
persecutors?103
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Various other representatives also insisted on the dangers of propaganda and the need
to penalize it.104 Nonetheless, the Soviet amendment was decisively rejected,105 and
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as finally
adopted did not contain a provision criminalizing hate propaganda.
That hate propaganda can amount to persecution was explicitly recognized in the
Jud Süß Case, which in 1949 came before the Oberster Gerichtshof für die Britische
Zone, the predecessor of the German Supreme Court. The accused was a well-known
film director who had frequently been given special tasks by the Goebbels as minister
for propaganda.106 He was, moreover, the co-author and director of the film Jud Süß,
and in that capacity was charged with having committed a crime against humanity.
The Court characterized the film as a ‘‘judenfeindlicher Hetzfilm,’’ that is, an antiSemitic film the purpose of which was to stir up hatred.107 It held that one of the
hallmarks of the crime against humanity of persecution is that any particular act
constituting persecution is an integral part of the general persecution.108 It was
sufficient that the film aggravated the persecution of Jewish people in Germany for it
to be seen as having caused their mistreatment. It therefore amounted to persecution
as a crime against humanity. The damage or harm of the film lay in the fact that, first,
it further denigrated the Jewish people in the opinion of the public, thereby
fundamentally infringing their human rights; and, second, it incited others to
commit their own acts of persecution or, at least, to acquiesce in persecutory acts.109
Moreover, it was clear that the act of the accused—that is, the production of the film—
consciously created one of the means of persecution that the Nazi regime made
systematic use of.110 According to the Court, the ‘‘Mitursächlichkeit des Films für die
Judenverfolgung durch hetzerische Beeinflussung der öffentlichen Meinung im
judenfeindlichen Sinne als einer wichtigen Grundlage der Verfolgung und
Schädigung der Juden’’111 was clear.112 The Oberste Gerichtshof recognized and
emphasized that it was the general persecution, involving massive and relentless
state-organized propaganda, as well as the repression of the opinions of those
who thought differently, that was successful and, indeed, necessary to effect the
conditioning of the Germans, to turn them against their Jewish fellow citizens, and to
prevent any empathetic identification with the victims’ fate.113 The Court thus
underlined the crucial role of hate speech in making possible the persecutory measures
that followed. Indeed, hate speech is indispensable for the realization of other
persecutory acts: this is why hate speech must accompany other persecutory acts and
is usually accompanied by other persecutory acts.
More than fifty years later, in 2003, the ICTR confirmed in Nahimana et al. that
incitement to hatred can be a form of persecution.114 The three accused in that case all
held leading positions in the Rwandan media before and during the genocide of 1994.
Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza were co-founders of the notorious
Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), and Barayagwiza was also a
founding member of the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) party, while
Hassan Ngeze, a journalist, was the founder and editor-in-chief of the newspaper
Kangura and also a founding member of the CDR party. The ICTR Trial Chamber
found that ‘‘hate speech targeting a population on the basis of ethnicity, or other
discriminatory grounds,’’ reaches the same level of gravity as the other acts that
constitute crimes against humanity, and therefore amounts to persecution.115
The Trial Chamber specifically pointed out that hate speech ‘‘destroys the dignity of
those in the group under attack’’ and emphasized that it can cause ‘‘irreversible
harm.’’116 It distinguished hate speech as persecution from incitement, explaining that
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persecution ‘‘is defined also in terms of impact,’’ and ‘‘is not a provocation to cause
harm,’’ but ‘‘is itself the harm.’’117 This definition corresponds to that expounded above,
that hate speech as such is harmful, in that it represents an attack on someone’s
dignity and humiliates the victims, and that its evil therefore does not depend on its
potential to spark off acts of physical violence. The Trial Chamber explained further
that the writings of Kangura and the broadcasts of RTLM ‘‘condition[ed] the Hutu
population and creat[ed] a climate of harm,’’ thereby giving birth to ‘‘the conditions for
extermination and genocide in Rwanda.’’118 Moreover, it held that ‘‘persecution is
broader than direct and public incitement, including advocacy of ethnic hatred in other
forms.’’119 Here the Trial Chamber thus went a step further than it did in Ruggiu,
where it found that incitement to genocide constituted persecution. As an example
of hate speech amounting to persecution, the judgment mentions the Kangura article
‘‘A Cockroach Cannot Give Birth to a Butterfly,’’120 which reads in part:
A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach. [. . .] A Tutsi is someone who has a sweet
tongue but whose wickedness is indescribable. A Tutsi is someone whose desire for
revenge is insatiable; someone who is unpredictable, someone who laughs whereas he is
suffering. In our language, a Tutsi is called cockroach because he takes advantage of the
night to achieve his objectives. The word Inyenzi is a reminder of the redoubtable snake
whose venom is extremely poisonous.121

The Trial Chamber’s findings were recently largely upheld by the ICTR Appeals
Chamber, which found that hate speech directed against a group and inspired by
discriminatory motives—whether on the basis of ethnicity or any other basis—violates
the right to respect for the human dignity of the members of the group and thus
constitutes discrimination in fact.122 The Appeals Chamber opined that it is not
necessary to decide whether hate speech that does not incite violence against members
of an ethnic group is in itself of a gravity equivalent to that of other crimes against
humanity.123 It emphasized that each underlying act of persecution need not be of a
gravity equal to that of other crimes against humanity, because the underlying
persecutory acts can be considered together; the cumulative effect of all the underlying
persecutory acts must to be of equal gravity as the other crimes against humanity.124
Furthermore, the context in which the underlying acts were committed is ‘‘particularly
important’’ in determining their gravity.125 The Appeals Chamber thus correctly and
significantly stressed the importance of context and the need to consider all
persecutory and discriminatory acts in their entirety and to look at their cumulative
effect. It found that the hate speech disseminated in Rwanda after 6 April 1994 was
accompanied by calls for genocide of the Tutsi ethnic group and that all the incitement
to hatred took place in the context of an extensive campaign of persecution directed
against the Tutsi population, which was also characterized by acts of violence and
destruction of property.126 Considered in this context, the hate speech was of a gravity
equal to that of other crimes against humanity.
The Supreme Court of Canada has also held that hate speech can amount to the
crime against humanity of persecution. In Mugesera v. Canada,127 the Supreme Court
had to decide whether to reinstate a deportation order against an active member of a
radical Hutu party who in 1993 had successfully applied for permanent residence in
Canada. The deportation order had been issued under s. 27 of the Immigration Act on
the basis of a speech Mugesera had given in Rwanda in 1992, and with which,
Canada’s minister of citizenship and immigration had decided, he had incited murder,
genocide, and hatred, thereby committing a crime against humanity. Section 27 of the
Immigration Act provides for the removal after admission of a permanent resident who
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‘‘is a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)’’;128 Section 19(1)(j)
of the same act provides that no one is to be granted admission with regard to whom
there are ‘‘reasonable grounds to believe’’ that he or she has ‘‘committed an act or
omission outside Canada that constituted a war crime or a crime against humanity
within the meaning of subsection 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code and that, if it had been
committed in Canada, would have constituted an offence against the laws of Canada.’’
The Court held that the deportation order had been valid and should be reinstated.129
Defining the elements of the crime of incitement to hatred, laid down in s. 319 of
the Criminal Code of Canada, the Supreme Court held that ‘‘wilful promotion of
hatred’’ required that the accused ‘‘[have] had as a conscious purpose the promotion
of hatred against the identifiable group, or [that] he or she foresaw that the promotion
of hatred against that group was certain to result and nevertheless communicated the
statements.’’130 Moreover, the speaker had to ‘‘desire that the message stir up hatred,’’
even though it need not be proven that the statements actually resulted in the stirring
up of hatred.131 With respect to the actus reus, the Court found that ‘‘hatred’’
refers to ‘‘emotion of an intense and extreme nature that is clearly associated
with vilification and detestation,’’132 while ‘‘promoting’’ is equivalent to ‘‘actively
support[ing] or instigat[ing]’’ and requires ‘‘[m]ore than mere encouragement.’’133
In order to determine whether or not Mugesera’s statement expressed hatred, the
Court considered ‘‘the understanding of a reasonable person in the context,’’134 that is,
‘‘the speech’s audience and [. . .] its social and historical context.’’135 The Court then
turned to consider the elements of crimes against humanity.136
Finally, the Court turned to the question of whether incitement of hatred could
amount to a crime against humanity, and specifically persecution. Finding that ‘‘the
criminal act of persecution is the gross or blatant denial of a fundamental right on
discriminatory grounds,’’137 the Court discussed ICTR and ICTY case law, finding that
the ICTR’s holding in Ruggiu suggests that ‘‘hate speech always denies fundamental
rights’’ and that ‘‘[t]he equality and the life, liberty and security of the person of targetgroup members cannot but be affected.’’138 The Court reasoned that in certain cases,
such denial of fundamental rights may be of a gravity equal to that of the other acts
enumerated as crimes against humanity.139 Applying this reasoning to the particular
case at hand, the Court concluded,
A speech such as Mr. Mugesera’s, which actively encouraged ethnic hatred, murder and
extermination and which created in its audience a sense of imminent threat and the
need to act violently against an ethnic minority and against political opponents, bears
the hallmarks of a gross or blatant act of discrimination equivalent in severity to the
other underlying acts [. . .]. The criminal act requirement for persecution is therefore
met.140

Having found that at the time of Mugesera’s speech a systematic attack directed
against Tutsi and moderate Hutu was taking place in Rwanda, that the speech was
directed against those groups, and that ‘‘[a] persecutory speech which encourages
hatred and violence against a targeted group furthers an attack against that group,’’
the Court held that the speech ‘‘not only objectively furthered the attack, but also fit
into a pattern of abuse prevailing at that time,’’ and consequently was part of ‘‘a
systematic attack directed against a civilian population that was occurring in Rwanda
at the time.’’141
In denying the human rights of the target group—particularly the right to be free
from discrimination and the right to respect for one’s human dignity—hate speech is
particularly suited to be regarded as the crime against humanity of persecution,
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provided that it is systematic and is steered by the government or a similarly powerful
organization. Hate propaganda supports and furthers a climate in which the
commission of violent acts against the victim community is regarded as acceptable
and even necessary, thus encouraging any widespread or systematic attack directed
against the victim group.
This conclusion is reinforced by the considerations developed above with respect to
freedom of speech concerns, where it was submitted that only the most aggravated and
truly dangerous hate speech should be regarded as a crime under international law.
There are valid reasons for allowing hate speech up to a certain level of gravity.
It could be argued, for example, that those who engage in hate speech largely end up
discrediting themselves if they are allowed to do so in public. However, whether or not
this is the case depends to a considerable extent on the surrounding circumstances and
the context in which the hate speech is uttered, that is, the overall state and the
generally accepted particular morality prevalent in the society in question, as well as
on the identity of the speaker. Where the underlying morality generally accepted by
the majority of a society is characterized by tolerance, civic courage, and philanthropy,
then any racist or xenophobic speech will of course be broadly received with
expressions of disgust and disbelief and will not be taken seriously; in such a case,
publicly disseminated hate speech will indeed discredit those who engage in it.142
On the other hand, where a society is out of balance and characterized by a particular
morality marked by homophobia, racism, or ethnic or religious hatred and antagonism,
hate speech is particularly dangerous, and the humiliation of members of the victim
group, as well as the injury to their dignity, is particularly grave. Their vulnerability,
in such a situation, is immense. Such a moral climate is generally the product of
systematic persecution covering all areas of social and private life, directed against a
specific group and organized by the leadership of the state or by a similar state-like
organization. In order to prevent such systematic persecution, as well as worse
victimization, of specific groups—up to and including genocide— it is necessary to
criminalize hate propaganda organized by a state or by a similarly powerful non-state
actor, in a systematic manner, as part of a concerted system of persecution involving a
large variety of exclusionary measures. Aside from incitement to hatred, these include,
inter alia, discriminatory legislation, forcible expulsion, deprivation of citizenship, and
prohibition of intermarriage between members of the persecuted group and the rest of
the population.
In Nahimana, as indicated above, the ICTR Appeals Chamber conclusively upheld
the Trial Chamber’s most important findings on this point, confirming that hate
speech constitutes the denial of certain fundamental rights. The Appeals Chamber has
explicitly recognized that hate speech involves the denial of the right to respect for the
human dignity of the group under attack and constitutes discrimination in fact. It has
found that where hate speech occurs together with other underlying persecutory acts,
such as destruction of property and violence, and where, as a whole, their effect is
equally grave as other crimes against humanity, a conviction for persecution on the
basis of hate speech is appropriate.
In a number of cases, moreover, both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTY have explicitly found that persecution consists not only of acts of physical
violence but also, for instance, of such acts as destruction of property and enactment of
discriminatory laws.143 Importantly, the persecutory measures imposed and executed
by such criminal regimes typically also involve a concerted attack on the right to
freedom of speech. This fact was explicitly recognized by the Oberster Gerichtshof für
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die Britische Zone, the same German court that convicted the director of the film Jud
Süß. The Court found that the violent repression of political speech and attacks
against members of a particular political party, in this case members of the Social
Democratic Party, which opposed Hitler—effectively, acts of persecution directed
against members of a political group—denied their most basic and natural human
rights and amounted to crimes against humanity.144 The post–World War II
jurisprudence therefore recognizes the central role that suppression of freedom of
opinion and expression played in the Nazi system of terror and persecution. The denial
of the right to express opinions hostile to the Nazi regime was intrinsic to the
persecution, which in itself, of course, represented the expulsion of undesirable
‘‘others’’ from German society. Similarly, the Court found in the Case against L. et al.
that a dishonorable pillorying or exhibition of victims was dehumanizing and
amounted to a crime against humanity.145 The accused, members of the
Sturmabteilung (SA) or ‘‘Brownshirts,’’ forced a member of the Social Democratic
Party and a Jewish member of the community to take part in an SA procession, during
which they forced their victims to wear plates around their necks bearing dishonorable
inscriptions (including the word ‘‘Schieber’’—‘‘grafter’’ or ‘‘profiteer’’) and to be driven
around in a pig-cart.146 These actions were part of a systematic persecution of Jewish
people that had found its general expression in a boycott of Jewish stores in April
1933.147 It was typical of this persecution, which was executed through a system of
lawlessness, arbitrariness, and violence, that the victims had no recourse to effective
legal protection and were helpless to prevent what was in store for them.148 One of the
purposes of the system was to disseminate fear and terror, thereby suppressing all
indications of resistance against National Socialism wherever they arose, as well as to
render impossible any freedom of expression and thus to uphold the pretense of unified
approval on the part of the German people.149 Here the Court’s judgment underscores
the fact that suppression of freedom of opinion is typically also part of a system of
persecution—this is important, and it indicates where the real dangers of illegitimate
restrictions of freedom of expression lie. It also reveals the vital importance of freedom
of expression. Illegitimate limitations of freedom of expression can themselves involve
a violation of human dignity.
Systematic, persecutory hate speech is clearly harmful, as it is an inherent part of
the persecutory policy, supporting, justifying, and furthering any other persecutory
measures that the regime in question may be pursuing vis-à-vis the victim group. It is
intrinsically harmful because it serves to further degrade and humiliate individuals
who are subject to various other acts of exclusion and dehumanization, including laws
depriving them of their citizenship and denying them access to various professions;
expropriation of their property; and forced expulsion or being compelled them to live in
ghettos, separate from other members of the wider community—all of which measures
suggest to them that they are less valuable than the rest of the community and
that the community needs to be protected from their harmful influence. Moreover, the
primary underlying purpose of the right to freedom of speech is to protect
the individual against repression by the state. In the type of case that the approach
advocated here purports to address, it is the state or a state-like organization which
itself engages in incitement to hatred.
Nor is such hate speech in any way conducive to discovery of the truth. In the cases
envisaged here, the marketplace of ideas has been destroyed by the state itself—
freedom of expression is suppressed at the same time that hatred against the
persecuted group is being stirred up. Furthermore, because only the most vicious and
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organized hate speech would be criminalized, the danger that such criminalization
could lead to abuse as a result of vague language or a too broad interpretation is very
slim indeed.

Conclusion
History shows that hate speech typically precedes public incitement to violence and
specific criminal acts, including genocide. All are part of and support an organized
system of persecution that includes a variety of measures. The instigation of and
specific calls for criminal acts, such as genocide, is not likely to be successful unless a
climate of violence has first been created by means of hate speech.
Such a climate is achieved primarily through the demonization and dehumanization of opponents, which invariably involves a violation of their human dignity through
a process of humiliation equivalent to the victim group’s expulsion from the human
community. Vicious and systematic state-orchestrated hate speech and propaganda
must be criminalized, both because they violate human dignity, which in turn is closely
connected with an infringement of the victim group’s right to life, equality, and nondiscrimination, and because of the inherent danger grounded in hate speech’s crucial
position on the ‘‘continuum of destruction.’’ Hate speech is an integral and crucial part
of any persecutory process; it plays its part through the psychological conditioning of
the perpetrators.
I have argued here that criminalization of incitement to hatred is best achieved by
treating it as the crime against humanity of persecution. Dealing with it in such a way
would also answer concerns about freedom of speech, because incitement to hatred
would amount to persecution only if the other requirements of crimes against
humanity are fulfilled—in particular, that the words in question be part of a
‘‘widespread or systematic attack.’’ Hate speech that is less grave and that does not
occur in the context of a widespread or systematic attack cannot be considered to
amount to persecution and can therefore be dealt with only by means of a prohibition
under international human-rights law.
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The Greek Relief Committee: America’s
Response to the Greek Genocide
(A Research Note)
Nikolaos Hlamides
London, UK
In studies of the various relief efforts launched in response to the fate of Ottoman
Christian minorities in the early twentieth century, much attention is given to the
American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief and, in particular, to its
successors under different names, especially the Near East Relief. The role of other
American-based aid organizations has been largely overlooked. This paper serves
as an introduction to the Greek Relief Committee, a New York City–based
organization that worked alongside other relief organizations from 1917 until
1921, administering aid to the Ottoman Greek population.
Keywords: relief organization, Greek Genocide, American philanthropy
The Relief Committee for Greeks of Asia Minor, or Greek Relief Committee (GRC),
was an American relief organization formed during World War I in response to
the genocide of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire. Its principal aim was to alleviate the
suffering of the Ottoman Greek minority. From 1917 until July 1921, this New York–
based organization functioned alongside the American Committee for Armenian and
Syrian Relief (ACASR)—which in 1918 was renamed the American Committee for
Relief in the Near East (ACRNE) and eventually adopted the name Near East Relief
(NER)—in distributing aid to the Greek and other Christian minorities of Ottoman
Turkey. The GRC, ‘‘organized for non-political and purely humanitarian purposes,’’
had offices at 1 Madison Avenue as well as at 1115 Broadway in New York.1
The GRC assisted Ottoman Greeks in Thrace and Asia Minor through centers of
relief established at various points.2 Foreign consuls, missionaries, and relief workers
were the distributors of relief on the ground.3 The committee used the same channels
as the ACASR, which remained open in spite of the war.4 Similarly, the committee
assisted refugees from Turkey in Greece and the islands through the American
Legation at Athens and the American Consulate at Salonika, in cooperation with the
various Greek organizations there.5
Until October 1917, the GRC had ‘‘been working quietly under difficult
circumstances without much publicity.’’6 The committee’s chairman was Frank
Watterson Jackson (1874–1955), an attorney and former American consul at Patras,
Greece. It was only in a 17 October 1917 statement that Jackson brought the fate of the
Ottoman Greeks to America’s attention:7
The story of the Greek deportation is not yet generally known.. . . There were some two
or three million Greeks in Asia Minor at the outbreak of the war in 1914, subject
to Turkish rule. According to the latest reliable and authoritative accounts some
seven to eight hundred thousand have been deported, mainly from the coast regions
into the interior of Asia Minor.. . . Along with the Armenians most of the Greeks of
the Marmora regions and Thrace have been deported on the pretext that they gave
Nikolaos Hlamides, ‘‘The Greek Relief Committee: America’s Response to the Greek Genocide,’’
Genocide Studies and Prevention 3, 3 (December 2008): 375–383. ! 2008 Genocide Studies and
Prevention. doi:10.3138/gsp.3.3.375
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information to the enemy. Along the Aegean coast Aivalik stands out as the worst
sufferer. According to one report some 70,000 Greeks have been deported towards
Konia and beyond. At least 7,000 have been slaughtered. The Greek Bishop of Aivalik
committed suicide in despair. The latest account from Trebizond shows the towns along
the Black [S]ea are being emptied of their Greek population. From Lyndon S. Crawford,
missionary of the American Board [of Commissioners for Foreign Missions] at
Trebizond, we have a letter dated July 24, 1917, in which he says the following
order came from Turkish army headquarters at Sheishehie [Sus" ehri]: ‘‘By 12/25 July let
no Greek man over 16 and under 50 be found in Ordou. Send all such on into the
interior. As for the families, we will send further orders later.’’ . . . From the Greek
minister to the United States, George Roussos, I have a letter, September 21, 1917, in
which he says: ‘‘. . . [The Turks] have decided to exterminate the Greek element which is
the most important and most numerous in Asia Minor. Under pretext of necessities of
war entire populations have been deported. Members of families have been separated.
The old, the men unfit for military service and the women were sent into the interior
of the country, abandoned without the slightest help and exposed to all sorts of
deprivations.. . .’’8

Jackson’s statement was published by a number of newspapers across the
country and abroad in an attempt to rally support for the organization.9 The range of
sources cited provides further documentary evidence and reinforces the value of the
statement. Taner Akçam affirms that ‘‘the deportation of the Greek population of the
Ayvalık region had been carried out on [General Liman] von Sanders’s orders, and a
great many people had died as a result.’’10 The deportation of Greeks from Ayvalık is
widely documented, and so no further qualification is necessary. However,
Crawford’s account, which includes a deportation order issued by Turkish army
headquarters, requires closer examination. The original letter can be found in
Harvard University’s American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
collection, and Jackson correctly quotes the Turkish order in his statement.11
Crawford’s letter, which was addressed to Dr. James L. Barton and copied to the
American consul at Trebizond, also describes Greeks and Armenians from more
westerly coastal towns fleeing Turkish massacres by traveling at night using caı̈ques
to reach safety in Russian-occupied Trebizond.12 At least two further factors
support or, rather, do not discredit the authenticity of the order. First, at the time
the Turkish Third Army was indeed headquartered at Sus" ehri, Sivas.13 Second,
the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople recorded that the deportation of
Greek communities in Ordou took place between October 1916 and September
1917.14 Furthermore, Crawford’s evidence may be judged reliable, despite his death
in 1918, in view of later accounts written by his wife, Olive N. Crawford, also a
missionary in Turkey, which describe in considerable detail the continued
deportation of Greeks.15
Professor the Reverend John P. Xenides (1875–1945) served as the GRC’s
secretary. Xenides was born in Caesarea, Turkey, and had first-hand experience of
the genocide, since he and his family had fled to the United States to escape the 1915
massacres.16 He had taught at Marsovan’s Anatolia College and Theological Seminary.
In a private letter to a colleague, dated 1 October 1917, the secretary of the GRC
underlined the increasing threat to the collective existence of the Ottoman Greeks:
‘‘According to American Consuls just returned from Turkey some 700,000 Greeks have
been deported which means ultimate extermination if the war continues long
enough.’’17
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Later, in a report titled ‘‘The Recent Greek Deportations and Other Atrocities
in Asia Minor,’’ Xenides offered his interpretation of deportation as a method
of destruction and its continued impact on the Greeks:
Deportation means gradual extermination of the people. The deportees are either killed
on the way or die through exposure, hunger, disease or exhaustion. For that matter,
at least 500,000 Greeks perished between the outbreak of the World War and
the Armistice. At present the Greeks in the Black Sea Region and other parts of Asia
Minor are undergoing this method of extermination.18

Professor Jacob Gould Schurman (1854–1942), president of Cornell University,
was appointed honorary chairman of the GRC. Schurman had previously served as US
ambassador to Greece in 1912–13. Basile D. Dugundji was vice-chairman, and
Abraham E. Kazan, uncle to the famous Greek-American film director and writer
Elia Kazan, was treasurer until Rollin P. Grant, president of the Irving National Bank
with headquarters in New York City, replaced him in November 1917. Together,
these people formed the Executive Committee of the GRC. There was also a Board
of Trustees numbering more than forty members (see Appendix A). They were a group
of distinguished gentlemen, and at least one woman, and included US ambassador
Henry Morgenthau as well as a number of university professors and other eminent
figures.
It was not unknown for genocide survivors who escaped Turkey and sought refuge
in the United States to join the GRC. Lazaros George Macrides of Trebizond (in Greek,
Trapezo0!; in Turkish, Trabzon) is one such example. Macrides was rescued from
Cotyora (in Greek, Kot0ora; in Turkish, Ordu or Ordou) on the Black Sea coast by a
Russian vessel, along with 2,000 other survivors, in August 1917.19 In a statement
made public by the American relief organizations, Macrides described some of the
practices used in the destruction of the Ottoman Greeks:
Those of us who were between the ages of 16 and 60 were drafted into the Turkish
Army. Our women and children and the older men were placed temporarily in homes
and orphanages until the opportunity offered to dispose of them in the approved
Turco-Teuton fashion, which in this instance turned out to be by wholesale drowning.
The unfortunate survivors of the deportation were towed out for several miles into the
Black Sea and then calmly dumped overboard, just like so much garbage. None of them
survived.20

Donations to the GRC came mainly from Greek sources; clergy, organizations, and
many individuals all contributed generously. Many Americans also gave both money
and service to the cause. Donations were used for relief in regions designated by the
GRC.21 Mass gatherings proved a useful tool for fundraising and to rally support for
the organization. The first gathering of this kind was held on 18 November 1917 in the
Amsterdam Opera House on West 44th Street in New York. At the meeting, Henry
Morgenthau, former US ambassador to Turkey, told of the treatment of Greeks,
Armenians, and other nationalities by the Turks and said that the death from
starvation of many in the Christian population, who had been deported and
maltreated, was inevitable unless relief was sent speedily. A Greek government
minister also spoke, commenting that the Turkish authorities had implemented a
general extermination of the Greeks of Asia Minor. Some $1,000 in cash was
subscribed, and several thousand more dollars pledged, at this meeting alone.22
In addition to organizing such meetings, the GRC also published leaflets and
booklets, such as Relief for Greeks of Asia Minor and The Tragedy of the Sea of
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Marmora, to draw attention to Greek suffering.23 In their publications, the GRC
frequently drew a parallel with the Ottoman Armenian experience, appealing to
America’s long-standing and steadfast sympathy for Armenians in the hope that
such philanthropy might also be extended toward the Greeks. The following passage is
a typical example of this policy:
The world was shocked with the horrors of Armenian atrocities. Now we hear similar
horrors meted out to the Greeks, the most numerous Christian element in Turkey.
They are being deported from the coast regions, where they used to live and prosper.
They have been deported in large numbers from their homes along the Black Sea coast,
the Marmera [Marmara] and the Aegean Sea, suffering and many of them dying from
hunger, exposure, hardships and resultant diseases. The world already knows from its
application to Armenians that deportation means slavery, untold suffering, exposure,
starvation and disease, thus gradual death. Massacres were more merciful as compared
with the tortures and horrors of deportation. The Greeks are not massacred at the same
rate as the Armenians, but they are forced to move on, move on to regions where no food
can be found. The route of their march is strewn with corpses. Deportation proves to be
more effective than massacres in making havoc and devastation, but it also gives better
opportunities to relief workers and those engaged in life saving. Missionaries and
other devoted kind-hearted people are on the spot able and ready to render relief to the
deportee. Would you not give a helping hand and send relief to these latest innocent
victims of oppression and tyranny.
Thousands have escaped with their lives from the Black Sea coast towns and villages
to Trebizond, now in Russian hands. American Consuls and missionaries are ready to
render relief to these refugees. Would you not help to make the relief possible?
A quarter of a million of Greek refugees have escaped from Turkey to Greece proper,
where they are practically homeless and in urgent need of food and clothes. Scores are
dying daily of insufficient food and resultant diseases, especially women and children
are in a terrible plight. The Relief Committee for Greeks of Asia Minor, 1 Madison
Avenue, endeavors to raise funds for these sufferers.24

The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief had been formed in 1915
in response to the massacres and deportations of Armenians. Its name suggests that
the organization was principally concerned with the Armenians and Syrians. Talcott
Williams, a member of ACASR and also later a member of the GRC, asserted that ‘‘the
need of relief for the suffering Greeks is as urgent as for the Armenians and Syrians.’’25
The obvious question is, Why were the Greeks apparently excluded? In practice, they
were not. ACASR fundraising, educational, and other documents indicate that this
organization did engage in relief for Ottoman Greeks. However, the absence of the
word ‘‘Greek’’ in its title may certainly have prompted the creation of a committee
that unmistakably spoke for the Greeks, namely the Relief Committee for Greeks
of Asia Minor. ACASR eventually became the Near East Relief (NER), an organization
of greater scope. According to that organization, ‘‘Armenian suffering in Turkey is
paralleled, with certain modifications by the experiences of the Greeks.’’26
In Story of the Near East Relief, James L. Barton, NER chairman, refers to the
GRC as a ‘‘co-operating’’ committee.27 In fact, the GRC and the NER were intertwined
in several ways. To start with, they shared offices at 1 Madison Avenue. A number of
members served on both committees, including Henry Morgenthau. Chairman Jackson
and at least six other members of the GRC were appointed trustees of the NER in
the 6 August 1919 act of Congress that formally incorporated the organization.28
Finally, there existed a financial relationship between the two organizations, in that
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any contribution made to the GRC was doubled by the NER. In total, the NER
contributed $250,000 to the GRC. Thus, $500,000—several million dollars by today’s
standards—was spent for the relief of Greeks in the Ottoman Empire by the GRC.29
At the same time, the NER was also heavily engaged in relief work that included
Ottoman Greeks—as is emphasized by how heavily the word ‘‘Greece’’ featured on
NER fundraising posters and in other documents. Given the intimate relationship
between the two organizations, it is all the more remarkable that not even scant
references to the Relief Committee for Greeks of Asia Minor exist in the works of those
who have studied and written about the relief efforts in Turkey.
In terms of both mission and operation, it is true that the GRC was a much smaller
organization than the NER. Nonetheless, it had strong support from outside the
Greek-American community. President Woodrow Wilson sympathized with the plight
of the Ottoman Greeks and supported the relief movement:
I am in hearty sympathy with every just effort being made by the people of the United
States to alleviate the terrible sufferings of the Greeks of Asia Minor. None have
suffered more or more unjustly than they. . . . I warmly commend the efforts being made
by the Relief Committee for Greeks of Asia Minor, to relieve the suffering Greeks of that
country, and I bespeak for it the hearty and continued support of the Greeks and all
lovers of Greece in America.30

Others who expressed their support or gratitude included the Ecumenical Patriarch of
Constantinople, various bishops, and leading Greeks in both Greece and Turkey.31
On 8 December 1919, the Royal Order of George I was bestowed upon six
members of the GRC on behalf of King Alexander of Greece by George Roussos,
Greece’s ambassador to the United States. The recipients were GRC chairman Frank
W. Jackson; treasurer Rollin P. Grant; Dr. Hamilton Holt, editor of the Independent;
Dr. Frederick H. Lynch, editor of Christian Work; Prof. Alfred D.F. Hamlin of
Columbia University; and Rev. Herbert F. Laflamme of the Interchurch Movement.
Through this decoration the Greek government officially expressed its appreciation
for the work of the GRC.32
In July 1921 the Relief Committee for Greeks of Asia Minor ceased to exist.
It handed over its work to the NER, which actively continued the Greek relief effort for
several more years. The circumstances in which the GRC came to an end are unclear.
One speculation is that the inclusive and increasingly encompassing nature of the
larger NER organization now made unnecessary the existence of two committees
whose operations were overlapping. After all, by its own admission, the NER had now
become ‘‘a non-denominational Christian organization . . . ministering to the desperate
needs of the Armenians, Greeks, Syrians and others, victims of the Great War,
in Turkey and nearby regions.’’33 However, further research must be completed before
we can establish what brought about the end of the GRC.34
In any case, this was not to be the end of cooperation between the NER and Greekorientated relief organizations. To name only one example, in the post-Genocide
period, when there was an effort to keep alive hundreds of thousands of refugees,
orphans, and other survivors, American Friends of Greece, Inc. (AFG), was formed
‘‘for aid to Greece and the refugees of the Near East.’’35 The NER’s Cleveland Dodge,
Charles Vickrey, Barclay Acheson, and John Finley, along with many of the
other leading officers of the NER, were all active members or officers of AFG, an
organization that saved countless Greek and Armenian lives.36
The work of the Relief Committee for Greeks of Asia Minor is an important chapter
in the history of both the Ottoman Greek Genocide and American philanthropy.
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Unfortunately, material pertaining to the GRC is not housed in one central depository
but is dispersed in different archives—personal, organizational, and governmental—
throughout the United States. The same is true for a fair amount of material
pertaining to the NER. Therefore, much work remains for researchers interested in
constructing a more complete picture of the GRC’s work in saving Greek lives during
the final years of the Ottoman Empire.
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Appendix A: Greek Relief Committee Board Members
Executive Committee:
Chairman: Frank W. Jackson!
Honorary Chairman: Jacob Gould Schurman
Vice-Chairman: Basile D. Dugundji
Secretary: John P. Xenides!
Treasurer: Abraham E. Kazan (resigned November 1917), Rollin P. Grant

Board of Trustees:
Mr. Nicholas P. Antoniades, merchant
Mr. Michael B. Atheneos
Mr. Athanasios D. Barouxakis, merchant
Rev. Prof. Hugh Black, Professor of Practical Theology, Union Theological Seminary
Rev. Dr. Robert G. Boville, Baptist clergyman, founder and director of the Daily
Vacation Bible School movement
Rev. Dr. Arthur J. Brown,! secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions
Prof. Howard Crosby Butler, Professor of the History of Architecture, Princeton
University
Rev. Prof. Demetrios Panos Callimachos, journalist, priest, author, professor, and
editor of the National Herald
C. Carusos
N. Cindaxopoulos
Dr. Sophocles Dadakis, physician, president of the Pan-Hellenic Union
Prof. Raphael S. Demos, Harvard University
Dr. Samuel Train Dutton,! secretary of the American Committee for Armenian and
Syrian Relief
Prof. Henry Pratt Fairchild, American sociologist
Prof. Alfred Dwight Foster Hamlin, Professor of the History of Architecture, Columbia
University
Dr. William I. Haven,! general secretary of the American Bible Society
Dr. Hamilton Holt, editor of the Independent
Mr. Abraham E. Kazan, pioneer organizer of housing cooperatives in the United States
Eurypides Kehaya
Rev. Herbert F. Laflamme, Interchurch Movement
Dr. Walter Laidlaw, Federation of the Churches
Prof. Abby Leach, Vassar College
Mr. Michael Litsas, merchant
Mr. B.A. Livieratos
Mr. C.D. Logothetis
Dr. Frederick Henry Lynch,! editor of Christian Work
Mr. Nicholas E. Marcoglou, merchant
Mr. Henry Morgenthau,! former US ambassador to Turkey
Mr. George D. Nicholas
Dr. Frank Mason North,! minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church
Mr. Theodore Photiades, merchant
Prof. Aristides Phoutrides, Harvard University
Mr. John C. Pialoglou, tobacco merchant
Prof. Chandler Post, Harvard University
Mr. John N. Poulides, tobacco merchant
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Prof. Theodore Leslie Shear, Professor of Classical Archeology, Princeton University
Prof. John Gabriel Stateropoulos, Professor of Chemistry, Columbia University
Mr. John D. Stephanides, lawyer
Petros P. Tatanis, publisher of the National Herald
M. Theodoropoulos
Dr. George William Tupper
Rev. Dr. William H. Van Allen, rector, Church of the Advent, Boston
Dr. Talcott Williams!, Turkish-born journalist
!

Also connected with the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief
and/or its various successors.

Appendix B: Sample Archival Document
To encourage researchers to explore GRC material and to illustrate the type of
material available from the perspective of documentation of the Greek Genocide,
I append the following document. This telegram was written in 1918 and sent from
Athens to GRC headquarters in New York City:
According to the testimony of Mohammedan prisoners of war in Salonica made to the
Entent [Entente] authorities there, the Greeks in Turkey are undergoing the worst
blow since the fall of Constantinople. This takes place in a threeforld [threefold] way.
First, in General Moblization [Mobilization]. Second, Commandeering. Third,
Deportation. Since the beginning of the war to the end of 1917 these Mohammedan
prisoners state that more than two hundred thousand Greeks between the ages of
fifteen and forty eight have been drafted into the Turkish army. Thousands of these
have died as a result of ill treatment, hunger and epidemics. More than five hundred
thousand Greeks have been deported from Thrace into Asia Minor. With the exception
of the Greek population of Smyrna, Constantinople and a few other towns, all the
Greeks underwent untold suffering, exile, tortures and epidemics. Many were
slaughtered in the interior of Asia Minor, and the survivors are in a terrible plight.
Women are sold as slaves, men are forced to become Mohammedans and the Military
officials declare openly everywhere that no Greek will be allowed to live in Turkey
unless he becomes a Mohammedan. The property confiscated from the Greeks is worth
five billions. Many of these Mohammedan prisoners relate that they saw with their own
eyes men from Aivali and many other large cities who were working as slaves in rags
and begging for a piece of bread. They say Smyrna is melting like wax. There are from
forty to fifty deaths daily among the Greeks as a result of hunger, weakness and
epidemics. Two hundred families have been deported from Tatavla in Constantinople.
The streets in larger cities are full of Greek orphans, half naked begging for bread in
spite of the fact that the Turkish authorities tear them from the bosoms of their parents
and circumcise them.37

Incidentally, the deportation of Greek families from Tatavla (in Greek, Tataú!a; in
Turkish, Kurtulus" ) is an important assertion, because for some considerable time we
have been led to believe that the Greeks and Armenians of Constantinople were not
subjected to the perils of deportation.38 Only in recent years has a corrective been
provided.39 Of course, the 24 April 1915 arrest and deportation of Armenian
intellectuals has always been widely known—unlike its precursor, the 8 March 1915
arrest and deportation of 200 Greeks from the same city.40
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Book Review
Helena Cobban, Amnesty after Atrocity? Healing Nations after
Genocide and War. Boulder CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007. Pp. 284,
paper. $26.95 US.
Reviewed by Helen Fein, Institute for the Study of Genocide

Helena Cobban’s Amnesty after Atrocity? offers an exposition of the different ways in
which three African states—Rwanda, South Africa, and Mozambique—have responded
to crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide and criticizes the prescriptions
previously made by international human-rights groups as to the need for prosecution
and judgment. Written in a lively style (Cobban is a reporter for the Christian Science
Monitor), each chapter begins with quotations from people on the scene and often
returns to the judgments of local people.
The book forms a chapter in the international debate about judgment and
reconciliation. Cobban concludes that the emphasis on prosecution and ‘‘meta-tasks’’
prescribed by Martha Minow1 are wrong, and offers an alternative list that focuses on
reconciliation. Her case is fortified by the relative stability of South Africa and
Mozambique and the continuing tension and repression in Rwanda.
Amnesty after Atrocity? covers the historical background of atrocities in each
country before the exposition and judgment. In brief, after the triumph of the Tutsidominated Rwanda Patriotic Front ended the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda,
the new government resorted to mass indictments of alleged perpetrators—more than
100,000 in all—some of whom were also prosecuted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, with which the new Rwandan
government did not cooperate. Rwandan efforts to separate and judge proved
untenable; they were later revised by sifting the gravity of allegations, and the
country began a process called gacaca, taking the name of a traditional process for
settling grievances.
In South Africa, a long negotiation between the African National Congress and the
nationalist government of the apartheid Union of South Africa led to a relatively
nonviolent transition, followed by the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission that offered an opportunity for amnesty by public confession.
Mozambique is the most distinctive case, in that the conflict between the political
parties FRELIMO and RENAMO had no ethnic dimension. The soldiers of both sides
greeted each other as brothers, and often they were in fact brothers or cousins. The two
sides immediately agreed on an amnesty; the people were sick of war and eager to start
a new life. Had there been trials, everyone would have had to be tried; there were no
guiltless judges. Religious rituals of precolonial origin were used by local healers to
purge the violence they ascribed to war itself.
Because of the distinctiveness of the conflict in Mozambique, it seems dubious to
me to suggest its resolution, as Cobban does, as a positive model for other conflicts.
However, Cobban makes many good points about the inadequacy of the contemporary
model advocated by Minow and others: the cost of trials; the frequent inability to
distinguish between victims, accomplices, and perpetrators; and the lack of
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relationship between the demands of abstract justice and the needs of people mired in
poverty. She especially criticizes the ICTR, which has been noted for incompetence,
expense, and corruption.
Cobban’s book includes useful tables and a list of acronyms. There are points that
could be reconsidered, and sources that were not used, including the extent of early
warnings of genocide in Rwanda, which was greater than she implies—the works of
Roméo Dallaire and Alison Des Forges, among others, on Rwanda are omitted—and
the distinctive problems created by genocide. The structure of post-war relations
between ge´nocidaires and victims in Rwanda is distinctive, because the numbers who
must coexist present a singular problem that cannot be solved by calls for justice or for
reconciliation. Cobban does cite local people who prefer to change the course of the
future rather than to punish offenders for the past with conviction. Her observations
on how the current leadership has created an ideology to justify authoritarianism in
Rwanda are well founded.
Amnesty after Atrocity? will be an enduring contribution to the literature on
coexistence and the punishment of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Note
1.

Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and
Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).
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